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DCF/253

IRAN SUBMITS DRAFT NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY TO DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE; DESIGNED TO MOVE CURRENT TREATY NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD

22 February 1996


Press Release
DCF/253


IRAN SUBMITS DRAFT NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY TO DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE; DESIGNED TO MOVE CURRENT TREATY NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD

19960222 GENEVA, 22 February (UN Information Service) -- The delegation of Iran this morning submitted a compromise text to the Conference on Disarmament designed to move negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT) forward.

Introducing the draft treaty, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati said it was by no means intended to divert the current course of negotiations on a CTBT, but rather to encourage all parties to the negotiations to "consider possibilities for reasonable agreements both on the broader conceptual differences as well as the details and wording". The draft was not meant as a substitute for the rolling text of a CTBT the Conference had been considering.

The representatives of Indonesia, Myanmar, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Australia and Egypt welcomed the Iranian text as a valuable contribution to negotiations on a CTBT, highlighting the view that it was possible to conclude a treaty this year. Mexico also thanked Iran for its contribution and dismissed reports that negotiations on a CTBT were bogged down.

Also this morning, the Conference welcomed its new President, Jaap Ramaker (Netherlands), who is also the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Mr. Ramaker said the Conference was going through a crucial period in its existence with negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. He would accord due priority to this issue as well as to a review of the future agenda of the Conference, the issue of nuclear disarmament and expansion of the membership of this disarmament forum.

Statements

ALI AKBAR VELAYATI, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, said the world had just surpassed half a century of living under the threat of a nuclear war. To undo what had been done in five decades would be a long and tedious process. It was essential, however, that the process should start and should include a step-by-step approach which attempted to bring the goal of nuclear disarmament as clearly into reach as possible.

The non-nuclear-weapon States had given up the nuclear option long ago and had decided to forgo that option indefinitely at the 1995 Review and

Extension Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). That decision, it had been agreed, was not ever to be interpreted as legitimizing a permanent possession of nuclear weapons by a few. It was, to the contrary, arrived at with the fundamental understanding that negotiations for eliminating nuclear weapons would be pursued resolutely and expeditiously. He encouraged the Conference to continue to search for ways that such negotiations could commence.

He recalled that the Conference had agreed to conclude a CTBT this year and to start negotiations on the prohibition of weapons-related fissile material. It had even been argued that no further multilateral treaties could be envisaged beyond a CTBT and cut-off. This could lead to the erosion of confidence within the Conference at a time when it was needed most. All the necessary and elemental ingredients for a CTBT were now at the Conference's disposal. Most of the differences that persisted were of a political nature, and as such needed to be solved politically.

Regarding the nature of the CTBT, he said that achievement of an agreement for total elimination of all nuclear weapon systems at the earliest possible date within a time-bound framework could be declared a principal aim. The scope of the treaty should ensure that no nuclear test in any place and at whatever yield would be permitted. As the CTBT was intended to be unlimited in time, it would seem reasonable to envisage, under stringent conditions, the possibility of peaceful explosions if a real benefit for the sole purpose of purely peaceful scientific research and civilian applications were demonstrated. As for verification, extensive technical considerations had shown that it could be reliably achieved with coverage of stations operating under the four monitoring networks. Introduction of national technical means, on the other hand, entailed more complications than benefits and could put into question the reliability and validity of international verification. The verification system needed to be complemented with provisions for on-site inspections, he added.

It would be useful, as an associated and transparency measure, he said, if States parties would decide to close test sites and destroy equipment specifically designed for nuclear testing. As for entry into force, it could be stipulated that accession by 65 States would accomplish it. That should be viewed along with an undertaking by States parties not to transfer nuclear materials, equipment and technology to non-parties without application of full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Like the IAEA, a CTBT organization should be based in Vienna, where it could benefit from the expertise of the former.

He then introduced a "possible compromise text" for a CTBT (document CD/1384). The Iranian draft was by no means intended to divert the current course of negotiations, nor was it meant to be a substitute for the current rolling text. The effect sought was to encourage all interlocutors to

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consider possibilities for reasonable agreements both on the broader conceptual differences as well as on the details and wording. The underlying approach taken in the text was based on compromise and balance for all.

