BRIEFING BY FORCE COMMANDER OF FORMER UNMIH

3 May 1996

Press Briefing

19960503 FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

Major-General Joseph W. Kinzer, Force Commander of the former United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), told correspondents at today's noon briefing that he had not expected to meet the press, but that he would never "turn down an opportunity to tell the story about Haiti and our piece in that story".

General Kinzer was introduced at the noon briefing by Sylvana Foa, Spokesman for the Secretary-General. In the morning, he had met with the Secretary-General for a farewell call and later had a 20-minute interview with the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Kofi Annan, and his staff.

The purpose of his visit to Headquarters, he said, was to "say thanks to the people who supported me and the Force while we were in Haiti, and to backbrief them on the mission, and how we saw it".

General Kinzer was designated as Force Commander of UNMIH in January of 1995 and took command on 31 March. The UNMIH force comprised 6,000 soldiers from 21 countries speaking nine languages and with six or seven different religions. "My challenge was to take this and bring it together in a cohesive and united way", he told correspondents.

The purpose of the mission, according to resolution 940, was to assist the Government of Haiti in maintaining stability and security, in creating an environment conducive to fair elections and assist it in fielding a Haitian national police force. General Kinzer added that the force had been downsized and that he himself had left Haiti on 1 March. He had returned to the United States and resumed his duties as Deputy Commander of the Fifth United States Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and was in the process of writing an after- action review on the mission in Haiti.

A correspondent asked, since it had come up during the noon briefing by the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, what was his stance on land-mines and whether they were useful in military terms? General Kinzer said he had not done enough research on the subject to give "a good answer", but that they were certainly part of military training and were "still in the tool box of military commanders". It was a policy decision that was being worked by policy workers, and was best left at that.

What did he tell the people he had been meeting today about the mission in Haiti? General Kinzer said that he had often been asked in May of 1995 what Haiti would look like in February 1996, and his reply had always been, "I

don't have a crystal ball". He had also been frequently asked, what the United Nations had done for Haiti, and he had always responded by saying that it was the wrong question. "The right question was, what had Haiti done for Haiti during this window of opportunity provided by the United Nations?" It was an opportunity to reinvigorate the government, and so on, he said. "I think the opportunity still exists, I think there's hope, but it's going to take the undivided attention of all the parties that are engaged in this process", including the Government of Haiti, the international community and all the agencies the United Nations brought to the fore, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Health Organization (WHO).

Had he told Mr. Annan that he did not have a crystal ball? a correspondent asked. "Yes I did", the General said. The entire operation in Haiti, as in any other country, was hard to predict. It was a prognosis of continued analysis, "of where we are, where we've been and where we're headed".

But what was his reading of the situation? the correspondent asked. The United Nations accomplished, and continued to accomplish its mission: to help the Government of Haiti in the three areas just mentioned, the General said. "Now it's up to the Haitians. We have 5,201 policemen, more or less, in the force, albeit young and inexperienced, but there's potential there to develop this force into a viable organization capable of policing its country" in a way that was different from what had been before. How that process of development was going to occur was "the biggest unknown we have"; again, it was a question of analysing the needs and bringing to bear the kinds of support mechanisms that can help in that process, he added.

In response to another question concerning resolution 940, General Kinzer said that the word "assist" had been the key to the focus of the mission. "The civilian police played the primary role in fielding of the national police, vis-à-vis the force; we worked in close cooperation and support with the CivPol, but it was their mission to do the coaching and teaching and mentoring of the new police officers, and they are continuing to do that as we speak, although in fewer numbers", he noted.

What was the most difficult part of the mission in Haiti? There had been many challenges, such as building cohesion and team effort among such a diverse force. But "it turned out that it was not such a problem, because of the quality of leaders, and the quality of soldiers", General Kinzer said, adding that it had become a very enjoyable process for him personally. Another challenge was trying to keep the political and the military operations "in balance, realizing that the military operated to support the political objectives". Through the professionalism and guidance of Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, "whom I have the utmost respect for", the whole operation really came together and that problem went away, he said. In tactical terms, one of the

UNMIH Briefing - 3 - 3 May 1996

biggest challenges was the lack of a quality infrastructure, which made it difficult to get supplies to certain units stationed in remote areas, or ensuring the soldiers were cared for, regarding food, fuel, shelter, medical support, transportation. "Again, we overcame through coordinated effort". Also, "understanding how the UN worked was a challenge early on, but once we understood the ground rules, it worked, and UN people were as concerned about the force as I was", he added.

The force would not stay much longer in Haiti; did the General think it would stay long enough and did it have enough troops? That was for the political arm to decide, the General said.

What do you think will happen when they pull out? the correspondent asked. It would depend on how the Haitians take charge of their own destiny, and "I don't think there is a Tonton Macoute under every rock in Haiti, and there are a lot of rocks in Haiti", the General said. "I believe in accentuating the positive, eliminating the negative and leaving the mediocrity to someone else." There were some "good new stories" in Haiti, he added, "and we did the mission we were asked to do. We had the right force at the right place at the right time". There is hope in Haiti, if the Haitians get involved and if the international community stays involved. The opportunity is there.

In response to another question on the United States Congress cutting off the aid to Haiti, the General said that he had taken extended leave after the end of his functions there and was "out of the loop"; in any case, he had not had any responsibility in such a decision.

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