REVIEW CONFERENCE ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONCLUDES GENERAL DEBATE
Press Release
DC/2569
REVIEW CONFERENCE ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONCLUDES GENERAL DEBATE
19961129 GENEVA, 26 November (UN Information Service) -- Measures to prevent development and use of biological weapons had to be balanced somehow with the need not to interfere with advancing research in biotechnology and with the transfer of knowledge and technology to developing countries, speakers said as the two-day general debate of the Fourth Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention concluded this afternoon.The representative of Iraq, which had been found to have established a biological-weapons programme, said his country had cooperated fully with United Nations inspection teams and had destroyed all its weapons in the biological field. He called for any attempt to strengthen the Convention to be based on accurate assessment and to avoid "double standards", and said that any on-site inspectors should be committed to "rational behaviour" and should avoid resorting to "provocative methods".
The representative of Australia remarked that while that country was concerned not to hamper legitimate research, production, and trade, it accepted a degree of intrusion as one of the necessary costs of security. Bulgaria's representative said the Convention and efforts to provide it with a practical verification programme exemplified two main opportunities before the world at the end of the century -- development and disarmament. Together, she said, they made the best formula for security.
The two-week Conference -- formally titled the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction -- which concludes on 6 December, has as its basic task consideration of proposals to strengthen the treaty, the first multilateral disarmament instrument to ban a whole category of weapons. There are close to 140 States parties to the Convention.
Addressing the afternoon meeting were representatives of Bulgaria, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Australia, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Belarus, Chile, Indonesia, Iraq, Bangladesh, and Iran.
Statements
IRINA BOKOVA (Bulgaria) said that at the close of the century there were two main opportunities before the world -- development and disarmament; together they made the best formula for security. Development, for many countries at the Conference, including Bulgaria, was today the predominant issue; it was necessary to make sure that all societies developed in a way which would not threaten their own and their neighbours' existence, and so it was best for countries to cooperate in all fields. Development in the biological sciences was so quick that the accumulated information doubled every few years; that rapid progress could become the cause of further proliferation of biological weapons, and it was the task of the Conference to reiterate that article 1 of the Convention applied to all advances and developments in the field; at the same time it was important not to restrict development in the biological sciences. The ad hoc group to be convened should be properly instructed by the Conference to achieve its mandate as quickly as possible, and to allow that it should be authorized to meet for longer and on a more regular basis than in the past two years.
JOUN YUNG SUN (Republic of Korea) said that many were well aware that the lack of a legally binding verification regime was the principal shortcoming of the Convention; the necessity for such a regime had been reaffirmed by recent evidence that biological materials had been illegally acquired and developed by some States parties to the Convention. The ad hoc group, to complete its work, must overcome several difficulties: it must secure the voluntary cooperation of the private sector and public laboratories dealing with the relevant materials; the interpretation of article 10 of the Convention on the scope of cooperation between developed and developing countries for peaceful use of biological agents and toxins must be broadened; and confidence-building and transparency measures should have clear-cut criteria. The Republic of Korea had faithfully implemented its obligations and duties under the Convention, and had never developed, produced, stockpiled, or acquired or retained any such materials for weapons purposes.
ANTONIO DE ICAZA (Mexico) said it was necessary to balance security concerns with the need for access to development in the biological sciences for peaceful purposes; strict verification machinery was needed, but the machinery must be non-discriminatory and resulting from multilateral negotiations that would allow the peaceful use of biotechnology that had dual-use character. Terrorism was a clear concern; all States parties to the Convention must re-emphasize commitment to responsible use of biotechnology and establish the means to ensure that such materials were not used for terrorist purposes. The ad hoc group had the support of Mexico; it must come up with an instrument that both fostered confidence and trust between States parties and encouraged development cooperation. The existence of such weapons was banned under the Convention, and if ban of "use" of such weapons was not contained in the treaty, Mexico felt that use was effectively banned
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by several international humanitarian instruments and was implicitly banned by the Convention.
JOHN CAMPBELL (Australia) said rapid progress in biological technology and the revelations of offensive biological weapons programmes in the former Soviet Union and in Iraq, coupled with persistent reports suggesting that possibly as many as a dozen other countries might have some level of interest in acquiring such weapons, made the most important need of the Convention an effective and efficient verification regime. Australia felt that an effective regime must include mandatory declaration of relevant facilities and activities; on-site activities to reinforce the declarations regime, and routine inspections; and rapid and effective investigation of compliance concerns both at specific facilities and across a larger geographic area would be needed to investigate an allegation of use of biological weapons. An efficient, appropriately-sized structure could be created to adequately support such verification machinery. The dual-use nature of biological research meant that measures demonstrating openness and transparency must be the basis for a verification regime. While Australia, in common with other parties, was concerned not to hamper legitimate research, production, and trade, it accepted a degree of intrusion as one of the necessary costs of security.
GRIGORI BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that a decree by the President in 1992 precluded the formulation or execution of biological programmes in breach of the Convention and provided for monitoring of compliance with its provisions in the country; Russia's Penal Code now made activities in breach of the Convention a criminal offense. The Russian Federation also in 1992 had waived the reservation relating to the possibility of retaliatory use of biological weapons made by the former Soviet Union to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Russian Federation imagined a monitoring mechanism for the Convention which on the one hand was effective, specific, and viable, and on the other was financially non-burdening and non- discriminatory, thus not hampering in any way the economic and technical development of States parties. Russia was in favour of intensifying the ad hoc group's activities and in favour of a full-scale negotiation process, although against an artificial forcing of events that would be prejudicial to final results; the activities of the group should come to an end when it completed its mandate in full.
