NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY PROMPTING NUCLEAR-WEAPON TECHNOLOGY RACE, INDIA TELLS DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE
Press Release
GA/DIS/3084
NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY PROMPTING NUCLEAR-WEAPON TECHNOLOGY RACE, INDIA TELLS DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE
19971017 Says Loopholes in Treaty Being Exploited; Pakistan Calls India's Possession of Chemical Weapons 'Rude Surprise'The representative of India told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) this afternoon that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty was about to prompt "a new technology race in the quest for more innovative and lethal nuclear weapons".
Speaking as the Committee continued its general debate, she said that the loopholes of the Treaty were being exploited by some countries "even before the ink has dried". Mere non-proliferation treaties had resulted in renewed efforts to consolidate the nuclear-weapon infrastructure, with continued non-explosive nuclear testing and new designs for weapons.
She said that the international community wanted a nuclear-weapon convention like the Conventions on the two other weapons of mass destruction -- chemical and biological -- that would ban development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and ensure their destruction in a comprehensive manner. India's proposal for a time-bound phased programme did not seek to impede the bilateral process. Yet, the nuclear-weapon States had retained their nuclear weapons and become more insistent on "stand-alone" treaties.
The representative of Pakistan said he endorsed the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, he said, "the Indian declaration that it possesses chemical weapons came as a rude surprise to Pakistan, since we had signed a bilateral declaration in 1992 affirming neither India or Pakistan possessed chemical weapons". His Government was now in a quandary, because under the Convention, India could continue to hold such weapons for another 10 years. "Furthermore, we must now seriously question all of India's declarations, including those relating to non-development of nuclear weapons."
The representative of Ukraine said that his country had removed all nuclear weapons from its territory and, short of a similar step from other countries, a number of steps could be immediately undertaken to increase security: nuclear forces could taken off alert; warheads could be removed
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from delivery vehicles; the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons could be stopped; and all nuclear-weapon testing could be banned.
Statements were also made by the representatives of Brunei Darussalam, Thailand, Nepal, Marshall Islands and Haiti.
The First Committee will meet again at 3 p.m. Monday, 20 October, to continue its general debate.
Committee Work Programme
The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to continue its general exchange of views on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements.
The Committee will discuss the lack of relative progress in the nuclear disarmament sphere, against the backdrop of the adoption last year of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), so far signed by 148 States. It will also review the implementation of the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that were adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in the context of assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.
The Committee is also expected to focus on the establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones. Such zones have already been created by: the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga); the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok); and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of similar zones in south Asia, central Europe and the Middle East.
Other agreements to be discussed include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention). The Committee will also consider the multilateral efforts under way to strengthen the verification mechanism of the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention).
Also under discussion will be the treaty agreed to in Oslo following the so-called "Ottawa process" -- the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. The Committee will also consider ways to further negotiations on that weapon in the Conference on Disarmament, namely Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons).
Another matter to be debated is the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, subject to the emergence of a consensus and agenda. Other issues before the Committee include regional transparency measures, such as the United Nations Register of
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Conventional Arms, and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the international non-proliferation regime.
(For more background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3079 of 9 October.)
Statements
P.H. MAIDIN (Brunei Darussalam) said that efforts to achieve universality to the NPT should continue, with the aim of bringing in those countries that had not yet acceded to it. It was important to move forward with efforts to eliminate those weapons. In that regard, a universal and legally-binding international agreement should be concluded committing all States to the elimination of those weapons.
He said he also supported initiatives for a legally-binding international instrument to provide unconditional assurances to all non- nuclear-weapon States against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons. Efforts by the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the ongoing efforts in nuclear arms reduction by the United States and the Russian Federation, were encouraging.
Also encouraging was the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, he said. His country's accession to the Treaty was part of its commitment to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. The entry into force of the Bangkok Treaty in March reaffirmed his country's commitment to regional peace and security. In that regard, all nuclear powers were called upon to strengthen their support for that Treaty by acceding to its Protocol. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a testimony to the determination and genuine aspirations of the peoples of various regions to be free from the threat of nuclear weapons.
