In progress at UNHQ

PRESS BRIEFING ON IRAQ

3 December 1997



Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING ON IRAQ

19971203

The humanitarian situation in Iraq will get "worse and worse" unless urgent measures are taken to alleviate it and contain the risk of further deterioration, the Executive Director, Office of the Iraq Programme, Benon Sevan, said at a Headquarters press briefing Tuesday.

He said that, in spite of the sanctions imposed on Iraq, the human dimension had to be taken into account and programmes should be prepared to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. The problems were many. It would be wrong, however, to put all the blame on the Security Council Committee monitoring the implementation of the sanctions regime. "In-house cleaning" also needed to be carried out within the Secretariat, as well as the United Nations system, to expedite the arrival and distribution of goods and services.

Mr. Sevan said that there was a lot of frustration for United Nations personnel, because the Organization was not used to working and implementing a humanitarian programme as unique as the one under Security Council resolution 986 (1995) -- a sanctions regime. They were familiar with peacetime or conflict and post-conflict situations, but it was the first time humanitarian assistance was being provided under a rigorous international sanctions regime.

Despite the difficulties in implementing the resolution, he said a good job was being done. "Much remains to be done, irrespective of the limitations", he said. That was why the Secretary-General had decided on an overall review of the whole programme and processes -- from the contracting phase, the processing of applications, approval of contracts, procurement, transportation and distribution of the goods and services. There was a lot to be done by all those involved -- the Government of Iraq and the United Nations system, as well as by Member States -- to expedite the operation. "It is not acceptable that in 11 months, we have been able to provide only one food basket."

Part of the review to be carried out was to determine the priority needs, he continued. As the Secretary-General had stated in his report, even if all the goods procured under the "oil-for-food formula" [Security Council resolution 986 (1995)] arrived on time, it was insufficient to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.

Mr. Sevan, who recently returned from a two-week visit to Iraq, said conditions "are terrible". There were serious complaints in the country about the quantity and quality of the basket of food being provided. The food was mostly starch, and there was insufficient protein. That should be looked into during the review; how to increase the food basket and how to introduce variety to meet the nutritional needs of the people. "We are not talking about luxury needs or six-course dinners", he said. "We are talking about meeting basic minimum needs." The problem of providing spare parts and items of possible

dual usage needed to be reviewed. As part of that, he would recommend the streamlining of the processing of contracts and coordinating interrelated goods or equipment.

For example, he continued, the spraying of agricultural fields had been postponed until the next season, because the contracts for spare parts for the helicopters to carry out the spraying had been approved only 10 days ago. Huge quantities of the spraying material was unused as a result. It was time for United Nations observers to be organized in such a way as to be able to verify the use of spare parts and to give assurances to that effect to the Security Council Committee. The Committee needed better information. The issue was important, as some contracts had been put on hold simply because there was not enough assurance that the items would not be diverted for other purposes.

Replying to questions, Mr. Sevan said that more than 176,000 observations of the distribution of humanitarian goods had been carried out by the United Nations observers under Phase II of the programme, who also confirmed that the distribution had been carried out properly. But what was being distributed was not sufficient, he added.

He said, in response to a question, that three helicopters were to be used in the spraying project. He also said that the sanctions resolution did not permit the Secretariat to be involved in reconstruction in Iraq. Some goods were wasted because they arrived late, or contracts covering them were not approved on time or put on hold. Some of the problems could be blamed not only on the "oil-for-food formula", but on some Secretariat rules and regulations that were archaic. He observed that one of Iraq's complaints was that it would prefer supplies to be delivered within the same six months that it was obliged to provide its quota of oil, in order to obtain the necessary revenues. Practically, that was not possible, Mr. Sevan said.

To an observation by a correspondent that some officials of United Nations agencies had spoken of political interference in the implementation of the programme, he noted that, while it was humanitarian in nature, the programme was part and parcel of a sanctions regime. The mandate of the Secretary-General, set forth by the Security Council, was very clear, and Secretariat members were duty bound to implement it fully. They were expected to comply fully with Council resolutions and decisions.

Asked if the Secretariat could act on the Iraqi complaints of delays in the implementation of the programme, he said that there was no doubt that there was room for improvement. He observed that under the first phase of the programme, 778 contracts were approved, 45 were blocked and 31 placed on hold. Under the second phase, 117 contracts were approved, one blocked, seven placed on hold and 16 were pending. "The biggest problem we are having is, of course, the question of spare parts and items of possible dual usage", he said. "The Sanctions Committee must look into that. Ways must be found to improve the approval

Iraq Briefing - 3 - 3 December 1997

process." He said a distinction had to be drawn between the work of the United Nations Special Commission monitoring the destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and the oil-for-food scheme, a distinction which all members of the Security Council had repeatedly reaffirmed.

The Iraqis recognized that something must be done about the food basket, and were talking about including such items as powdered milk and canned meat, he added. Sometimes, the problem was not one of quality, but of different tastes.

Asked to comment on the conditions of the people and about the reports of children dying, he said conditions in the hospitals were dismal and below standard. Prices were very high. There was no doubt that the people were suffering. The Secretary-General would submit a supplemental report based on the review to be undertaken. He noted that certain things could be done, such as implementation of the distribution plan, even before the publication of the Secretary-General's supplemental report.

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For information media. Not an official record.