PRESS BRIEFING BY UNSCOM EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY UNSCOM EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN

The Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission set up under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) to monitor the disposal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (UNSCOM), Richard Butler, told correspondents last evening that an UNSCOM technical team had just concluded a thorough briefing of the Security Council on the status of the Special Commission's investigations during the current "period of crisis".

Mr. Butler was joined at the Headquarters press briefing by technical experts serving on UNSCOM teams in New York investigating Iraq's missile systems, chemical and biological weapons programmes, and the concealment practices used by Iraq. The technical briefing to the Council held earlier that day had not been staged in response to the current crisis in Iraq, and it was, in no way, intended to add drama to the situation, Mr. Butler said. Technical briefings had been conducted in the past, and no extra steam or drama had been added to the information delivered at the most recent one. The UNSCOM investigators were scientific experts, whose sole objective was to provide accurate date to facilitate Council decisions.

The Special Commission had also provided the Security Council with a chronology of UNSCOM's activities throughout its operations, in order to better respond to Iraqi statements implying that UNSCOM was intentionally delaying the investigation process, Mr. Butler said. The chronology clearly showed that the repeated delays had been due to Iraqi decisions. Also, his letter of 27 October to the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq had been released to the Council that day. In that letter, he had suggested future steps which might move the inspection process forward. While no response had been received, Mr. Butler said that the letter and the outline of work to be undertaken contained in it still remained on the table. Turning the briefing over to the UNSCOM technical team, Mr. Butler said that the Commission stood ready and willing to resume its efforts following proper resolution of the current situation.

Fouad El Khatib, of France -- a senior inspector on the UNSCOM missile team -- said that prior to the start of the Persian Gulf war, Iraq had imported 819 long-range missiles. During the past six years, the Commission had accounted for 817 of those missiles. Over the past years, the Commission had also worked to verify Iraq's capabilities to produce missile systems indigenously. While progress had been made in identifying the quantities of equipment and material for such a missile programme, it had not been possible to verify the current condition of the Iraqi indigenous missile development programme. However, the Commission knew that even with sanctions in place, Iraq's indigenous programme was active. John Larrabee, of the United States -- also of the missile inspection team -- joined the briefing.

Igor Mitrokhin, of the Russian Federation -- a senior chemical weapons inspector -- said a significant amount of chemical weapons components had been destroyed between 1991 and 1994. Due to Iraq's unilateral destruction of a significant amount of chemical weapons and components, the Commission faced serious problem relating to the verification of the quantity and types of weapons destroyed. Even with the Commission's destruction of large quantities of chemical-production equipment, further verification of Iraq's chemical weapons production equipment and material was needed to assure a credible accounting.

Mr. Butler said there were outstanding matters relating to Iraq's production of the nerve gas known as VX. Horst Reeps, of Germany -- also of the chemical weapons team -- described VX as 10 times more toxic than sarin gas (a chemical weapons agent). Iraq had never denied its interest in chemical weapons, but the Government had said that it had no intentions of producing the chemical weapon VX on an industrial scale. In 1995, Iraq had admitted to this aspect of its chemical weapons programme and the existence of several grams of the VX nerve gas. By 1996, it had been determined that Iraq had produced nearly four tons of the VX nerve agent in industrial plants.

Cees Wolterbeek, of the Netherlands -- also a chemical inspector -- said that Iraq had originally declared that while it could produce VX, the nerve agent had not been stable -- it could not be stored and would spoil. However, in September 1997, the Commission had determined that Iraq was able to produce VX in its stable form.

The leader of the biological weapons inspection team, Richard Spertzel, of the United States, said that until July 1995 Iraq had denied the existence of an offensive biological weapons programme. Since then, Iraq had presented a series of "full, final and complete disclosures" regarding that programme. After Commission efforts to verify information in a 1996 disclosure had failed, an international expert group met in New York to review the information. All members of the panel determined that the declaration was deeply deficient. A new disclosure was made available in September 1997, but it contained no new information on core issues. A panel of experts again met to review that information and concluded that the disclosure failed to give a credible account of Iraq's biological warfare programme. At the current stage, the Commission could not account for the extent of Iraq's biological weapons programme with any degree of reliability.