ANTONIO DE ICAZA (Mexico) said the ongoing debate on the issues of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and prohibition of nuclear tests might lead some to believe that negotiations were about to become bogged down. Such apprehensions were unjustified, or at least not yet justified. It was inherent to the dynamics of any negotiation, especially when they reached the stage of key decisions and practical concessions, that debates heated up, reproaches were exchanged, opposing views exaggerated or distorted and even hidden agendas were attributed to divergent positions. Further, even in the strongest statements it had been clear that positions were more flexible than conveyed. Silence had been eloquent in this debate; nobody had put into doubt the priority of reaching a CTBT this year.

Everyone knew that the efficiency of the non-proliferation regime depended on the systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals worldwide, with the ultimate objective of their elimination, and that those efforts would only be successful in the context of an effective non-proliferation regime. It was useless to speculate on what came first, the egg or the chicken. One must come to terms with the fact that there would be no clear disarmament without non-proliferation and no non-proliferation without nuclear disarmament.

He recalled that Mexico had co-sponsored at the fiftieth session of the General Assembly the resolution requesting the Conference to establish on a priority basis an ad hoc committee to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. A timely conclusion of a CTBT would facilitate and give a new impetus towards the process of elaborating a programme for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. In the meanwhile, one had to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a CTBT.

Regarding the scope of the treaty, consensus was building around the formulation that prohibited nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion. Mexico favoured a simple formula for the entry into force of the treaty that would at the same time ensure its implementation and avoid conditioning its coming into force to the will of a single State or of a group of States. The CTBT had to be compatible with the activities it wanted to ban and with the verification requirements of the treaty. The IAEA had the necessary infrastructure and experience in this field. Mexico also favoured the creation of an independent organization, located in Vienna, with a close relationship with the IAEA. The composition of the Executive Council should respect the principles of equal rights, equitable geographical distribution and periodical rotation, he added. On-site inspections should be carried out rarely and in the least intrusive but expeditious manner.

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He commended Mr. Velayati for submitting a most valuable contribution to the work of the Conference. He urged all States to refrain from carrying out tests or experiments related to nuclear weapons in this last phase of delicate negotiations, which might give way to questions regarding commitment to the cessation of the nuclear arms race or on the scope of the treaty. Differences on the agenda of the Conference and on the future programme of work should not delay deliberations.

AGUS TARMIDZI (Indonesia) said conclusion of a CTBT was within grasp, even though a number of issues remained to be resolved. He welcomed the initiative of Iran to present its draft as a step to accelerate negotiations for the conclusion of a CTBT. He took note of the fact that it was not intended as a substitute for the rolling text. Iran's text, together with the rolling text, could if necessary be used to search for a balanced, compromise resolution to the outstanding issues confronting the Conference. Although some of the positions in the text were not in line with Indonesia's views, he was ready to study the draft carefully and send it on to his capital.

U AYE (Myanmar) welcomed the text, which would constitute another important impetus to negotiations on a CTBT. The compromise text provided a solid basis for further study.

NACER BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) took note of the proposals in the text and of the commitment of Iran to the conclusion of a CTBT in 1996.

BERNARD A. B. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka) expressed deep gratitude for the text submitted by Iran. The Conference should speed up negotiations to conclude a treaty by June. The speed thus far demonstrated had made some delegations skeptical as to whether that could be achieved. The Iranian initiative was a step to speed up negotiations. He was aware of apprehensions that a new text might delay negotiations. However, he took note of the clarification by the Foreign Minister that Iran's text was not a substitute for the rolling text.

RICHARD STARR (Australia) welcomed the text as a contribution designed to assist in the Conference's most important negotiation effort. He took note in particular of the fact that Iran had concluded that there were few distinct issues outstanding before the Conference in this regard. Indeed, the more delegations studied the rolling text, the more they would conclude that conclusion of a CTBT was feasible by the middle of this year. He was heartened by the shared sense of urgency at the Conference. There was an obvious desire to intensify, refocus and complete these negotiations.

MOUNIR ZAHRAN (Egypt) said he welcomed any initiatives that would move work on a CTBT forward. His delegation would study the Iranian text. He noted that the new text was not intended as a substitute for the rolling text, but as an attempt to move negotiations forward.

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For information media. Not an official record.