PRESS BRIEFING BY HUMANITARIAN COORDINATORS FOR IRAQ

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY HUMANITARIAN COORDINATORS FOR IRAQ

At a press briefing at Headquarters today, Staffan de Mistura, the outgoing United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, told correspondents that the United Nations should be "a little proud" of the fact that the United Nations Secretariat was the "only player" implementing the unique oil-for-food programme in Iraq. Unlike the Great Lakes region, where there were other major partners involved in the humanitarian programmes, the Secretariat was handling the Iraqi programme on its own. "We make it or break it in terms of implementing a resolution in a firm and fair way. So far, that has been the case and it will be even better in the future."

Also at today's press briefing was the newly appointed Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, Denis Halliday, who introduced the programme's new Deputy Coordinator, Kevin Farrel, who would be based in northern Iraq, and the Director, Iraq Programme, in New York, Yohannes Mengesha. He stressed that the office in New York was a critical part of the programme.

Mr. de Mistura, Humanitarian Coordinator for the last six months, said his assignment had been to try to make resolution 986 (1995) develop from "oil for nothing to oil for something, if not oil for food" and to have it renewed, if the Security Council decided to do so. The programme's beginning had been difficult because resolution 986 was complex and influenced the development of a complex endeavour. The oil-for-food programme was also unique because it was the first structured, systematic attempt to attenuate, in a controlled, firm and fair way, the terrible results of sanctions on ordinary people, while maintaining sanctions.

The United Nations was honoured to have been entrusted with such a unique operation, he said. The resolution was basically political, but had a humanitarian purpose. It was a challenge to combine both aspects of it. Another feature of the programme was that it did not have a funding problem -- which was unique in the United Nations -- since it was being funded by oil revenue. The actual challenge, therefore, was to make the programme work in a politically tense environment. It also had to be "created from scratch" since the Organization had never undertaken such a programme, which required time and a lot of creativity from the entire United Nations system which had to develop an unusual, new approach. While those involved had started with the idea that it might not work, the efforts of everyone -- including Mr. Mengesha's office, the Under- Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Yasushi Akashi, the Iraqi Government, Kurdish colleagues in northern Iraq, the Security Council and more than 300 colleagues throughout the United Nations system -- made it work. What was called "oil for nothing has become 1.3 million tonnes of food and medicine" which have arrived in Iraq, and have, by all indications, reached the ordinary Iraqis affected by the sanctions.

For the United Nations centre in the south of the country, the most crucial part of the programme was the observation of the arrival and distribution of all the commodities all over the country, he continued. In the north, it was the actual implementation -- the distribution of food and medicines and other items. There were 142 international observers who moved around the country freely, with few incidents . The problems they faced had been confronted with a fair and firm approach, and had been solved. The result was that, based on more than 12,000 observations, food and medicines had been arriving without major impediment. The proof of that was the renewal of the programme for a second $2 billion operation for the next six months.

The techniques used by the programme had been important and had been adjusted and constantly fine-tuned, Mr. de Mistura said. The programme had started with overall coverage of the whole country by observers who covered their areas of responsibility systematically. Secondly, the programme tried to track the commodities from their arrival in the country to the 53,000 retail centres. Thirdly, spot checks were done on a number of the retail centres to determine whether the commodities had reached the actual end-users. Lastly, the observers had covered the sensitive areas -- which were considered as having received "less than fair treatment". More than 560 missions had been done in such areas, including in the south, the north and the village which was the birthplace of the country's President, to make sure that food was reaching all areas.

He added that the situation in the north had been complicated because of intra-Kurdish tensions and the need to control distribution, as well as carry out observations. However, "so far so good", he said. In the opinion of the programme's staff, the implementation of resolutions 986 (1995) and 1111 (1997) had favourable side effects, which showed that such an operation could produce some equilibrium and even have an impact on human rights in the environment in which the United Nations was working.

[Resolution 985 authorizes States to permit the import of up to $1 billion of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products every 90 days to meet the Iraqi's humanitarian needs. By resolution 1111, the provisions of resolution 986 (1995) remain in force for another 180 days, from 8 June.]

Citing an example of a favourable side effect, Mr. de Mistura said that when fighting between two Kurdish groups began in May, the United Nations had issued a strong message to the factions, reminding them that food from the programme would not reach them if the fighting did not stop immediately. Since people were already receiving food and were seeing the difference in their food supply after seven years, it was enough to remind the factions that they should pay attention to their people's needs rather than revert to the usual habit of fighting whenever they had a disagreement.

