PRESS CONFERENCE BY UN SPECIAL COMMISSION

Press Briefing

PRESS CONFERENCE BY UN SPECIAL COMMISSION

It was disturbing and pathetic that the list of "Americans" to be expelled from Iraq included staff from the United Kingdom, Canada and Denmark, the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), Richard Butler, told a press conference at United Nations Headquarters today. The people who seemed so riveted on the nationality of UNSCOM staff had not even been able to get it right, he added.

Mr. Butler said he wanted to set the record straight with regard to the facts, in light of recent statements regarding the composition of UNSCOM staff, including those by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz. Facts were central to the performance of UNSCOM, as there was no second prize in the business of disarmament. Either you got the weapon and destroyed it or you did not. Doubt prevailed when you did not know the facts.

While he would not provide a list of all UNSCOM staff and their nationalities, especially under present circumstances, he said that total UNSCOM staff in New York, Baghdad and Bahrain comprised 180 people, drawn from 35 nationalities. The top six nationalities represented in UNSCOM were: Chile (22 per cent); United States (14 per cent); United Kingdom (11 per cent); New Zealand (9 per cent); Iraq (6 per cent); and Australia (5 per cent). The Commission had Iraqi staff because it conducted a lot of its work in Iraq. It also conducted a lot of work in its New York office, so it had a lot of American staff -- including "people who do really dangerous things, like some of our bookkeeping", he said.

Others had quoted percentages of nationalities in UNSCOM, as well as numbers of inspectors and their nationalities, he continued. Were those figures arrived at by counting the number individuals, the number of inspections being carried out by an individual or the number of times a staffer entered the country? he asked. He had no idea on what basis those calculations had been made, but more importantly, "We don't care". It was distasteful and against the Charter and he would not take part in a long term process of swapping various calculations and ways of counting figures. It was wrong to identify people in that way and contrary to UNSCOM rules.

The UNSCOM staff often operated under exceedingly uncomfortable conditions, with long hours and trying circumstances, he said. He had never encountered a group of people for whom he had more respect. He resented that some individuals had been named in public and given incorrect labels and titles. The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister had referred several times to a Scott Ritter, whom he called a Colonel in the United States Army in the intelligence

area. Mr. Ritter, a diligent and honest inspector, was a retired Major, not a Colonel in the United States Marine Corps. He and a Russian staffer had come to UNSCOM because they had been involved in the verification of the United States-Soviet Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter- Range Nuclear Missiles (INF Treaty). Their expertise was in the verification of the arms control agreement.

It was revealing, he continued, that much of what was said about the nationality of officers of the Commission was also factually incorrect.

The call for a change in the makeup of the staff implied that the answers would be different if there were more Russians and French on the staff, he said. However, if he were to replace the current staff with completely new people, honest scientists of different nationalities, and they were presented with the same data, they would come to the same conclusions as the current staff. It appeared that what was being said was, "If you don't like the message, shoot the messenger". Science and technology was not enough. They wanted a political and national point of view.

He expressed disappointment that there had been almost no mention of disarmament. The emphasis had been on the process rather than substance; on people rather than the issues. The Special Commission was about finding and destroying the weapons of mass destruction that the Council deemed illegal. The only reference to disarmament was contained in a letter from Mr. Aziz to the Council, in which he said that Iraq had disposed of all of its weapons of mass destruction in 1991 and 1992. "I'm speechless, which is rare, of course", he said. The Iraqi's own documentation showed that disarmament was not over, since just a few weeks ago they themselves were destroying chemical equipment. What could one make of a person who wrote a letter to the President of the Council saying that everything was done in 1991 and 1992, but four weeks earlier had given the Commission a declaration on biological weapons that were still current?

Asked if he objected to or supported the Iraqi request to have the Council hear its grievances, he said the Council would decide that.

What did he have to say to criticism of his comments that this was a matter of cultural difference -- that the West did not lie, whereas Iraq came from a culture of lies? a correspondent asked. People were upset about those comments. "I made no such statement", he said.

How worried should world community be about the gap resulting from the halt of inspections? a correspondent asked. What could the Iraqis do in nine days or possibly more? "We are worried about it", Mr. Butler replied. Referring to the removal of two fermenters from the biological areas, he said that, based on figures provided by the Iraqis, they could produce significant

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quantities of biological weapon within a week. He was not saying they were doing that, but he did not know because the inspectors could not verify what was going on.

A correspondent asked if he was concerned that the suspension of inspections played into the Iraqi hands. Would it not be better to continue the inspections in order to keep the process going? Mr. Butler said that was out of the question. "You are falling into exactly the trap that you are supposed to", he added. "Now you're talking about process, not substance."

The situation faced by the Special Commission was about disarmament, not national or political preferences, he continued. A lot of the teams included Americans. The Commission recruited staff on the basis of the best possible technical expertise it could find and those people were not interested in pinning Iraq against the wall. "We have the honesty and expertise to do the job", he said, but there had been a history of concealment. The other side had to work with the Commission, end concealment and the job would get done. "This stuff about nationality is a red herring", he added.

Tariq Aziz had not said many kind things about the Chairman, a correspondent said. How difficult would it be for Mr. Butler to deal with the Iraqis when the current situation was over? he asked. He responded that he had not taken those remarks personally. The two men had disagreements, but they were supposed to behave like adults and work them out. His ability to work with the Iraqis would not be affected.

How serious was the possibility of Iraqis grouping things in what they called "national security areas?" a correspondent asked. He said he had never received a reply to his letter of 27 October to the Deputy Prime Minister, in which he had put forth the agenda he felt should be discussed, including the modalities of inspecting sensitive sites. He had expressed concern that the number of sites declared sensitive seemed to be expanding and he wanted to "get a new handle on that". He hoped to get through the current crisis and get back on track.

In response to a question, he said he did not know how long it would take to "weaponize" Iraq's biological agents.

If and when there was final disclosure, was it true that the Iraqis could redevelop their capability in 48 hours? a correspondent asked. The Chairman responded that the hardest area to monitor was biology, because dual use equipment could be used to make biological agents. No one minimized the problem of verification in that area, regardless of the country concerned. One could never be sure that someone was not making the stuff in their kitchen. Yet, in the absence of a Biological Weapons Convention, it would be a far worse situation. If Iraq adhered to the Convention, something he did not rule out, and there was an ongoing monitoring regime, there could be a

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reasonable degree of confidence that Iraq would not have a large biological weapons capability.

Were not the Iraqis on the team under tremendous pressure, given the regime under which they lived? a correspondent asked. The Chairman said he thought they were happy to have a job and the Commission was pleased to have them. However, he did not want to call attention to them or cause them trouble.

In response to another question, he said he hoped common sense would prevail in the next 48 hours and there would be a solution to the problem. He hoped to be back doing his job. Clearly, it was in the interests of the Iraqis to put the situation behind them.

Given the highly technical nature of scientific expertise required, was there not a limited supply of such experts, and would it not be impossible to carry out the mission without Americans? a correspondent asked. The Chairman said he thought so, but to expertise one had to add the willingness to do the job. He had never had the privilege of working with a more skilled or dedicated people and dedication was one of the characteristics of the American staff.

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