DCF/251

LINKING NUCLEAR WEAPON ELIMINATION TO TEST BAN THREATENS BOTH GOALS, UNITED STATES TELLS CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

8 February 1996


Press Release
DCF/251


LINKING NUCLEAR WEAPON ELIMINATION TO TEST BAN THREATENS BOTH GOALS, UNITED STATES TELLS CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

19960208 Expansion of Membership Also Discussed

GENEVA, 8 February (UN Information Service) -- The ghost of nuclear disarmament linkage had been evoked in connection with negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) and threatened to impede progress on that instrument, the representative of United States said this morning at the Conference on Disarmament.

Recalling the address by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the inaugural plenary meeting of the current session of the Conference, the United States representative said linking the CTBT to a time-bound framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons, as requested by members of the Non-Aligned Movement, raised a number of questions. Holding one important goal hostage to another was a sure way to fail at both, he said.

The representatives of Algeria, Thailand, Nigeria and China also made statements in the general debate.

Also this morning, the Conference discussed a proposal by Indonesia to admit at the plenary session as full members all 23 countries mentioned in the decision of 21 September 1995. Indonesia also proposed that the Conference reconsider the possibility of admitting the other States aspiring to membership. Participants expressed support for the proposal, but it was determined that there was still no consensus regarding the criteria for participation of any new members. The matter of expansion will be the subject of further consultations.

The representatives of Finland, Chile, New Zealand, United States, Morocco, Ukraine, Cuba, Republic of Korea, Egypt and Mexico took part in the discussion.

Statements

HOCINE MEGHLAOUI (Algeria) recalled that 36 years ago, almost to the day, the first nuclear explosion had taken place in Algeria. That supplied an

additional reason for the country to want the conclusion of a CTBT as soon as possible. Regarding the issues in the "rolling text" of the CTBT, Algeria favoured a total prohibition of all nuclear tests and explosions, in all environments and for all time. As for the organization to monitor the CTBT, he was in favour of an independent organization with links to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The nature of such links should be examined with precision. The executive council of the organization should receive particular attention. There should in it no permanent seats, veto power or exclusion.

With respect to the verification regime, on-site inspections should be authorized by the organization of the CTBT and conducted under its sole supervision, he continued. Information obtained through the international monitoring system would be the basis for any decision on on-site inspection taken by the organization. As for the CTBT's entry into force, the treaty should not be held hostage by any State or group of States. Algeria was also conscious of the fact that if the treaty was not accepted by at least the five nuclear Powers, it would be fragile and would face an uncertain future.

Algeria wholly approved of the decision to give priority to the conclusion of a CTBT, he said. However, there were other matters that were just as important, such as the question of effective international arrangements to safeguard non-nuclear weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. That major problem had not found a solution. The end of the cold war had freed the world from the spectre of nuclear war, but now the world must rid itself of nuclear weapons. Algeria appreciated the efforts of certain nuclear Powers, particularly the United States and the Russian Federation, to reduce their nuclear arsenals. But all these efforts could not totally take the place of multilateral negotiations, whose appropriate framework was the Conference on Disarmament. Priority should be given to the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. He was also in favour of the immediate opening of serious negotiations on a convention to prohibit production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or explosive devices.

OUM MAOLANON (Thailand) reaffirmed his country's opposition to all nuclear tests. All nuclear-weapon States must exercise the utmost restraint and respect the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. He hoped the decision by France to cease its nuclear test programme would contribute to negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. He recalled that Thailand, along with Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, had last December signed the Treaty on the South- east Asia nuclear-weapon-free Zone.

STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR (United States) said all countries in the Conference agreed on the need for discussions on nuclear disarmament. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference had resulted in the indefinite extension of that Treaty, and was a historic accomplishment for

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all mankind. It was from the NPT and the NPT process that the United States derived its international commitments on nuclear disarmament. The principles and objectives document for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at that Conference stated that the undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the NPT should be fulfilled with determination. In that regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment, as stated in Article VI of the NPT, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

The document pointed out, he added, that three measures noted in a "program of action" were important "in the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI". The first item was the completion by the Conference on Disarmament of CTBT negotiations no later than 1996. The second item was the immediate commencement and early conclusion by the Conference of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The third item, he continued, was "the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". Those clear and circumscribed NPT commitments notwithstanding, more emphasis was applied by some in the Conference to the general concept of "nuclear disarmament". Linkage was created between getting on with the negotiation of a convention on the cutoff of the production of fissile material, and an issue called "nuclear disarmament".

