UNITED STATES CALLS ON DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE TO ACCEPT DRAFT NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY WITHOUT CHANGES

1 August 1996

Press Release
DCF/271

UNITED STATES CALLS ON DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE TO ACCEPT DRAFT NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY WITHOUT CHANGES

19960801 Pakistan Says Text Not Comprehensive Because Bans Only Nuclear Explosions and Not All Nuclear Tests

GENEVA, 1 August (UN Information Service) -- Further negotiation on the draft comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty would turn back a 40-year effort to ban nuclear explosions, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency told the Conference on Disarmament this morning.

Addressing the 61-member disarmament forum as it pursued efforts to conclude a treaty in time to be opened for signature at the upcoming regular session of the General Assembly, John Holum called on the Conference to approve the draft treaty before it without changes.

He said no one could guarantee a nuclear weapon-free world by a date certain if the Conference forwarded the treaty to the United Nations. "But all can fully understand that such a day will be long postponed, perhaps indefinitely, if after four decades of effort we now falter in taking the next concrete step down that road", he added.

The representative of Pakistan rejected calls that the draft treaty be accepted without change, saying the text did not live up to the expectations of the world community. It was not comprehensive, as it would only ban nuclear explosions rather than all nuclear testing. Despite those serious shortcomings, a test-ban treaty would contribute significantly to restraining the further development of nuclear weapons, and Pakistan was ready to remain engaged in negotiations.

This morning's plenary was the first of the third part of the 1996 session of the Conference. Participants were commenting on a draft treaty text submitted to negotiators by the Chairman of the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban at the end of the second part of the session on June 28. Most speakers supported the text, although with qualifications.

Also this morning several speakers expressed regret at China's 29 July nuclear test explosion, but welcomed the Chinese Government's announcement that it was now observing a moratorium on nuclear weapon tests.

Statements

JOHN HOLUM (United States) recalled that on 26 July, United States President William Clinton had called on all Conference participants to forward the Chairman's text without change to the Assembly for approval and opening for signature. The most probable result of a further negotiation on the text was to doom the treaty, and once more to turn back a 40-year effort to ban nuclear explosions. He said that throughout the 1980s his Government had not been ready to move swiftly on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, adding that President Clinton had confirmed that the United States was ready to achieve that historic goal. Was the Conference ready? he asked.

He rejected the claim that the draft did not contribute sufficiently to nuclear disarmament because it did not contain a commitment to a specific end point when nuclear disarmament would be completed. The draft, he said, was fully consistent with the nuclear disarmament process, containing no fewer than five preambular paragraphs addressing the connection between a test ban and nuclear disarmament. Some Member States wanted more. But overloading the test-ban treaty with distinct goals not achievable now was a formula for paralysis.

As for criticism that the draft treaty's scope should be broader, he said the United States had made it crystal clear that the treaty would stop new generations of nuclear weapons as well as constrain the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities to other States. Another criticism was that the verification regime reached too far. The United States would have preferred stronger measures, especially in the decision-making process for on-site inspections. The United States had made a difficult decision -- that on balance, it would accept the positions in the treaty, recognizing that it had stretched itself to the limit in what was provided for effective verification.

He said the United States would have preferred a number of outcomes regarding entry-into-force provisions than the one it was now prepared to support. His Government was well aware of the anxiety voiced by many States that the present provision was tantamount to neutering the treaty. However, it was confident that the treaty would be signed immediately by the great majority of nations, and also that before too long, those not presently in a position to adhere would be able to reconsider.

No one could guarantee that if the Conference forwarded that treaty to the United Nations, then by a date certain the world would be free of nuclear weapons, he said. "But all can fully understand that such a day will be long postponed, perhaps indefinitely, if after four decades of effort we now falter in taking the next concrete step down that road."

SHA ZUKANG (China) said his Government had shown flexibility and a willingness to compromise on almost all important issues in the treaty: it

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had adjusted its stance on the scope of the treaty; the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions; the issue of first use; and the issues of the international monitoring system, on-site inspections and national technical means. China now agreed in principle with much of the text, but differences still existed between China's position and the options presented by the Chairman in his text. Those involved the trigger basis and the decision-making procedure for on-site inspections. The so-called "compromise options" contained in the text only accommodated the needs and interests of certain countries possessing advanced verification technologies, while not fully reflecting or simply ignoring the reasonable proposals and demands put forward by many other countries, including China.

