PRESS BRIEFING BY USG FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS AND UN LEGAL COUNSEL

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY USG FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS AND UN LEGAL COUNSEL

The Secretary-General had gone to Baghdad to see what he could do to resolve an issue that could have had "very serious consequences" even outside the region, the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel, Hans Corell, told correspondents at a Headquarters press briefing today. He said the Secretary-General had achieved his objective after considerable diplomatic effort, involving personal contact with many heads of State and other influential personalities around the world and after a constructive dialogue with President Saddam Hussein and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz.

The Secretary-General had brought home a Memorandum of Understanding that had diffused the immediate crisis and clarified many questions which had been subject to rumours, Mr. Corell continued. It had also preserved and even strengthened the authority of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) set up to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The Memorandum would make it possible for UNSCOM to complete its work, including its inspections of presidential sites, within a different time-frame than so far envisaged. It also guaranteed the dignity of a sovereign State that was subject to unprecedented international control.

Mr. Corell said it was understandable that many would be concerned about the outcome of the Secretary-General's effort. Given the history of relations between the United Nations and Iraq, he had no illusions: "the truth was in the testing". He noted that UNSCOM's Executive Chairman Richard Butler had said he expected the Iraqis to live up to their commitment.

The Secretary-General had determined to "reach out" to the Iraqi authority and had recognized its legitimate interest to be treated with dignity even in the present circumstances, Mr. Corell continued. That had bridged a way for the understanding.

As with all agreements, there could be views on the details and there was much talk about the fine print, but he was not so concerned with that, Mr. Corell said. If the Iraqi side did not live up to its commitment under the Memorandum -- and the Iraqi President had been personally engaged in the exercise -- then the difference would not lie in the so-called "fine print".

Mr. Corell, who prepared the first draft of the Memorandum, said he had had a number of "lode stars"; to preserve UNSCOM's integrity and also that of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); to recognize the legitimate concerns of the Iraqi side; and to solve the question of the palaces or the sites. The final Memorandum was negotiated by the Secretary-General, President Hussein and Deputy Prime Minister Aziz.

Referring to erroneous press reports that the Secretary-General had described some UNSCOM inspectors as behaving like "cowboys", Mr. Corell said he had followed the Secretary-General's efforts over the last few days. He had shown statesmanship and should be treated accordingly.

Replying to a question on how he would define a breach of the Memorandum, Mr. Corell said those issues would be dealt with by Mr. Butler and UNSCOM. They would assess the situation and examine how it related to the Memorandum, which referred to all relevant Security Council resolutions and UNSCOM procedures. There was no question of detracting from obligations under those resolutions. He was working closely with Mr. Butler, at the request of the Secretary-General, to refine the extra procedures. Mr. Butler would determine if there were any violations of the Memorandum and, if that ultimately became an issue, the Council would decide on the matter.

To what extent did the Memorandum protect Iraq's sovereignty and how would he define the country's legitimate concerns? a correspondent asked. Mr. Corell said when the Secretary-General went to Iraq, he was dealing with a sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations, and there were legitimate concerns. The Secretary-General's party had visited presidential sites that were used as houses and villas where President Hussein might choose to stay or reside. The sites were also used for hospitality, which was very important in that region of the world. Visiting heads of State and other foreign officials were quartered in them. Certain rooms were considered sacrosanct and displayed Iraq's coat-of-arms. It was important to show respect when visiting those sites.

Asked whether Iraq or UNSCOM would decide on the validity of documents found on the presidential sites, Mr. Corell said there was no question that the Commission or the IAEA should be able to fulfil their tasks under the relevant Council resolutions. He did not believe that would be a problem. The idea was to treat people who might be staying at villas on the sites with respect.

Would UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter be able to lead an inspection team? a correspondent said. Mr. Corell said the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM had jurisdiction in such matters. The fourth paragraph of the Memorandum referred to a special group which included experts from UNSCOM and the IAEA.

How did the idea of more transparency in the inspection process support the element of surprise or unannounced inspections? a correspondent asked. Mr. Corell said particular elements of the Memorandum could not destroy the main purpose of the whole exercise, namely, that Council resolutions should be applied, and UNSCOM and the IAEA should do their jobs. At the same time, the Secretary-General had recognized that there could be more transparency in areas that would not destroy the work of UNSCOM or the IAEA. Those were technical details which would be examined by Mr. Butler and the IAEA, he said, adding that he would provide advice on the text.

Legal Counsel Briefing - 3 - 26 February 1998

Asked whether a new Council resolution was necessary to make the Memorandum legally consistent with prior resolutions, Mr. Corell said that issue was one of the many problems he had to wrestle with when drafting the document. He had been careful not to infringe on the authority of the Council, nor to draft the text in such a way that it forced the Council to take a particular decision. The purpose was to give the Council the full freedom to deal with the Memorandum as it saw fit. He did not wish to speculate because Council members were discussing in what manner to deal with the Memorandum.

In reply to a question about the line of authority between the diplomatic observers and UNSCOM, Mr. Corell said he did not believe that there would be any problem. The teams would work under UNSCOM and IAEA authority, and there was no question of taking away from their technical or scientific work. Diplomats who accompanied the inspection teams visiting the presidential sites would have a precise mandate. The diplomats would not deal with the technical work, but would guarantee that the visits were conducted in a way that respected the dignity of the sites.

Asked whether a military strike would be justified if Iraq violated the Memorandum, Mr. Corell said that question was "the big issue" and one for the Security Council, not the Legal Counsel.

In response to question as to whether the Memorandum carried the force of law or needed ratification by the Council, he said he preferred not to comment on the status of the Memorandum, which contained language normally used in internationally binding documents. On the United Nations side, it was an internal constitutional issue, presently in the hands of the Council.

Would a Council resolution give the Memorandum less weight, and if it already ratified existing resolutions, why would a new one be needed? a correspondent asked. Mr. Corell said the Secretary-General had made an extraordinary effort. Normally, such matters were dealt with by the Council, UNSCOM or the IAEA. But with the immediate threat of an armed conflict, the Secretary-General had decided to take an initiative. After a major diplomatic effort and discussions with the Council, particularly the five permanent members, he had gone to Baghdad with the blessing of Member States and the whole world. It was a difficult undertaking. He had to strike the right balance and negotiate a document that was within the framework in which he could act. The whole regime established in Iraq was a Security Council matter.

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