MARIA KRASNOHORSKA (Slovak Republic) said the report that the Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan had been close to achieving biological-weapons capability underlined the importance of the adoption by States parties of national legislation to criminalize biological weapons and thereby deter sub- State actors from considering the acquisition and use of them. Frightened by the apparent risk, the Slovak Republic supported any effective domestic or international activity which would draw attention of authorities to the threat of use of nuclear, biological or chemical materials, or toxic
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substances, for terrorist purposes. The country believed that States parties should reaffirm that the scope of the Convention covered all scientific and technological developments and advances in microbiology, genetic engineering, and biotechnology.
The Slovak Republic was of the opinion that the Convention applied to purposes, not things, and could not be viewed as applying solely to the technologies current at the time of the negotiation of the Convention, she said. The Final Declaration of the Conference should welcome States which had become parties to the treaty since the Third Review Conference and their statements confirming that they did not possess biological agents or toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery referred to in article 1 of the Convention.
PIOTR RYTIK (Belarus) said his country had never developed, produced, or stockpiled biological weapons, or otherwise violated the Convention. Programmes had been developed to protect the population against diseases most prominent in the region, and against biological warfare agents. The institute that carried out that work was opened to visits by all persons interested. It also submitted regular results of its research to the United Nations and published such information openly. National legislation was being brought into line with the requirements of the Convention and related instruments, and Belarus favoured the earliest possible implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
JORGE BERGUNNO (Chile) said events over the last five years had not dispelled concerns over the potential proliferation of biological weapons. The Conference must clearly state its political resolve to strengthen in key areas methods for compliance, cooperation, and verification of the treaty. Use of such weapons could be disguised as epidemics or accidents, and their consequences could be catastrophic, and recent progress in technology made the threat all the more potent. Paradoxically, laudable scientific advances could be used to cause speedier, more widespread, and more lasting damage. The obligations in the Convention should be clearly stated to apply to all relevant scientific developments, while it also should be made clear that the Convention's provisions were not to interfere with peaceful uses of knowledge and technology. The final declaration should include a reaffirmation of a total ban on the use of biological weapons; adjustments to the language of the Convention might not be necessary, but the step should be taken even if a study indicated that an amendment to the Convention was needed to do that.
AGUS TARMIDZI (Indonesia) said any verification regime should not hinder the use or research and development of biological/toxin agents for peaceful purposes, or the need to develop biotechnology to improve the well-being of the Indonesian population. Such regime should be reliable and trustworthy, deterring non-compliance but protecting sensitive information not relevant to the implementation of the Convention. It should not make it difficult for
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States parties to engage in technical cooperation among themselves or deny developing countries access to technology. That was particularly important because Indonesia's development guidelines called for development of agricultural industries to improve the well-being of its people. Indonesia saw a need to conduct an analysis based on data and parameters set by a competent international authority, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), to first determine whether or not a case of an unusual outbreak of disease was a natural calamity before hastily reporting to on-site inspection measures under a verification protocol, but it recognized that a balance had to be struck between care not to carry out unnecessary inspections and speedy response to potential Convention violations.
WAGDE ABBAS (Iraq), while reaffirming its commitment to the Convention, he stressed that Iraq had cooperated in full transparency with the United Nations Special Commission on the disarmament of that country. Iraq had destroyed all its weapons in the biological field and had complied with all requirements for documents and allowed the inspection team all the access it needed, as well as allowed all requirements for monitoring by the Commission. It was therefore incumbent on the Commission to recall those facts in an objective manner in its report to the Security Council. The delegation felt that any attempt to strengthen the Convention should be based on accurate assessment and should avoid double standards; it was also important for on-site inspectors to be committed to rational behaviour and to avoid resorting to any provocative methods. The security and sovereignty of the inspected country should be respected. Illegitimate disclosure of commercially valuable information should be avoided.
ANWAR HASHIM (Bangladesh) said Bangladesh was committed to general and complete disarmament. Its participation in the Conference and in other forums was based on that commitment. There clearly was a need for a coherent regime to enhance compliance with the Convention; yet it also was necessary not to hamper economic and technological development and international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities. Considering that the need for access to high technology would grow more acute in the future, all efforts at putting in place a verification regime must strive for a balance between greater access to technology and the Convention-enforced commitment to non-proliferation. There was some need for strict vigilance in the pursuit of biological research and development, but at the same time a need for much greater openness. For Bangladesh, the central thrust of the Convention was action by those possessing biological arsenals -- it wished to echo the representative of Brazil in stressing that any effort to contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction such as those must be combined with measures for their complete elimination.
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SIROUS NASSERI (Iran) said there had been some scepticism about convening the Fourth Review Conference, as the ad hoc group was continuing with substantive negotiations; but Iran felt that convening the Conference was too important to delay, as it focused on improving and strengthening the Convention. Formulation of a verification system should be seriously continued, and negotiations towards that end should be intensified. Additionally, the Conference should assess and augment the Convention. Greater focus must be placed on disarmament and a total ban on biological weapons should be pursued. It was a simple, non-discriminatory goal. The Conference should declare such a full ban once and for all, noting that such behaviour violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Convention; lack of specific reference in the Convention to a total ban could leave the door ajar, and so Iran had formally presented specific language for amending the Convention to remedy that shortcoming.
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