SIDDIQUE KAHN KANJU (Pakistan) said that despite the rhetoric about building freedom and democracy, the security structures now being built promised total security only to a few privileged States, while denying most States even the basic right of self-defence. Eventually the world would move towards multi-polarity. If that was not achieved though peaceful evolution, it could involve violent confrontation.
He rejected the unilateral and unequal regimes designed to impose an unequal security order on the smaller and weaker States. Those States should be supported through the machinery of the United Nations, he said. Just because there had been little progress this year in the Conference on Disarmament, for example, that was no reason to denigrate its viability or threaten to discard that valuable negotiating mechanism.
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The threat of global devastation still stalked the world and his country welcomed the prospects for the second Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) implementation and the commencement of START III. But, even if the objectives of those negotiations were fully achieved, the United States and the Russian Federation would still retain over 4,000 nuclear weapons between them -- larger than their arsenals at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.
Major concerns remained in the field of nuclear disarmament, such as some nuclear-weapon States were still engaged in nuclear testing and research programmes, contrary to the spirit of the CTBT; non-nuclear-weapon States were still threatened by the use of nuclear weapons; threats to the strategic balance between the nuclear-weapon States could lead to a revival of a nuclear arms race, both on the ground and in outer space; and, if there were a re- emergence of great Power confrontation, it would be extremely difficult to manage nuclear deterrence.
Nuclear disarmament was, therefore, the highest priority, he said. It was not the exclusive concern of the nuclear-weapons States. In particular, the 20 or so countries that could build such weapons should be included in disarmament negotiations. There should be an international, legally-binding multilateral agreement committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a fixed time-frame. There should also be a prohibition on the production of fissile material. However, his country would only support such a treaty if it did not allow unequal stockpiles of fissile materials.
He endorsed the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, he said, "the Indian declaration that it possesses chemical weapons came as a rude surprise to Pakistan, since we had signed a bilateral declaration in 1992 affirming neither India or Pakistan possessed chemical weapons". His Government was now in a quandary, because under the Convention, India could continue to hold such weapons for another 10 years. "Furthermore, we must now seriously question all of India's declarations, including those relating to non-development of nuclear weapons."
He shared the world community's abhorrence of the suffering caused by anti-personnel landmines. Pakistan had used such weapons only in strict conformity with the rules of international humanitarian law, he said.
His country was an original party to the Treaty on Certain Conventional Weapons, and had participated in the Ottawa process as an observer. However, because of the security situation along its long borders, his country could not accept a total ban on such weapons. There were a number of other countries in such a position.
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His country's approach to disarmament was determined by its challenging security environment, he said. For 50 years, it had a relationship of conflict with its eastern neighbour, arising from the Kashmir dispute. There had been a six-year brutal conflict within occupied Kashmir, with deployment of an army of 1.2 million men. Short-range and nuclear-capable Prithvi missiles targeted Pakistan's major cities and defence assets. Its neighbour had spent billions of dollars on armaments and the planned development of the medium-range Agni -- and perhaps longer-range missile systems -- threatened not only his country, but the entire region.
Since 1974, Pakistan had actively sought to promote a nuclear-weapon- free zone in south Asia. He thanked his country's "time-tested friend", the People's Republic of China, for its cooperation, and said he opposed interference that would impede his country's legitimate cooperation with friendly States. His country was striving for peace and stability in the region. He called for a treaty of non-aggression between Pakistan and India, and said that country was resisting genuine negotiations on Kashmir.
BHARATI RAY (India) said that a careful reading of the 1997 Report on the Conference on Disarmament would show anyone why, and on what issue, it had remained deadlocked. The reason why consensus had been eluded on the objectives and agenda for a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was also the same -- the issue of nuclear disarmament.
The international community expressed its serious commitment to laying the foundations for a new global security framework by the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, she said. It was consistent with India's position favouring the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction on the basis of multilaterally negotiated, non-discriminatory agreements. It was important that all the declared possessors of chemical weapons ratify the Treaty. In that regard, she looked forward to the positive results by the Russian Duma. Non-universality of multilaterally negotiated disarmament Conventions could give rise to security apprehensions among the States parties to the Convention, and was likely to impact on the international security environment.
