PRESS BRIEFING BY EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF UNSCOM

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF UNSCOM

Richard Butler, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission which was established by Security Council resolution 687 (1991) in connection with the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (UNSCOM), addressed correspondents and responded to questions during today's press briefing at Headquarters.

Mr. Butler said he would have to be brief because he had a prior engagement. He wanted to say a few words about the Memorandum of Understanding, signed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz over the weekend, and would then mention a matter that had come up in the media in Baghdad.

He said he would make four points regarding the Memorandum. First, the text had been created at a very high political level. Any reading of the Memorandum must take that fact into consideration. Second, the text reaffirmed and reiterated high-level political commitment to the fact that UNSCOM must have immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites in Iraq for the purpose of carrying out its mandate.

The third point was that he welcomed the Memorandum, Mr. Butler continued. He viewed it as strengthening UNSCOM's ability to conduct its work in Iraq. The text contained provisions ensuring UNSCOM's access to eight presidential sites within Iraq. The arrangements for access, set forth principally in paragraph 4* of the text, had been the subject of some misunderstanding and

__________ * "The United Nations and the Government of Iraq agree that the following special procedures shall apply to the initial and subsequent entries for the performance of the tasks mandated at the eight Presidential Sites in Iraq as defined in the annex to the present Memorandum:

"(a) A Special Group shall be established for this purpose by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This Group shall comprise senior diplomats appointed by the Secretary-General and experts drawn from UNSCOM and IAEA. The Group shall be headed by a Commissioner appointed by the Secretary-General.

"(b) In carrying out its work, the Special Group shall operate under the established procedures of UNSCOM and IAEA, and specific detailed procedures which will be developed given the special nature of the Presidential Sites, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

"(c) The report of the Special Group on its activities and findings shall be submitted by the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to the Security Council through the Secretary-General."

misrepresentation. However, as his fourth point, he stressed that the arrangements were entirely satisfactory to him and to the Commission. They provided access to presidential sites in Iraq. Those sites had been accurately described through the work of the United Nations mapping team, and presented yesterday to the Security Council.

A special inspection group would be established for those sites, which would be led by an UNSCOM inspector, he said. Diplomatic observers would be added to the inspection teams to address the concerns expressed by Iraqi authorities -- and acknowledged by Security Council members -- regarding the dignity of those sites. He welcomed the appointment of a new Commissioner, who would have particular responsibility for the inspection of those sites.

With respect to reporting and scientific analysis responsibilities arising from the inspection of those sites, he said the analysis would be carried out by UNSCOM and the new Commissioner would report to him. Mr. Butler would, as usual, report to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. The lines of authority and reporting were clear and entirely satisfactory. The Memorandum was a positive additional resource for UNSCOM, which enabled it to do its work within designated sites in Iraq.

Mr. Butler said he was aware of reports that said that the Memorandum had weakened UNSCOM, but he disagreed. Some had gone further to say it was the beginning of the end of UNSCOM. To that, he recalled that when writer Mark Twain had been told of reports of his own death, he had responded that "they were somewhat exaggerated".

The Memorandum was a strong agreement, he said. It should not be evaluated so much by the fine print -- although that held up to examination -- but by the "thumbprints" on it, which were those of the Secretary-General and the President of Iraq. He looked forward to implementing the agreement as soon as possible, and to testing in practice what was written on paper. He earnestly hoped Iraq would provide the full cooperation it had pledged in the agreement, and that the disarmament portion of the Special Commission's work in Iraq could be completed soon, so that all that remained was the long-term monitoring.

He then turned to reports from Baghdad of comments made by a United Nations official regarding the conduct of helicopter crews provided by the Government of Chile. He said he regretted that those comments had been made. They were not factual and had not been authorized. He had received an apology for those remarks. While he had not required that apology, he had welcomed it. The work done for the Commission by the 40 Chilean Air Force personnel who flew the Commission's helicopters was simply outstanding. The crew was made of diligent and courageous young men; they were indispensable to the work done in Iraq. He reiterated his deep gratitude to the Government of Chile for making those personnel available.

