PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR BOSNIA

12 November 1996

Press Briefing

19961112 FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

Iqbal Riza, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Bosnia and Herzegovina, told correspondents at a Headquarters press briefing Monday, 11 November, that the first anniversary of the Dayton Accords and of the "handover" of authority from the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) to the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) would take place in December. The Secretariat was waiting for a review of the mandate by the Contact Group. They would meet in Paris later this week and in London in early December. He imagined that the Contact Group would bring the matter to the Security Council for its endorsement.

The situation on the ground was generally stable, he said. There were isolated incidents, but there had been a transformation in Sarajevo since the war. The question was, how deeply rooted was the stability? An enormous reconstruction job needed to be undertaken so that people could get jobs and the Government could get revenue, but progress was being slowed by political tensions. For example, there had been tremendous difficulty, following the partial elections in September, establishing joint institutions in which all three communities would be represented on the basis of the two political entities. The joint Presidency, the sharing of senior posts such as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and the national assembly were all examples of that difficulty.

The return of refugees was a central problem, he said. That had been a major problem ever since the Dayton Accords. Some two thirds of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina were refugees and there had been little progress in addressing the problems. The inter-entity boundary line had become a de facto border or partition. It was not impermeable -- thousands of crossings took place every day for commercial purposes and for transit. But when people tried to return to their homes, they met resistance. The latest manifestation of that had been the blowing up of houses in villages, to which refugees were expected to return, and the destruction of houses near the town of Brcko.

The main responsibilities of the United Nations under the Dayton Accords were in the area of civilian police and demining, he continued. Some 1,700 international Police Monitors were now stationed in 54 places throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, in both entities, drawn from 34 national contingents. They were now functioning as an effective, professional team. Some 45 civil affairs and political officers were also deployed throughout both entities. Those officials liaised with political leaders and mayors, and provided

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guidance on human rights. They were also charged with providing political reporting to Sarajevo. That reporting was forwarded, when appropriate, to the High Representative, Carl Bildt.

Regarding demining, he said that there was a unit called the Mine Action Centre, which was supposed to coordinate programmes. It had no resources of its own, but it set standards, provided training, assisted in establishing contracts, and helped the Bosnians in setting up their own demining structure. The Mine Action Centre served to coordinate demining activities paid for by the World Bank, the European Union and certain governments.

Its programmes had not really started in earnest, he continued. Demining up to now had been undertaken by IFOR. They had concentrated on the demining of bridges, highways, trains, tramlines and in their operational areas. Demining was also a component of reconstruction projects financed by the World Bank and the European Union. "Humanitarian demining" for returning refugees was still a problem.

Under the Dayton Accords, several organizations played a role, he said. In the military area, NATO was clearly in the lead, but no civilian official had authority over NATO forces and no military officer had authority over civilian staff. Carl Bildt, the High Representative, played a coordinating role. Otherwise, each organization was responsible for its own work.

A correspondent asked what had influenced the decision to postpone local elections. Mr. Riza responded that elections went to the heart of the problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because it turned on the situation of refugees and their right to return home. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had responsibility for organizing elections. Under the rules they introduced, three categories of voting were allowed. As a rule people voted in their home of origin -- either in person or by absentee. Alternatively, they could vote where they were, if they had been displaced internally and had given up all hope of returning home.

The OSCE had also provided for a third possibility -- that people could vote where they intended to reside, he said. That provision had been manipulated to an extent where the municipal elections had to be postponed. The issue of the return of refugees had been circumvented until the municipal elections could be held. That was where you might have massive crossings of the inter-entity boundary line to vote. It remained to be seen whether the elections would even have international supervision. For example, the Republika Srpska might simply decide to proceed with elections on its own.

Diplomats had reported that in his report to the Security Council, Mr. Riza had stated that Bosnia was heading for virtual partition, a correspondent said. Was that a fair representation of his beliefs? There was a trend in that direction, Mr. Riza said. Under the Dayton Accords, Bosnia was a unitary State composed of two entities, with highly decentralized powers. "We all

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know that the war was about separation", he said. "About separating and controlling populations. It was a war where civilians were the targets. They were not caught up in military conflict. They were the main targets."

Partition had in effect been achieved, he added. That was why there was such a large number of refugees and displaced persons. There was a trend towards "de facto" partition, not a de jure partition, demonstrated by the difficulty refugees had trying to return home. If that trend was not checked, it might strengthen. One to two years of international presence might be essential, so that the extreme nationalist policies could be moderated. Political leadership on both sides might realize that there was a better option -- to remain part of Bosnia as one of the two entities. Economic and commercial links were expanding. People needed to trade. They had to work together on the ground.

Asked what he would recommend to make police training more effective, Mr. Riza said that the deployment of civilian police was a relatively recent phenomenon, beginning with the mission in Namibia. Doctrine, practice and training were being developed. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, local police had taken part in the atrocities. It was not just a matter of professional retraining. It was a matter of changing mentalities -- away from one of control and towards the notion of protecting and serving.

The role of retraining has to be seen within the broad context of human rights, he said. To oversimplify, the root cause of the problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a massive violation of human rights, particularly minority rights. Violations had reached the level of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The human rights mandate of Dayton was not strong. It should be strengthened. He had suggested that to the Contact Group.

Asked about arms control being monitored by the OSCE mission, Mr. Riza replied that Dayton required the reduction of weapons by three parties, but also allowed build-up under the "train and equip" programme in order to establish a balance of military power. The Federation needed a deterrent power not susceptible to intimidation. All parties were trying to probe limits. The IFOR repeatedly found unauthorized arms caches and deposits. The IFOR very convincingly confiscated and destroyed them. However, arms control was not a self-executing agreement. That was an OSCE and IFOR, and not a United Nations, responsibility.

Did he have any evidence of increased hopes for moderation? a correspondent asked. Had any new political parties come forward? Mr. Riza said that the encouraging results of the September elections had been the appearance of opposition parties in the national legislative assemblies. They were not as strong as they would have hoped, but they were there, on both Bosnian and Serb sides. Since some war aims were achieved and the national elections were held, there was a degree of stability. There was the possibility of moderating existing positions that was linked to development of

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economic links across the boundary lines. However, there was no large-scale reconstruction going on. Bosnia had lost its markets. Inter-entity trade might build stronger links. The World Bank was emphasizing country-wide projects to build such links, but that required time. On the ground, people were cooperating to set up trade and facilitate economic exchanges.

Asked how General Mladic's dismissal could be explained, Mr. Riza said that General Mladic and Radovan Karadzic were the two major targets on the International Criminal Tribunal's list. Anything that weakened their position was welcomed. In a perfectly constitutional move, the civil authorities had deposed a military figure. The challenge for the international community was to support political development without interfering with the internal affairs of States. Those two men should have been in The Hague long ago. After recent elections, Mladic's influence had diminished somewhat. However, Mladic had put up predictable resistance. The salaries of Republika Srpska military officers were being paid by the Yugoslav National Army.

A correspondent then asked how the human rights aspect of the Dayton Accords could be strengthened. "We all look to personal experience", Mr. Riza said. In El Salvador, the United Nations mission had a strong human rights mandate, which had produced results. Now, in Dayton, international organizations had been invited to monitor human rights. There was not an accord requiring compliance to international standards. If some means were available to encourage compliance with the standards that they had agreed to, they would pursue it, but they could not impose compliance from outside.

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