He said that to the dismay of his Government and many others, the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Cartagena in October had called on the Conference on Disarmament "to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to commence negotiations early in 1996 of a phased program of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework". The idea of discussing nuclear disarmament and a programme of reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework raised several questions.

What did "time-bound framework" mean? he asked. The five declared nuclear weapon States were not all ready to respond now to the challenge of multilateral negotiations. The United States and the Russian Federation conducted successful bilateral efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals, and France and the United Kingdom had taken unilateral nuclear disarmament steps. China, however, continued nuclear weapon testing and the build-up of its nuclear arsenal.

There was also the question, he continued, of whether and how nuclear reductions "in a time-bound framework" would affect certain nuclear capable or "threshold" states which, unlike NPT States, had no solemn treaty commitments.

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However, recently the ghost of nuclear disarmament linkage had been evoked in connection with CTBT negotiations and threatened to impede progress. Holding one important goal hostage for another was a sure way to fail at both. The United States would be prepared to play an active and constructive role in discussions and negotiations on nuclear disarmament wherever they were agreed to take place. Everyone agreed that completion of a CTBT would be a critical move towards the objective of nuclear disarmament. Completion soon thereafter of a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes would be another such important contribution. The time to accomplish that was now, while the window of political opportunity to do it was open.

EJOH ABUA (Nigeria) said since 1946, more than 2,000 nuclear tests had been carried out in the atmosphere, underwater or underground. The latest such test was carried out not long ago against the spirit of the times and of current international opinion. Nigeria hoped that the recent statement announcing the end to those tests would be strictly adhered to. After four decades of persistent calls and two years of serious negotiations, a CTBT appeared within reach, but serious impediments remained. A major obstacle was the scope of the treaty. As Nigeria had stated in the past, the treaty should cover all nuclear tests in all environments, without exception, even for so-called sub-critical tests.

A second major obstacle was related to verification, particularly on- site inspection, he continued. A careful balance had to be struck between the need to vigorously monitor treaty implementation and intrusive on-site inspection that might go beyond monitoring compliance with the Treaty. On- Site Inspection should be rare, less intrusive and timely. It should be triggered by data from the International Monitoring System after appropriate opportunity had been given for consultation and clarification. Early agreement on such vital issues was necessary if the treaty was to be concluded by "early 1996".

A CTBT with strong disarmament language would be a significant step towards establishing a nuclear disarmament regime, he said. Such a regime could be achieved within the framework of a time-bound programme of nuclear disarmament. Nigeria had indeed advocated such a framework in the NPT Review and Extension Conference. The Conference on Disarmament was uniquely placed to discuss such a programme of nuclear disarmament in the context of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, which should be established early in the year, he stated.

In 1996, he continued, the Conference should summon the necessary political will to conclude the CTBT by the middle of the year, so as to begin work on other important issues, such as: nuclear disarmament; security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States; cessation of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or explosive devices; and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. At a minimum, ad hoc committees should be

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established or re-established on those subjects. Failure to do so would stain the success that might arise from the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996. The expansion issue should also be fully resolved. Those members admitted in principle through the decision of September 1995 must be enabled to take their seats in the Conference immediately.

AGUS TARMIDZI (Indonesia) said his delegation saw the need to address urgently the issue of nuclear disarmament in the Conference, as stipulated by the "Group of 21" at the first plenary session. Regarding the CTBT, Indonesia, unlike those who perceived the treaty as a mere non-proliferation measure, held the view that it should also function in such a way as to cap totally both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, as a first step towards their complete elimination from the world's arsenal. If the scope of the CTBT still allowed the nuclear-weapon States to continue working on their nuclear weapon programmes, this would merely create another non-proliferation regime, while totally contradicting the new realities of the post-cold-war era. The treaty should have a two-fold objective: to prevent all States from proliferating nuclear weapons; and to deter the nuclear-weapon States and other States with a nuclear capability from producing or designing new nuclear weapons.

Regarding on-site inspections, he said he was somewhat concerned over the protracted debate on how to proceed with a request for such an inspection by a State party. There were two important points to be borne in mind concerning the inspections. First, the CTBT organization should be able to determine whether an ambiguous or suspicious event was in fact a nuclear explosion in violation of the treaty. Secondly, an on-site inspection should be based on sufficient technical data gathered by the international monitoring system to prevent abusive or baseless requests for such inspections.