While concluding negotiations quickly was a laudable goal, he continued, the basic objective of negotiations should be to conclude a treaty that could stand the test of time. China firmly opposed using human intelligence or espionage information to trigger on-site inspections in the name of "national technical means". The Chinese delegation also formally proposed that the Executive Council be allowed to approve an on-site inspection request by a fixed 30 affirmative votes out of its 51 members.

MUNIR AKRAM (Pakistan) said his Government was not satisfied with the manner in which the test-ban treaty negotiations had proceeded at this session. Talks had been characterized by a lack of transparency. The text that had emerged was not entirely the product of negotiations, with parts of it having descended from heaven, or elsewhere. The text did not live up to the expectations of the world community; it would not be comprehensive, as it would only ban nuclear explosions, not all nuclear testing. It also fell short of promoting nuclear disarmament.

Despite those serious shortcomings, he continued, Pakistan had displayed its readiness to remain engaged in negotiations in order to evolve a text that could be accepted universally. A test-ban treaty would contribute significantly to restraining the further development of nuclear weapons. But Pakistan should not be expected to accept the Chairman's text "without change". The text had not addressed several issues of serious concern to his country. His Government had repeatedly affirmed that the verification of the test-ban treaty must be accomplished primarily by the international monitoring system and that on-site inspections should be rare and exceptional. As for the use of national technical means of verification, there must be binding assurances that espionage and human intelligence would be expressly excluded from the purview of those means.

He added that Pakistan attached the highest importance to the provision in the text that the treaty would only enter into force once it had been signed by 44 States, including all the nuclear-capable States. If one State maintained the right to test, so would the other seven.

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LUCY DUNCAN (New Zealand) said that on 15 July her Government had ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, the fifty-eighth country do to so, and now stood with other States parties on the brink of achieving the goal all had hoped for, the achievement of the sixty-fifth ratification, which would start the 180-day countdown to entry into force. New Zealand hoped other signatory States which had not yet ratified would do so quickly, and it particularly urged the United States and the Russian Federation to complete their ratification procedures before the Convention entered into force.

New Zealand also wanted to inform the Conference of its firm protest against China's conduct of a nuclear test on 29 July, she continued. It had condemned the test and had conveyed to China its expectation that it would go further than its new moratorium on nuclear testing and join other countries in bringing to a prompt conclusion the negotiations on a test-ban treaty.

RICHARD STARR (Australia) said the draft treaty now before the Conference was the synthesis of two-and-a-half years of dedicated work, and in many cases the negotiations to achieve it had required countries to modify some of their most cherished national positions. In some respects the text did not match Australia's preferred positions, notably in its entry-into-force formula. But his Government was confident that the treaty would have significant normative value even prior to its entry into force. After careful consideration, Australia had made the decision to support the test-ban treaty text as it was. It was as reasonable a compromise as it was possible to achieve.

He regretted China's 29 July nuclear test, expressing the hope that test would be the last conducted by any State, ever. Australia now looked to China to take the commitment evident by its moratorium further, by putting its considerable weight behind the successful conclusion of the test-ban treaty negotiations.

ALAIN GUILLAUME (Belgium) said his country could support the text of the draft treaty. It was not an ideal text; for example, Belgium would have preferred more firm language in the preamble on the question of nuclear disarmament. He also had misgivings about the procedures for entry into force and the system of verification. Belgium, however, was in favour of a test-ban treaty without delay, and today it accepted the compromise text, the fruit of 32 months of negotiations. At this stage, the text must not be reopened, risking everything that had been gained. If the international community wanted a treaty, it had that text and none other. He regretted the recent Chinese nuclear test, and hoped that it would go down in history as the last ever conducted by any State.

HISAMI KUROKOCHI (Japan) read for the record the comment made by the spokesman of his Government on 29 July, expressing regret at China's carrying out of another nuclear test. Japan had requested repeatedly that China cease

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such testing, and earnestly hoped that it would make an effort from a wider perspective for the early completion of the test-ban negotiations and for promotion of nuclear disarmament.

