PRESS CONFERENCE BY HEAD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS VERIFICATION BODY
Press Briefing
PRESS CONFERENCE BY HEAD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS VERIFICATION BODY
19971017
The Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Jose Mauricio Bustani, this afternoon briefed correspondents on the current and future activities of that organization. The OPCW is the verification body for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention).
Speaking at a press conference at United Nations Headquarters, Mr. Bustani said the purpose of his visit was twofold: he had wanted to report to the General Assembly about the OPCW's successes to date, as well as to contact signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention which had not yet ratified it and those countries which had yet to accede to it. The Convention had 100 full members already. While the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had entered into force with 47 members, the Chemical Weapons Convention had entered into force with 87 members. It was hoped some important players would soon join that list.
Mr. Bustani said he had just met with the Secretary-General. Their discussion had included ideas for the OPCW's future work. Yesterday, he had addressed the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), telling its members that the OPCW would soon conclude its initial inspections of chemical weapons facilities -- including those which produced an extremely dangerous chemical agent called "schedule 1" or "list 1" for pharmaceutical and other purposes.
Those initial inspections had been the OPCW's main task, he said. Towards the end of the month, some 80 inspections would have been carried out in 17 countries. Some 90 additional inspectors would be trained next year, bringing the total number to over 200. The idea was to have a standing body of over 200 inspectors for the Convention's implementation.
A correspondent asked about follow-up to the inspections, as well as mechanisms to respond to violations of the Convention. Mr. Bustani said the Chemical Weapons Convention included a verification mechanism which was non- discriminatory, applying equally to all. When a State declared its weapons and "opened its house" for inspection, it was expected that such a declaration would be truthful. Of course, safeguards must be included to prevent the possibility of deception. The Convention contained clauses to address such cases.
OPCW Press Conference - 2 - 17 October 1997
In principle, the OPCW conducted routine inspections, he said. It sent inspectors to assess the accuracy of a country's declaration. Discrepancies sometimes occurred, having to do with the procedural aspects of information transmission. Serious discrepancies would be brought to the attention of the OPCW's Executive Council, which was its 41-member operating body. The Executive Council would assess the matter and then action would be taken. Depending on the level of the violation, different responses were possible.
One aspect of the Convention was its "challenge inspection procedure", he said. When one State did not trust another's declaration, it could request a challenge inspection. In that event, he would convene a meeting of the Executive Council within 12 hours. For the inspection to be undertaken, three quarters of the Council must approve. The country to be inspected did not have the right to refuse. If serious violations were discovered, the matter could be brought before the Security Council for an appropriate response.
Asked for more details on the training of inspectors, Mr. Bustani said there were different types of inspectors, including chemical engineers and munitions specialists. Some concentrated on the military aspects of operations relating to the destruction of facilities, while others inspected industries. The latter type of inspection would begin next year and represented the OPCW's long-term mission. The work of the OPCW would be to ensure that chemicals were neither proliferated nor deviated to different countries. Inspectors' training entailed a five-month course covering both theory and practice. Some countries had contributed installations and industries to the training endeavour, to enable inspectors to learn how to check the quantity of chemicals that entered into a process, as well as other practical measures.
With respect to the challenge inspection's 12-hour rule, a correspondent expressed doubt as to whether the United Nations body could take a decision in 12 hours, much less undertake an inspection. Mr. Bustani said the arrangement was indeed ambitious, as were other timelines within the Convention. According to the rule, he would have to convene an Executive Council meeting within 12 hours of the challenge and a decision must be taken out immediately. He agreed, however, that it would not be possible to carry out an inspection within that 12-hour period.
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