On the issue of participation in the Conference, he said Indonesia was disappointed that the decision to allow another 23 countries to participate as full members could not be implemented, for reasons he could not understand. The Conference should admit at the present plenary session all 23 States mentioned earlier and reconsider the possibility of admitting the other States aspiring to membership. The proposed criteria to be considered in order to allow countries to participate in the Conference as full members should be discussed within the framework of refining the Conference's rules of procedure. Those rules had to be refined in any case in order to meet the new realities of the post-cold-war era.

SHA ZUKANG (China) said the United States representative had mentioned China's nuclear tests. If non-nuclear-weapon-States had expressed concern over Chinese nuclear tests, that would at least be understandable. But the United States had a different situation. That country had the biggest and most advanced nuclear arsenal in the world. The United States was not qualified to lecture China on its very limited amount of nuclear weapons,

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which it possessed for its self-defence. China's tests were extremely limited and would cease the minute the CTBT came into effect.

Statements on Expansion of Membership

The President of the Conference, U AYE (Myanmar), then opened the floor to statements on Indonesia's proposal. He drew attention to the decision of 21 September 1995 and to the 22 September 1995 United States proposal to incorporate into that decision a mechanism to deny members subject to comprehensive enforcement measures by the Security Council the ability to block consensus on any decision to be adopted by the Conference.

BJÖRN EKBLOM (Finland) stressed the need to take a decision on expansion, adding that conditions for participation should be the same for all members. It was possible to find a solution to the problem of expansion, provided that the Conference's 37 members and the future 23 showed flexibility. The question of expansion should be taken up under the guidance of the President as soon as possible, perhaps in an informal plenary session, in order to examine the different proposals. Among the issues that could be considered were the possibility that a new member not be able to block consensus and that the 23 new members make a declaration that they would not oppose consensus in the Conference.

JORGE BERGUNO (Chile) underlined the importance of demonstrating the political will to find a solution to the question. Like Finland, Chile considered that a solution was within reach in the framework of an informal plenary session. A decision must be taken regarding a matter that had remained a dead letter for too long.

WADE ARMSTRONG (New Zealand) said that in the framework of an expansion of the membership, the rules of procedure must be modified. New Zealand was willing to contribute to such a review. He urged members to support the Indonesian proposal.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States) said he fully sympathized with the motives behind the Indonesian initiative. However, the United States had made its own proposal on 22 September. He asked that before turning to the Indonesian proposal, the Conference address his proposal, which could be implemented with a modification of the rules of procedure on the need for consensus or on the nature of membership.

The PRESIDENT said the Conference was not in a position to discuss the matter further.

NACER BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) said it had been agreed in consultations not to raise in plenary matters that could lead to stalemate. He had come away with the feeling yesterday that it would not be

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useful to raise the issue of expansion now. He regretted having to say that, as he was in favour of expansion. However, such an exercise would not help the Conference make headway.

OLEXANDRE SLIPTCHENKO (Ukraine) said additional efforts and genuine political will were necessary to ensure the full implementation of the decision. He supported Indonesia's proposal, taking into account all other proposals made in that regard.

EUMELIO CABALLERO (Cuba) said his was among the countries wanting a decision on expansion. He fully understood the process to which the representative of Morocco had referred. However, Indonesia's proposal had merit. In the plenary, members had become aware of who was responsible for not finding the desired solution, which had been especially useful since lately there had been rumors that the Group of 21 was responsible for thwarting a decision.

YONG SHIK HWANG (Republic of Korea) said he supported wholeheartedly Indonesia's proposal and hoped the question could be solved in a spirit of compromise.

MOUNIR ZAHRAN (Egypt) said he was surprised the question had been raised during the meeting. He reiterated Egypt's position in favour of expansion, but added that the Conference had to reach consensus before raising the matter in plenary.

The PRESIDENT reaffirmed that the time was not opportune to raise the issue of amending the rules of procedure now.

ANTONIO DE ICAZA (Mexico) said it seemed that the only achievement of the last three weeks of meetings of the Conference was an increase in the number of square brackets in the rolling text of the treaty. He thanked Indonesia for its proposal, on which his delegation was prepared to act. As to the revision of the rules of procedure, Mexico had no objection as long as such an exercise respected the principle that all rules were to be general in nature and applicable to all.

Summing up the discussion, the PRESIDENT said no one wished to have a decision on the matter of expansion more than he, but the Conference had to go along with the guidance and decisions of the past months on the issue. As the rules of procedure indicated, the Conference should conduct its work and adopt its decisions by consensus. It was clear that the matter did not yet enjoy consensus. He would continue his consultations on the issue of expansion. He also announced that consultations on the question of nuclear disarmament would be pursued.

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For information media. Not an official record.