PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR GREAT LAKES REGION OF AFRICA

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR GREAT LAKES REGION OF AFRICA

The joint United Nations/Organization of African Unity (OAU) Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, Mohamed Sahnoun, this afternoon briefed correspondents on the situation in Congo-Brazzaville, following his briefing to the Security Council on the matter.

He said that since 5 June about 3,000 people had died, adding that the Mayor of Brazzaville had informed him that the figure may even be much higher than that. About 20,000 or more had left their homes to seek refuge elsewhere.

The Special Representative said he had visited Brazzaville a couple of times and seen corpses on the streets. In addition, there was looting and generally a "very sad situation" there. The Mayor of Brazzaville was heading the National Mediation Commission, while President Omar Bongo of Gabon headed the International Mediation Commission. Both were making tremendous efforts to establish a cease-fire and have the parties enter into negotiations. So far, however, there had been little success: one cease-fire had lasted one week, and another only four days.

He said that a draft agreement for a permanent cease-fire had been submitted to the protagonists, with several provisions, including getting the militia and armies to move to specific places and also establishing communication and joint monitoring of the cease-fire. There was also a proposal for a document for negotiations between the two sides. In the political negotiation, the main contention concerned mistrust as to how elections should be organized. Elections had been set for 27 July, but had been postponed.

Ambassador Sahnoun said that he felt that much progress could not be made in the absence of some kind of international force in Brazzaville to enhance the chances of a cease-fire and to enable the protagonists to negotiate seriously. Even a force, modest and limited in its mandate, would be reassuring for everybody, including the combatants and the protagonists who were concerned about the airport and would wish to see it secured, so that weapons and reinforcements do not flow into the country and tilt the advantage to one side. The second need for such a force, he continued, is that it would be helpful to the mediators themselves, national and international, who had put together plans for joint patrolling of the city, and joint monitoring of the cease-fire.

Thirdly, he said, the force would encourage the humanitarian organizations, especially the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which need to map out their undertaking; the monitoring of the cease-fire would assist movement to help victims.

Fourthly, the populations, including those who had abandoned their homes, would be encouraged to return and begin to alleviate the sufferings of each other, repair damages and help with reconciliation within the city.

The fifth rationale for the international force, Mr. Sahnoun added, was regional. By its mere presence, it could help quell tensions between Congo- Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville because a number of shells fired in Brazzaville were bound to fall in Kinshasa as long as the battle for the airport continued. He had spoken to the Foreign Minister of Congo-Kinshasa last week, who had said that a special meeting of the Council of Ministers had decided on reciprocation, should more shells fall into Kinshasa.

He said that when those factors were added to other contentions in the region, such as the presence of refugees and especially people from the former armed forces of Rwanda (ex-FAR) and ex-Zairean armed forces (ex-FAZ), in neighbouring countries whose leaders were worried about the involvement or potential involvement of those refugees in their internal situations, the Secretary-General and Mr. Sahnoun himself felt that conditions for the rapid deployment of an international force should be created. President Bongo had made the request for the force on behalf of eight African heads of States and governments in the region, joined by other colleagues in West Africa. The Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution had requested the Security Council to facilitate such a deployment without delay.

He further told correspondents that he had expressed to the Council his realization of the difficulties in putting such a force together quickly. The Secretary-General, however, was doing his utmost to speed up the process of consultation. Mr. Sahnoun stressed that without a clear indication from the Security Council that when conditions were met it would give its backing to the force, the project would not materialize and the consequences could be detrimental to the course of peace in the region.

Responding to questions, he said the President of the Security Council would brief correspondents on the subject after the Council's consultations, but that he had been encouraged by its response.

Asked what his specific request was, whether an authorization for an African multinational force or a United Nations peace-keeping force, he replied that he was leaving that to the Secretary-General. His own emphasis was on the urgency of the need. He said he understood that it was traditionally faster to put together a multinational force than a peace- keeping force. The only problem was that with a multinational force, you needed a lead country for the military aspect, and you had to find the funding.

Had the Foreign Minister of Congo-Kinshasa indicated whether his country was preparing for intervention in Brazzaville, or just retaliation? The

Sahnoun Briefing - 3 - 3 July 1997

Ambassador said that he had only been told they would reciprocate. He stressed he was concerned about any escalation -- whatever form it would take -- and its consequences.

Regarding any possible conflict between his combined United Nations/OAU portfolios, he said there were none. The secretaries-general of both organizations were in constant contact, and the Central Organ of the OAU had clearly requested the rapid deployment of an international force. He and the Secretary-General had met with the President of the African Group and he had also met with a representative of the current Chairman of the OAU, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, as well as with African ambassadors, to brief them so that they could present the point of view of the OAU within the Security Council.

A correspondent said that it was understood that the Council would give an agreement in principle for an advance force to go in. How quickly did he think that would happen, given that the issues of a lead country and the funding had not been settled? Mr. Sahnoun said he could not answer that, suggesting that the question be asked to the President of the Council, and the Department of Peace-keeping Operations. He pointed out that a number of countries had already indicated their readiness to provide troops; the problem was what the lead country would be, and where the funding would come from. Some countries had also said they could provide logistical support; but he had no details.

Asked about statistical details of the proposed force, he said the contingency plan, worked out with the assistance of a military officer from the Peace-keeping Department, was for a detachment force of between 800 and 1,000 for the first phase. He could not say what the cost might be, nor the size of the full force. What was really needed now was the detachment, which would make a major psychological impact as far as the airport was concerned, thus enhancing the cease-fire, and also helping with the political negotiations.

On whether the detachment would not be drawn into the conflict, Mr. Sahnoun said that he had the commitment of both sides that they would cooperate with it.

Were members of the Security Council weary about sending troops to a place where there was no cease-fire? he was asked. Mr. Sahnoun replied that the matter had been in the debate today, but he lacked elaboration on the subject. Some people were concerned that there was a need for conditions to be fulfilled before any deployment, and he understood that. "I noted that we could have cease-fire for a week, for 10 days, but we could not guarantee a cease-fire forever because then we would not need the force", he concluded.

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