UNSCOM Briefing - 3 - 26 February 1998

A correspondent asked when the Security Council would adopt a resolution or issue a presidential statement on the Memorandum. Mr. Butler said he did not know when such action would be taken, but he had been told that the Council's work was proceeding. His impression was that the Council felt that the text was important, and should be put into its "lexicon of its laws". He hoped that would be done soon.

A correspondent said that the Secretary-General had called some inspectors "cowboys", and suggested that some inspectors needed to be more diplomatic in their treatment of Iraqis in order to respect their dignity. What was Mr. Butler's response? she asked.

Fred Eckhard, Spokesman for the Secretary-General, who was present at the briefing, said the Secretary-General had never said that UNSCOM inspectors behaved liked cowboys. Rather, he had relayed a complaint by the Iraqis that used that term.

Mr. Butler said he had been in the room when the Secretary-General had mentioned the matter that had given rise to the press reports. The Secretary- General had conveyed to the Council something that had been said to him by Iraq, he had not himself said those words. There had obviously been difficulties between Iraq and the Commission in the past, but he did not want to dwell on those matters. The Commission was ready to do its job as quickly and diligently as possible under the terms of the document that had been agreed. He hoped Iraq was ready to do the same. Of course, he hoped that the work would be accomplished in a courteous and cooperative manner.

Some Council members had openly criticized Mr. Butler's leadership of UNSCOM, a correspondent said. The Secretary-General had criticized the behaviour of some of the inspectors and had, for that reason, assigned chaperons to some of the inspectors, he continued. Did Mr. Butler have any plans to resign? he asked.

Mr. Butler said that to describe the diplomatic observers who would accompany the inspectors to presidential sites as chaperons was not accurate. "A lot of things had been said by a lot of people" during the past few months. Some comments were perhaps less well considered than others, but there was no point in going over them now.

"I'm happy in my job and I propose to continue to do it. I know that that's what the Secretary-General wants me to do, and I look forward to continuing to do this to the best of my ability", he said.

How would UNSCOM deal with government ministries in terms of conducting inspections? a correspondent asked. Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel Hans Corell said the Memorandum focused on presidential sites. His ambition in drafting the text had been to preserve

UNSCOM Briefing - 4 - 26 February 1998

UNSCOM's integrity. Outside of the sites, it was "business as usual" for the Commission.

Mr. Butler said the answer to the question was contained in paragraph 5** of the Memorandum. Paragraph 4 set up the special arrangements for presidential sites, while paragraph 5 said the rest of the country would be inspected in terms of the established procedures. He would continue to direct the Commission's inspectors to go where they needed to go to do their work.

Asked about the modalities of the agreement, Mr. Butler said the Commission needed to test the agreement throughout Iraq. With regard to presidential sites, the Commission would be proceeding according to the terms set out in paragraph 4; with respect to the rest of the country, it would proceed as indicated in paragraph 5.

Next, a correspondent asked whether Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala -- who was appointed by the Secretary-General as the Commissioner who will head the special group established to inspect the eight presidential sites -- would be reporting to Mr. Butler. Mr. Butler said he was delighted about the new appointment. He and Mr. Dhanapala had known each other for almost 30 years. They had done basic diplomatic training together in Australia in the late 1960s.

Mr. Dhanapala was also one of the world's leading experts in disarmament matters, making the Secretary-General's recent appointment of him to Under- Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs a "gifted decision", he continued. Mr. Dhanapala had a big job to do as Under-Secretary-General, but Mr. Butler was extremely pleased that he had also been appointed a Commissioner of UNSCOM. While he and Mr. Dhanapala could work together on all UNSCOM issues, his appointment was to be the Commissioner with special responsibility for inspections under the regime for presidential sites. It was a fine appointment, he looked forward to working with him.

A correspondent asked two questions: did Mr. Butler think that Iraq's President Saddam Hussein was hiding anything in the presidential sites, and would the chaperon/observers bog down the inspections?

