FOURTH CONFERENCE OF PARTIES TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TREATY BEGINS TWO-WEEK SESSION
Press Release
DC/2566
FOURTH CONFERENCE OF PARTIES TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TREATY BEGINS TWO-WEEK SESSION
19961126 Secretary-General, in Message to Meeting, Stresses Need for Coherent Regime To Enhance Compliance With ConventionGENEVA, 25 November (UN Information Service) -- Scientific and technical advances and verification measures were cited as focal points of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the biological weapons Convention, as the two-week meeting opened this morning.
The Conference -- formally titled the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction -- will meet over the course of the session in plenary and as a Committee of the Whole. Drafting and credentials committees will also be established.
The basic task before the Review Conference is to consider proposals to strengthen the Convention, the first multilateral disarmament instrument to ban a whole category of weapons.
In a message read out at the meeting, Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali said there was a clear need for a coherent regime to enhance compliance with the Convention, given the evidence that had come to light a year ago that a party to the Treaty had been able to acquire a full-scale biological-weapons programme.
Yet, the elaboration of such a regime was a task of utmost complexity, he added. It was clear that the need for access to high technology would become more and more acute as countries sought to develop, and in elaborating any verification regime, strenuous efforts would have to be made to achieve the delicate balance between that need and the need to prevent the proliferation of sensitive technology for weapons purposes.
Among the key elements of a verification regime, according to the representative of Ireland (speaking on behalf of the European Union), were mandatory annual declarations by all States Parties of facilities, activities and programmes of relevance to the Convention; and mandatory on-site
investigations at short notice to address a non-compliance concern. All State Parties to the protocol should be entitled to submit requests, accompanied by supporting information, for the investigation of a non-compliance concern. Decisions relating to those investigations should be taken by a political representative body of Member States.
At this morning's meeting, Algeria, Israel, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kazakstan were granted observer status to the Conference. Sir Michael Weston (United Kingdom) was appointed President. Confirmed as Secretary-General of the Conference was Sola Ogunbanwo (Nigeria), who is Senior Coordinator of the Disarmament Fellowship, Training, and Advisory Services Programme of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs of the Department of Political Affairs.
Appointed Vice-Presidents of the Conference were the following: Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru and South Africa, from the Group of Non-aligned and Other States; Canada, Germany, Ireland (on behalf of the European Union), Japan, Netherlands and the United States, from the Western Group; and the Russian Federation, from the Group of Eastern European States. Three other States from the Eastern European group remained to be appointed.
In addition, Jorge Berguño (Chile), will serve as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole; Lars Norberg (Sweden) and a representative of Bangladesh will serve as Vice-Chairmen. Elected Chairman of the Drafting Committee was Tibor Toth (Hungary). Norway and Indonesia were appointed Vice-Chairmen.
Colombia will chair the Credentials Committee. A representative of the Group of Eastern European States was to be selected as Vice-Chairman. Other States proposed and confirmed to serve as members of the Credentials Committee were Cuba, New Zealand, South Africa and Belgium. One country remained to be appointed from the Eastern European Group.
Making statements this morning were the representatives of Hungary, Ireland (on behalf of the European Union), and France. A representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also spoke.
Statements
VLADIMIR PETROVSKY, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, read a statement on behalf of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
The statement noted that the biological weapons Convention was a legal instrument highly appreciated by the international community, and now had nearly 140 States Parties. Steps to enhance the Convention included efforts at a set of confidence-building measures, formal recognition that more
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effective verification would reinforce the Convention, and agreement to establish an ad hoc group to consider appropriate measures to make the legal instrument more effective.
There was a clear need for a coherent regime to enhance compliance with the Convention, the Secretary-General's statement said, given the evidence that had come to light a year ago that a party to the Convention had been able to acquire a full-scale biological-weapons programme. Yet, the elaboration of such a regime was a task of utmost complexity -- it was clear that the need for access to high technology would become more and more acute as countries sought to develop, and in elaborating any verification regime, strenuous efforts would have to be made to achieve the delicate balance between that need and the need to prevent the proliferation of sensitive technology for weapons purposes.
MICHAEL WESTON (United Kingdom), appointed President of the Review Conference as recommended by the Conference's Preparatory Committee, recalled that among the issues before delegations, three were key: the impact of scientific and technical developments relating to the Convention; the relevance of the provisions of the chemical weapons Convention, with its extensive verification mechanisms; and the conclusions of the work of the ad hoc group established to study appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and to draft proposals to strengthen the Convention. He expressed confidence in the cooperation of delegations in working together to achieve a successful outcome over the next two weeks.