He went on to say that having so many observers in a country, which in the past seven years had not seen foreigners moving around freely, reassured

Humanitarian Coordinator Briefing - 3 - 26 August 1997

the Iraqis, as well as the international community, that if a resolution was adopted with the agreement of the Iraqi authorities and the Security Council to be implemented by the United Nations, its objectives could be achieved.

Mr. Halliday, who was expected to take up his post from 1 September, said he had been delighted to be asked by the Secretary-General to undertake the assignment. He had spent three interesting years running the Office of Human Resources Management. However, he was "a field person", who had spent many years overseas with the United Nations system. He was looking forward to going back into the field, particularly to Iraq, which was an interesting country with a very complex situation in which he would be able to apply some of his background in development and humanitarian assistance.

Mr. Halliday said he was also looking forward to working with the Government of Iraq, the Security Council and the members of the 661 Sanctions Committee with his colleagues in the Iraqi programme in New York, to ensure, to the fullest degree possible, the implementation of Council resolutions 986 (1995) and 1111 (1997) and to make sure that the provisions of the resolutions impacted fully and optimally on the people of Iraq.

Asked how many people were involved in the United Nations programme, Mr. de Mistura said the 53,000 retail centres were small Iraqi shops which had been given a special task, in addition to their own sales, to distribute the food in exchange for food coupons to 21 million clients. The United Nations observers cross-checked the distribution in those shops. There were about 300 United Nations staff members, including the 142 observers, who had been monitoring the actual implementation and observing the distribution of commodities.

A correspondent asked what was the amount of food to be distributed and when that would be achieved. In response, Mr. de Mistura explained the sequence of events prior to the start of the distribution. He said the distribution had been delayed from September last year because of military activity on Iraq's northern border. Permission for the sale of oil was granted only from 10 December; the first cash on the escrow account was received in January; the first observers were in place on 18 February; and on 20 March, the first shipment was received and food was distributed on 2 April for the first time. Overall, there had been no major delay.

From 2 April to August, 1.3 million tonnes had been distributed, he continued. It should have been 2 million tonnes. The rest of that food could still arrive. Even if phase one had not been extended into phase two, the food which had been purchased, but had not yet arrived, would still be arriving in November and December. Therefore, phase one distribution would probably terminate around 19 or 20 November. Phase two of the programme had already begun on 4 August following the Secretary-General's approval. The two phases had now dovetailed.

Humanitarian Coordinator Briefing - 4 - 26 August 1997

When asked if the United Nations had experienced any problems with the bureaucracy in Iraq in implementing the programme, Mr. de Mistura said Iraq was a very special environment, but he had the feeling that the Iraqi authorities had "a clear vested interest" in wanting to make the programme work. Although there had been problems, the United Nations had solved them by discussing them with the Iraqis in a fair and firm manner.

Mr. de Mistura cited the problem of the freedom of movement of the observers. The Iraqi Government had insisted on having facilitators -- Iraqis who would accompany the United Nations observers. However, the United Nations had stressed that the facilitators should keep their distance to ensure that the observers could talk to Iraqis without them feeling intimidated. That compromise was agreed on between the United Nations and the Iraqi Government, and the observers had been moving freely around the country.

Mr. Halliday was asked how he expected the challenges he would face in Iraq would be different from those faced by his predecessor. He said he did not think there would be any fundamental difference. He hoped to solve the problems that contributed to the delays in implementing the programme, such as issues related to contracts, availability of the foodstuff or medicines, transportation and the effectiveness of the 661 Sanctions Committee. The United Nations would continue to focus on the fact that the oil-for-food programme was a humanitarian one which would emphasize the urgency of getting both food and medicine into the country. Efficiency could be improved and there could be closer collaboration among all who implemented the programme, both in New York and in Baghdad.

Asked what kind of change in style he might bring to the job of Humanitarian Coordinator, Mr. Halliday said Mr. de Mistura had done an excellent job and had left a very positive impression in Iraq. He hoped to build on that. Mr. Halliday said he was fortunate to go to Iraq at a time when a lot of the issues had been resolved and the second distribution plan had been approved. His office could work on improving the implementation process of that plan. The new Deputy Coordinator was equally well-placed to make the programme work as optimally as possible.

A correspondent asked about the amount of food and medicines that would come in during the second phase. Mr. Halliday said it was an open question which he was not yet in a position to respond to. However, he said, the Iraqis were anxiously delivering the maximum amount of oil they could before the 90-day period was up -- on 5 September. They were optimistic that they would get a high percentage of the $1 billion expected during that period. The issue of how the shortfall would be dealt with would be raised with the 661 Committee and resolved in a suitable way here in New York.

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