Mr. Butler said that the diplomats were not chaperons, but rather diplomatic observers. He then said that a colleague had just handed him a diagram of how the system would work. There were not layers of bureaucracy. He was very happy with the arrangements: they gave the Commission new resources and access to sites that were recently inaccessible. In fact, some

__________ ** "The United Nations and the Government of Iraq further agree that all other areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation shall be subject to UNSCOM procedures hitherto established."

UNSCOM Briefing - 5 - 26 February 1998

of the sites had been called "absolutely" off limits by Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. The Secretary-General had now made those sites "on limits". The arrangements and the reporting responsibilities were clear. The diplomatic observers were to see that both sides -- not just the Commission but the Iraqi side too -- behaved in an appropriate manner in those special sites. He welcomed that aspect of the agreement. The inspection team would be led by an UNSCOM technical person.

Who decided when the inspections of presidential sites took place? When would they take place? a correspondent asked. Mr. Butler said he was the one to make that decision, but that he had not yet determined the dates. Arrangements had to be made, and the diplomatic observers identified. The Secretary-General was currently working on that. He hoped the inspections would begin soon.

He then turned to Mr. Corell, who was also present at the briefing, and asked whether he felt the diagram on the agreement seemed accurate. Mr. Corell said it was how he had understood the Secretary-General's intentions. Mr. Butler said the diagram would be made available.

The same correspondent asked again whether Mr. Butler thought that President Hussein was hiding something in the presidential sites.

Mr. Butler said that the disarmament process had three parts: "they declare, we verify, and together we destroy". What would he be doing to that process if he told correspondents, in public, what he thought was there?

The Memorandum had important thumbprints on it, he continued. It was a high-level political commitment to cooperation. He expected that Iraqi authorities would work with the Commission: "they will declare, we will verify, and together we will destroy".

A correspondent then asked how possible differences between Mr. Butler and Mr. Dhanapala would be resolved. "Where did the buck stop?" he asked. He also asked for rough estimate on the date the agreement could be tested.

Mr. Butler said he did not expect to have disagreements with Mr. Dhanapala. Human beings had different opinions and approaches, which was why the United Nations Charter referred to the need for peaceful settlement of disputes. He and Mr. Dhanapala would reach agreement in cases when they started from different approaches. The texts were clear, the lines of authority were clear.

As to where the buck stopped, it stopped with the Security Council, to which he reported through the Secretary-General, he continued. In accordance with the agreement, the new Commissioner with responsibility for inspecting presidential sites would work with Mr. Butler. In formal terms, Mr. Dhanapala would report to Mr. Butler, who would, in turn, report to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.

UNSCOM Briefing - 6 - 26 February 1998

A correspondent asked whether there were now three different procedures: for sensitive sites, presidential sites and the regular ones. Also, she asked how surprise inspections were possible when so many people were involved. Mr. Butler said that, according to the Memorandum, there were basically two categories of sites: presidential sites and the rest of the country. Underlying those distinctions was Iraq's commitment to honour, implement and cooperate with the basic decisions of the Security Council. Two of those decisions were actually named in the first paragraph of the Memorandum. With respect to the Commission's work in the rest of the country, as per paragraph 5, the Commission would work in terms of established procedures.

The previous agreement with respect to procedures for the inspection of sensitive sites was a unilateral document arranged by former UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus, he continued. The last paragraph of that text had said that its provisions would be subject to review in light of actual practice. As correspondents were aware, Mr. Butler had reported to the Council in December and January that there were ways in which the document's application could be improved. In some respects, the agreement did not work. That was not because Mr. Ekeus had created a bad document, but because, in Mr. Butler's view, Iraq's application of it hindered the Commission's work.

He and Mr. Aziz had recently agreed that the procedures should be improved, but not renegotiated, which would involve too much bureaucracy, he continued. He said he wanted to be able to go anywhere anytime in an unfettered manner. The new agreement made the Commission feel strong, provided Iraq kept its side of the bargain. He earnestly hoped it would.

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