His Government had decided to accept the Chairman's proposed test-ban treaty text although it was not entirely satisfactory to it, he said. The text seemed to be the only proposal that would enable achievement of a treaty. Japan strongly appealed to other countries to accept the text as well, so that it could be opened for signature in September.

BERNARD JEANTY (Switzerland) said his Government regretted the nuclear test conducted by China on 29 July. It was with great satisfaction, however, that it had learned of the Chinese decision to observe a moratorium on nuclear tests after 29 July. He reiterated its support for the draft treaty text before delegates, even if it did not meet all its expectations.

MARIA FRANCISCA ARIAS (Colombia) said her Government shared some of the concerns expressed regarding the treaty text. The preamble seemed weak, as it did not reflect the interest of everyone in having a world free of nuclear weapons. It was not clear to Colombia, furthermore, that the text was part of a set of international norms that would lead to the total elimination of those weapons of mass destruction. In accordance with its Constitution, and as a party to the Tlatelolco Treaty, Colombia had the obligation not to produce, possess or use nuclear weapons. Therefore, it was ready to sign a treaty that would contribute to the elimination of those weapons in the future. Nevertheless, Colombia was aware of the difficulties of some members of the Conference.

SIROUS NASSERI (Iran) said while some 60 countries had signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and a number of other countries were about to, the two declared possessors of chemical weapons had not done so and did not appear to be ready to do so. If they did not become parties to it, the integrity of the Convention would be severely threatened. Similarly, negotiations for a test-ban treaty had been carried out with great concern for the wishes of nuclear-weapons States. The notion became so strong towards the end that talks on some key issues had become confined exclusively to a very few States.

Iran felt that on remaining questions of the test-ban treaty, equal consideration should be given to the positions of all States concerned. His Government knew for a fact that qualitative development of nuclear weapons would still be possible within the existing scope of the draft treaty. And Iran still was bewildered by arguments raised by some nuclear-weapons States on their self-arrogated right to possess, even permanently, to use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons. It had full right to demand a commitment to disarmament through a step-by-step programme that would be developed and concluded within specified intervals of time.

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BERNARD A.B. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka) said the draft treaty was by no means comprehensive. As one delegation had aptly put it, it would only "ban the bang". It was to be noted that the mandate given to the Ad Hoc Committee was designed to effectively prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons "in all its aspects". Refusal to give a firm undertaking that under the treaty environment there would be no measures for the development or qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons had sent a signal that vertical proliferation would not be stopped under the draft test-ban treaty.

There was a considerable divergence of opinion as to whether the preamble contained in the Chairman's draft text offered the very best which the Ad Hoc Committee could achieve, he continued. Last year, the States parties had agreed to an indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, while reaffirming their commitment to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. In that context, the Group of 21 had called upon the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee time and time again for a commitment to nuclear disarmament in the context of the draft treaty. However, such a commitment had so far not been made.

His delegation felt strongly about the need for the treaty to enter into force with a minimum delay, he said. Annex 2 to the draft test-ban treaty contained a list of 44 countries, some of which had insurmountable difficulties with the treaty in its present form. To insist that all those countries should sign for the treaty to enter into force, as was the case now, was tantamount to creating a power of veto over the treaty, thereby negating all the hard work achieved since negotiations commenced in 1994.

GILBERTO VERGNE SABOIA (Brazil) said his country believed the draft treaty had many deficiencies, among which were the lack of any real commitment for nuclear disarmament; the absence of clear criteria regarding the use of data not gathered through treaty organs for verification purposes; and the heavy financial burden which would befall signatories regardless of their nuclear capabilities or past behaviour.

In spite of those shortcomings, Brazil was convinced that the text offered the best prospect for the attainment this year of the long-sought goal of an agreement outlawing nuclear-weapon test explosions, bringing all closer to a nuclear-weapon-free world, he said. The Brazilian Government thus would be prepared to accept the draft treaty. It was a fact that several important participants in the negotiations, including one nuclear-weapon State, still had difficulties with the text, and Brazil was ready to explore all avenues leading to a generally acceptable treaty.

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