She said she was reasonably satisfied with the progress made towards strengthening the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention. Conscious of the complexity of negotiations ahead, she opposed the imposition of artificial deadlines. Regulating the transfers of dual use technology for peaceful purposes called for a strict verification regime in the Chemical Weapons Convention and the establishment of similar measures in the Biological Weapons Convention. Continuation of export controls through exclusive clubs called into question the negotiations of the verification of the Biological Weapons Convention and the effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
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Such controls should be multilaterally negotiated by the States parties. The strengthening process of the Biological Weapons Convention provided an opportunity to create a non-discriminatory, transparent and cooperative regime.
Despite considerable progress in the biological and chemical weapons conventions, there still existed the most recalcitrant of issues -- the issue of nuclear weapons, she said. While India remained acutely conscious of the fragility of the bilateral process, which depended heavily on the relations between the United States and the Russian Federation, those efforts needed to be based in a framework that would lead to the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Her proposal for a time-bound, phased programme did not seek to impede the bilateral process and was not an "all-or- nothing" approach, as its critics had said. Rather, it aimed to focus attention on nuclear weapons and ensure that all States were bound to their elimination. Yet, efforts to address nuclear weapons multilaterally had met with constant opposition.
She said that given the comprehensive conventions on the two other weapons of mass destruction, logic dictated that a third convention should be negotiated for nuclear weapons. The difficulties so far encountered derived from "the unequal and discriminatory route" being followed. Through the indefinite extension of the NPT, the nuclear-weapon States had perpetuated their retention of nuclear weapons and become more insistent on "stand alone" treaties, rather than a comprehensive approach. "Mere non-proliferation treaties had been promoted as disarmament measures to serve this nuclear monopoly and perpetuate inequality", she added. Those States were also consolidating the nuclear-weapon infrastructure, which was being modernized into a smaller and more sophisticated apparatus.
Her apprehensions over the CTBT last year were coming true, she said. That Treaty's loopholes were being exploited by some countries "even before the ink has dried". Nuclear testing continued with non-explosive techniques, existing weapons were being improved and new types of weapons were being designed. The CTBT was "all set to start a new technology race in the quest for more innovative and lethal nuclear weapons". The prohibition of fissile material should halt the manufacture of nuclear weapons and contribute to their progressive elimination. Yet, any such treaty would only be meaningful if it was part of a phased programme towards the elimination of those weapons, within a specified framework of time.
The continued retention of nuclear weapons by a few who insisted that they were essential to their security and to that of their allies, while denying the same right to others, was an inherently unstable situation, she continued. Security based on such unjust, discriminatory principles had never
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lasted long, and peace based on those foundations had always been precarious. Partial measures promoted as disarmament measures deflected attention from the real issue. The international community wanted a nuclear-weapon convention that, like the Conventions on the two other weapons of mass destruction, would ban development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and ensure their destruction in a comprehensive manner.
Furthermore, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was not an answer to the threats those weapons posed. Given the global reach and deployment of those weapons, such zones "could provide at best an illusion of security against weapons whose effects do not respect territorial or regional boundaries". However, given her respect for the right of every country to safeguard its security in a manner which it deemed appropriate, she respected those arrangements that were freely arrived at among States in a region.
While she shared the objective of banning anti-personnel landmines, she had reservations on the Convention that emerged from the Oslo meeting. Its objective could best be reached through a phased approach that would enjoy international consensus, while addressing humanitarian concerns and legitimate defence requirements. She presented a number of suggestions, including universalizing the present export moratoriums and consideration of non-lethal technologies able perform the legitimate defensive role of landmines. The international community should also effectively address the critical issue of mine clearance and dedicate greater assistance to affected areas.
Concerning conventional arms, she said that the global guidelines developed by the United Nations Disarmament Commission should also cover the international arms trade. International cooperation in curbing small arms traffic would help combat that phenomenon, as would greater transparency in the manufacture and transfer of those weapons. Greater participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was also required.