The Deputy Executive Chairman of the Commission, Charles Duelfer, of the United States, said that since 1991 Iraq had systematically concealed information from the Commission. In 1991, decisions were made about releasing some information and material on each programme area, while concealing other information. There was evidence that the pattern of concealment continued with the participation of Iraq's intelligence and security agencies, the elite military guard and the Office of the President. Iraq operated that system by maintaining close surveillance of UNSCOM investigators, establishing an early

UNSCOM Briefing - 3 - 20 November 1997

warning system, and the coordination rapid reaction abilities. For example, the Commission had evidence obtained by U2 surveillance flights that when investigators would be dispatched to one site, suspicious activities would occur at another site. While investigators were being detained at one location, vehicles would rapidly converge at another location and remove items or take actions to prohibit activities of UNSCOM.

Those were sensitive sites that were involved in concealment, and UNSCOM was aware of Iraq's legitimate security concerns, Mr. Duelfer continued. However, the Executive Chairman made decisions regarding each site to be investigated, balancing those real security concerns with the need for access. And access was vital to a credible inspection and monitoring regime. Also at the briefing was Scott Ritter, of the United States, who participated in the work related to the concealment mechanism and other field activities.

Mr. Butler added that no one questioned Iraq's right to legitimate self- defence. However, certain weapons, such as missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, had been proscribed by the Council. In addition, many weapons of mass destruction, which the Commission was mandated to destroy in Iraq, were weapons which other nations were barred from possessing under international arms control treaties. And without access, the Commission had no chance of successfully completing its task.

Asked by a correspondent for clarification on long-range missile systems possessed by Iraq, Mr. Larrabee said Iraq had, for example, been able to extend the range of hardware it had imported. And at the beginning of the war, Iraq had the capacity to produce missiles. While much of that capacity had been destroyed, Iraq had made attempts to import material or to produce related items.

A correspondent, noting that Mr. Ritter had been accused by Iraq of being provocative and difficult, asked whether he would alter his behaviour. Mr. Ritter said that it was not an issue about Scott Ritter, but an issue about the rights of the Special Commission as outlined by the Council. Each site was selected by the Executive Chairman, and all the investigators were sensitive to the valid concerns of Iraq. In fact, UNSCOM inquired at the conclusion of each investigation about any problems which might have arose. Consistently, the UNSCOM teams were told that the investigations went smoothly and without problem. There was no need for behaviour modification on the part of inspectors, but there was a need for Iraq to ensure access to site.

If the work of UNSCOM began again tomorrow, how long would it take to return to the status of investigations before the crisis? a correspondent asked. Mr. Butler said that every day the situation worsened and the data- base of UNSCOM was eroded.

UNSCOM Briefing - 4 - 20 November 1997

Asked if the removal of Americans would dilute the skill level and efficiency of UNSCOM, Mr. Butler said that any arbitrary exclusion of a certain nationality would reduce the Commission's ability to recruit the best personnel.

Asked when the UNSCOM mission could shift from its focus on inspections to long-term monitoring, Mr. Butler said that a baseline must first be established for future monitoring. The Commission's job was to gather accurate information for the Council. It would then be for Council members to make that political decision.

To questions about the means of extending a missiles range, Mr. Larrabee said that one possible conversion to prescribed ranges could be achieved by clustering together several scud missiles and thus extending the range. Also, other modifications could extend the propellant tank or reduce the overall weight of the devise to achieve greater ranges.

Asked if the situation in Iraq could ever return to normal, Mr. Butler said that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its production of vast amounts of weapons of mass destruction had led to the current situation. The goal of the international community was to restore Iraq as a full member of the community. While that would mean that Iraq would have to accept future monitoring, he noted again that all nations were under certain monitoring and inspection regimes. After the current bad period, it was hoped that Iraq would again hold its place in the international community.

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