WORKING GROUP ON STRENGTHENING OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION COMPLETES SESSION WITHOUT FINALIZING WORK

Press Release
DC/2561

WORKING GROUP ON STRENGTHENING OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION COMPLETES SESSION WITHOUT FINALIZING WORK

GENEVA, 27 September (UN Information Service) -- An intergovernmental working group established to produce proposals to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention completed its fifth and final session in Geneva today without finalizing its work. The group's report will now be considered by a review conference scheduled to be held in Geneva from 25 November to 6 December.

The session was the latest in the continuing effort to provide verification measures to strengthen the Convention, which was opened for signature in April 1972 and has since been signed and ratified by 139 States, as well as signed by a further 18.

Efforts to strengthen the Convention began at the Third Review Conference in 1991, which established an ad hoc group of governmental experts (the "VEREX" group) with a mandate to identify measures which could determine:

-- Whether a State party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining microbial or other biological agents or toxins, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or peaceful purposes; and

-- Whether a State party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

The mandate noted that "Such measures could be addressed singly or in combination. Specifically, the group shall seek to evaluate potential verification measures, taking into account the broad range of types and quantities of microbial and other biological agents and toxins, whether naturally occurring or altered, which are capable of being used as means of warfare."

The VEREX report was considered at a Special Conference of States Parties to the Convention held in Geneva in September 1994. That meeting, recognizing the complex nature of the issues involved in strengthening the

Convention, underlined the need for a gradual approach towards the establishment of a coherent regime to enhance the effectiveness and improve compliance with the regime.

The Special Conference agreed to establish a further ad hoc group with a mandate to draft proposals to be included in a legally binding instrument to be submitted for the consideration of the States Parties. Among matters the group was requested to consider were the following:

-- Definitions of terms and objective criteria, such as lists of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, their threshold quantities, as well as equipment and types of activities, where relevant for specific measures designed to strengthen the Convention;

-- The incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence- building and transparency measures, as appropriate, into the regime;

-- A system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention, including, as appropriate, measures identified, examined and evaluated in the VEREX report. Such measures should apply to all relevant facilities and activities, be reliable, cost-effective, non-discriminatory and as non-intrusive as possible, consistent with the effective implementation of the system and should not lead to abuse; and

-- Specific measures designed to ensure effective and full implementation of article X, which also avoid any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention, noting that its provisions should not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials.

The ad hoc group, chaired by Tibor Toth (Hungary), held three sessions in 1995 and two this year. In all, there were 71 meetings: 28 on issues related to "Measures to Promote Compliance"; 23 on "Definitions of Terms and Objective Criteria"; 12 on "Measures related to article X"; and eight on "Confidence-building Measures".

Although unable to complete its mandate of elaborating consensus draft proposals on possible verification measures, the ad hoc group believes it has made substantial progress. It recommended that the Fourth Review Conference endorse its work and its intention to intensify work towards the completion of the mandate. A meeting in April 1996 of the Preparatory Committee for the review conference recommended that Sir Michael Weston (United Kingdom) should preside over the review conference. Ogunsola Ogunbanwo, of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, has been nominated by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as provisional Secretary-General of the conference.

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Background on Convention

The Biological Weapons Convention [Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction] was commended by the General Assembly on 16 December 1971 in resolution 2826 (XXVI), and opened for signature on 10 April 1972.

The Convention was drawn up on the basis of work carried out by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, a negotiating body that preceded the Conference on Disarmament.

To date, the Convention has been signed and ratified by 139 States with a further 18 having signed, but not yet ratified.

The depositary Governments are the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Provisions of Convention

Under article I of the 15-article Convention, States Parties undertake "never in any circumstances to develop, produce or otherwise acquire or retain: microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protection or other peaceful purposes; weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict".

Under article II, States Parties undertake "to destroy or to divert for peaceful purposes", not later than nine months after the Convention's entry into force, all biological agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery which are in their possession or under their jurisdiction or control.

Article III provides that States Parties undertake "not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire" any of the materials or means of delivery dealt with by the Convention.

States Parties, under article IV, agree to undertake any necessary measures to prohibit or prevent within their territory or under their jurisdiction or control, the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the materials and means of delivery dealt with by the Convention.

Article V provides that States Parties "undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the

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objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention" and that consultation and cooperation may also be undertaken within the framework of the United Nations.

"Any State party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations", states article VI. Further, each State Party "undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations".

Under article VII, States Parties undertake to provide or support assistance to any State Party which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such a Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

Article VIII states that nothing in the Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

By article IX, each State Party "affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons" and, to that end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith to reach early agreement on effective measures to prohibit their development, production and stockpiling and to work for their destruction.

States Parties, under article X, "undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technical information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes". The Convention, the article continues, "shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties ... or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention".

Other articles of the Convention deal with amendments (article XI); duration of the Convention and right to withdraw from it (article XIII); signature, ratification or accession, and entry into force (article XIV); and depositary governments (article XV).

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