ASDA JAYANAMA (Thailand) said his country was fully committed to multilateral efforts towards disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. It was imperative that the nuclear-weapon States fulfilled their obligations within the NPT and that they adhere to the CTBT. It was also essential that the transfer of related technology for peaceful use should become a reality.
Complimenting the NPT, the Bangkok Treaty had entered into force in March, clearly representing the commitment of the 10 countries of the region to keep the area free from nuclear weapons. He urged the nuclear-weapon States to join their efforts. Applauding the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, he said his country was going through the process of ratifying it. He would like to see similar verification processes established
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for the Biological Weapons Convention. He welcomed efforts to control the illicit transfer of arms and supported the Register of Conventional Arms.
As a country that had been affected by landmines, Thailand supported efforts to eliminate such weapons and looked forward to signing the Convention banning them that had been agreed upon in Oslo, he said. However, efforts should not stop at banning such weapons. It was important to assist countries in removing anti-personnel landmines from their territory. He was dismayed that the fourth special session of the General Assembly had not yet been convened and that there was, as yet, no date set for such a session. He urged all parties concerned to agree on this as quickly as possible. He also applauded the work of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, noting the usefulness of the "Kathmandu process".
JANARDAN ACHARYA (Nepal) said that the several encouraging disarmament developments had not resulted in eliminating nuclear weapons. Sustained pursuit of negotiation, both bilateral and multilateral, was indispensable in achieving the goal of genuine and complete disarmament, as well as in eliminating the massive stockpiles of nuclear arsenals.
The CTBT was not an end in itself, he said. As such, he had stressed the need last year for starting immediate negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons in a reasonable and agreed time-frame. Given the fervent plea for nuclear disarmament, the conclusion of a treaty on a time-bound elimination of those weapons was not only a legitimate demand, but an achievable one. It was, therefore, regrettable that the current momentum in disarmament had been severely impeded in the Conference. The Conference must surmount its current stalemate and move decisively forward on nuclear disarmament and a fissile material cut-off treaty.
Although anti-personnel landmines did not have the same destructive power as nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, they possessed the power of indiscriminate killing, he said. In that regard, the Convention agreed upon in Oslo was welcome and one which Nepal would consider signing in Ottawa in December. Even as those efforts continued, the international community must continue to provide support and assistance to mine victims and to the development of technology for mine detection and clearance. His Government had always endeavoured to include demining experts as an element of its troops contributed to United Nations peace-keeping operations.
The absence of any agreed norms or standards on small arms had worsened conflict situations, he said. The recommendation of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms to reduce those weapons already in circulation and to
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control future accumulations was welcome. Also important was the Panel's recommendation to destroy those weapons as part of post-conflict reconstruction. The Register of Conventional Arms had proved to be valuable in building confidence and transparency and he urged participation by all States.
LAURENCE N. EDWARDS (Marshall Islands) said nuclear disarmament was important to his country, which had been the site of 67 nuclear explosions between 1946 and 1957. That was 7,000 times the yield of the atomic weapons used during the Second World War. He was encouraged by the IAEA in its process of conducting a survey in the northern areas of his country and looked forward to its report.
His county had signed the CTBT and urged all States to sign and ratify it as quickly as possible, he said. In 1995, along with Samoa and the Solomon Islands, his country had brought to the International Court of Justice the question of the legality of nuclear weapons and their use. The Court had ruled that the international community had an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. The international community should work towards a convention prohibiting the production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons. Such a convention would be a major step towards the ultimate elimination of such weapons. There should also be accelerated work towards a cut-off treaty on fissile materials.
On anti-personnel landmines, he welcomed the recent progress made towards their elimination and hoped that more nations would support the ban. He also commended the Register of Conventional Arms, which eased fears between neighbours who had tense relations. He hoped all States would comply with reporting to the Register. As one of the few countries in the world with no armed forces beyond police and fisheries patrols, his country was doing its best to cooperate and promote global security. He hoped for an equally supportive attitude from his colleagues.