TIBOR TOTH (Hungary), reviewing efforts to strengthen the Convention, recalled that it was the first international norm outlawing the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. The Convention had played a central role in curbing the threat of biological warfare. Notwithstanding its achievements, there was growing demand for measures to strengthen the Convention.
He said the decision on the establishment of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to study verification measures from a technical and scientific standpoint (the VEREX Group) marked the beginning of a process that over the past five years had helped prepare the ground for a strengthened Convention. The VEREX exercise could be qualified as the first and therefore most crucially important phase of those efforts. Following the completion of the work of that body, the 1994 Special Conference of States Parties had provided an opportunity to integrate political considerations with the scientific and technical assessment contained in the report of the VEREX Group. The States Parties confirmed their determination to further strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention.
That political commitment had been translated into concrete action in the form of the establishment of a further ad hoc group, which he had chaired,
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he continued. Its central task was formulated as "to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be submitted to the consideration of the States Parties".
The Fourth Review Conference provided an opportunity to make an interim assessment of the ongoing work of the Ad Hoc Group and give an impetus to its future activities, he continued. The signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the imminent entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention had created an atmosphere conducive to progress in other fields as well. Building on that and drawing on the results of the work done in 1995 and 1996, the Ad Hoc Group would be in a position to fulfil its mandate before the next Review Conference.
MERVIN TAYLOR, Minister for Equality and Law Reform of Ireland, speaking on behalf of the European Union, said despite the length of time for which the Convention had been in force and its increasing membership, evidence indicated that not all biological weapons programmes had been abandoned. In addition, given the rapid advances in biotechnology and the increasing ease with which biological weapons could be produced, there was an urgent need to strengthen compliance with the international system of non-proliferation of those weapons of mass destruction, including through the reinforcement of the Convention with a legally binding and effective verification regime. The Convention was the only treaty on weapons of mass destruction without such a regime.
He said the Union was committed to intensifying the work of the Ad Hoc Group established in 1994 to consider appropriate measures to strengthen the Convention to be included in a legally binding instrument. It therefore welcomed the decision by the Ad Hoc Group to intensify its work and to allocate nine weeks to the negotiations over the first nine months of 1997. The verification regime the Group was working on should be based on, among others, the following key elements: mandatory annual declarations by all States Parties of facilities, activities and programmes of relevance to the Convention; and mandatory on-site investigations at short notice to address a non-compliance concern.
All States Parties to the Protocol should be entitled to submit requests, accompanied by supporting information, for the investigation of a non-compliance concern, he said. Decisions relating to the investigation of such a non-compliance concern should be taken by a political representative body of Member States. The mechanism for triggering an investigation should be based on a red light approach which would facilitate the swift dispatch of inspectors to deal with the alleged non-compliance. Such investigations could be carried out by a small, cost-effective, independent organization established by the Protocol. The inspectors should be given access to the facilities or areas of concern and be equipped with the tools necessary for
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the accomplishment of their tasks. The regime could also benefit from the conduct of a limited number of short notice non-challenge inspection visits to declared facilities in order to strengthen confidence in the accuracy of declarations and to deter potential proliferators.
XAVIER EMMANUELLI, Secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister for Urgent Humanitarian Action of France, said that since its decision to join the Convention in 1984, France had favoured strengthening of the Treaty and improvement of its application, notably through methods of verification. It was encouraged that a growing number of countries shared that conviction and that development of a protocol of verification would begin in Geneva. States should be willing to submit themselves to necessarily binding regimes if that would make them and all other States more secure, although verification measures should not slow down the large transfers of peaceful knowledge and technology which were occurring around the world.
France supported the disarmament efforts the United Nations was carrying out in Iraq, he added. He called for greater attention to the threat posed by terrorist use of biological weapons, and announced that France intended to rescind its two reservations to the Convention.
PETER HERBY, of the ICRC, said developments in microbiology, genetic engineering, and biotechnology, and the spread of knowledge in those fields were proceeding at a pace which would have been unimaginable when the Convention was negotiated. Confirmed reports since 1990 of biological-weapons programmes were further reasons for concern. Clearly there was a need for increased vigilance and much greater openness in the pursuit of biological research and development.
He said the ICRC strongly urged States Parties to take that opportunity to decide to equip the Convention with an effective and legally binding compliance monitoring regime which would include regular declarations of relevant activities, on-site visits and investigations of alleged use. The ICRC hoped that work on such a regime could be completed by the Ad Hoc Group of Experts at an early date and adopted by a Special Conference of States Parties even before the next Review Conference.
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