IHOR KHARCHENKO (Ukraine) said that joint efforts by the world community to establish a non-proliferation regime by reducing and eliminating entire categories of weapons of mass destruction significantly reshaped the world security landscape.
However, world security could not be stable as long as nuclear weapons were relied upon, he said. The removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine should be emulated by all States, primarily the nuclear-weapon States, in order to ensure that weapon's removal from the face of the planet. That effort could be best elaborated in a programme of complete nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. At the same time, a number of relevant steps could
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be immediately undertaken such as; nuclear forces could be taken off alert; warheads could be removed from delivery vehicles; and the deployment of non- strategic nuclear weapons could be stopped. In addition, all nuclear-weapon testing could be banned, and negotiations to further reduce the arsenals of the United States and Russia could be initiated.
He said he welcomed the prospects of launching START III, and his country was faithfully carrying out its obligations under the START Treaty. Last month, years of negotiations on anti-ballistic missiles and on demarcation between the strategic and theatre anti-missile defences resulted in the signing of important agreements, jointly concluded by Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and the United States.
Regretfully, the CTBT was still missing the signatures of three States whose participation was a necessary prerequisite for that Treaty's entry into force, he continued. Since it was not possible to revise its entry-into-force provisions, other measures should be undertaken to ensure that the Treaty's verification system was functional before the Treaty itself was operational.
The conclusion of a multilateral agreement prohibiting the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons remained a timely demand, he said. The reductions of nuclear forces and the subsequent dismantling of nuclear warheads produced a growing amount of nuclear fissile materials, which might be reused for military purposes. The storage sites of those materials were a permanent source of environmental and terrorist threats to all nations. A cut-off treaty, therefore, should not be limited only to the ban of such production, but for the reduction of fissile stocks.
The Chemical Weapons Convention's entry into force was the first truly verifiable global disarmament accord with a comprehensive regime covering both military and industrial facilities, he said. As a non-possessor of chemical weapons, his country had accelerated its ratification and hoped to join the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons shortly. The Biological Weapons Convention would be scrutinized in the setting-up of its verification regime, for which Ukraine had prepared some recommendations.
The acute humanitarian problem caused by the worldwide use of landmines persisted, he said. In that regard, the adopted Protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons was an important achievement, which imposed rigorous restrictions or prohibitions on the use of specific types of anti- personnel landmines. While he shared the noble aspirations of the Ottawa process and commended its results, the Conference on Disarmament could best negotiate an agreement that would include a number of States not yet ready to sign the agreement reached in Oslo.
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ANTONIO RODRIGUE (Haiti) said that, in the climate of cooperation between the super-Powers since the end of the cold war, important advances had been made in the field of disarmament and weapons control. The NPT, which was the keystone in the non-proliferation regime, had been indefinitely extended and the CTBT had widespread support, as witnessed by the nearly 150 signatures it had gathered in the first year of its existence.
The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which had seen its birth in the Latin American and Caribbean region with the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, had also been a major advance, he continued. A total of 114 countries, encompassing more than half the world, were now covered by such treaties. He also welcomed the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, work towards greater verification of the Biological Weapons Convention and the treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines that would be opened for signature in Ottawa in December.
There had been much progress in multilateral and bilateral agreements, which had contributed to disarmament and international security, he said. However, the world was still far from achieving the objective of general and complete disarmament. While the threat of nuclear devastation had been reduced by time and international legal instruments, it still remained. The international community must make greater efforts to completely eliminate nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, little had been done to reduce the proliferation of conventional weapons, he continued. The threat posed by such weapons had been acknowledged. They fomented conflicts and threatened the new democracies. They were easy to transfer and procure, and they were easily obtained by terrorists and criminals. For a country such as his, which three years ago had made the courageous decision to give up its armed forces in favour of a civil police force charged with public security, the proliferation of small arms was a major problem. He, therefore, welcomed efforts to control such weapons, including the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms and Light Weapons.
International security depended not only on the control of weapons, he added. Economic and social factors must also be taken into account. Instead of investing in arms, States should invest in development.
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