DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE HEARS FURTHER CALLS FOR RAPID CONCLUSION OF NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

Press Release
DCF/249

DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE HEARS FURTHER CALLS FOR RAPID CONCLUSION OF NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

GENEVA, 25 January (UN Information Service ) -- The representatives of India, Australia, South Africa and Japan this morning stressed the urgency for the Conference on Disarmament to complete the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty this year. They said that much work remained to be done if they were to have a treaty text ready for signature by the General Assembly next September.

According to the speakers, a number of major technical and political issues still had to be resolved, among them, the scope of the treaty, the verification regime and on-site inspections. Once those issues were dealt with, other questions, such as the site of the treaty's organization, its entry into force and the executive council, should rapidly fall into place. All speakers believed that the intended goal was achievable.

They also declared that the comprehensive test-ban treaty was only the first step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and, therefore, nuclear disarmament. India said it was deeply disturbed that some nuclear-weapon States appeared unwilling to start addressing the security concerns of other States. The Conference had to start negotiations on a time-bound programme for the elimination of all nuclear weapons early this year.

Australia stated that a test-ban treaty would have an important normative and practical impact on disarmament and non-proliferation. States were moving in a determined way towards the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. If squandered, this opportunity would slip from their grasp, and they would be left with only recrimination at their failure.

South Africa said its support of the 1996 deadline for the conclusion of the negotiations and its position on the test-ban treaty as an instrument of disarmament and non-proliferation was reinforced by its view that such a treaty was an integral part of a programme of action, which would lead to the full implementation of the article VI nuclear disarmament obligations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Japan wished to see the test-ban treaty become a concrete step towards nuclear disarmament. The goal had to be the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons, to be achieved through a variety of measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation, to reduce existing nuclear stockpiles and to prevent qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.

The outgoing Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban presented a report on its work during the period 8 to 19 January.

Morocco announced that on 13 December 1995 it had ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. The adoption of this Convention constituted a step furthering the security of the entire international community.

The Republic of Korea referred to the decision adopted by the Conference last September on expanding its membership and noted that, in spite of the significance and urgency of that decision, it had yet to be implemented. He hoped that all the present members would not stand in the way of the consensus method which the Conference had chosen to advance and would cooperate in creating a general atmosphere conducive to solving the question of expansion at the earliest possible date.

Statements

ARUNDHATI GHOSE (India) said that, indeed, 1996 was a testing time for the Conference. It was necessary to be conscious of the fact that the international community and international public opinion had great expectations of them. That session had started at a time when apprehensions relating to the international security environment had increased rather than diminished. Less than a year ago, the NPT had been indefinitely extended. That single act had resulted in the legitimization, for the foreseeable future and beyond, of the possession of nuclear weapons by a few States and their possible use as a currency of power. That was not just India's view. Given the possibility of treating the perpetuation of the NPT as providing an indefinite licence for possession of nuclear weapons, it became even more imperative to have a legally binding commitment to eliminate those weapons in a specific time-frame, she said.

Global nuclear disarmament had been a major objective of India's foreign policy since independence. India was also conscious that disarmament could not be achieved while proliferation continued. However, non-proliferation lost moral credibility unless it was unambiguously linked to disarmament. "We have demonstrated our commitment to non-proliferation by voluntarily and unilaterally exercising the most rigorous control on our peaceful nuclear programme", she added. India was deeply disturbed that some nuclear-weapon States appeared unwilling to start addressing the security concerns of other

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States. It was hoped that the President of the Conference would be able to undertake serious consultations on that issue over the next week or two and that he would succeed in getting a satisfactory agreement at an early date. The Conference had to be able to start negotiations on a time-bound programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons early this year. That made 1996 a year critical to the Conference and to the future of all disarmament negotiations.

It was in that context that India envisioned the future negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. To have a multilaterally negotiated test-ban treaty was India's proposal four decades ago. During those four decades, the nuclear-weapon States had undertaken extensive testing programmes. India was committed to working towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty that would promote the universally enunciated goal of total nuclear disarmament and, thereby, the lasting and legitimate security interests of all countries in a nuclear-weapon-free world. In that spirit, India had been actively participating in the negotiations and would continue to be so engaged with the aim of achieving its goals.

Much work remained to be done on the comprehensive test-ban treaty text. They had yet to come to grips with several major technical and political issues, including the scope of the treaty, the verification regime, on-site inspections, International Monitoring System (IMS) architecture, the financing of both the new organization and the IMS, the composition of the Executive Council, withdrawal and entry into force. India intended to make concrete textual proposals so that the test-ban treaty would become a genuine disarmament step which terminated for all States, without discrimination, the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems. As to the treaty's scope, India continued to believe in a treaty which banned all kinds of nuclear weapons testing. They must ensure that the comprehensive test-ban treaty left no loophole for activity, either explosive based or non-explosive based, aimed at the continued development and refinement of nuclear weapons.

RICHARD STARR (Australia), after briefly recalling the history of the consideration of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban over the past 40 years, observed that resolution of the issue was hard precisely because it was meaningful. A test-ban treaty constituted a genuine step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, a step that could never have been taken during the cold war decades. Because such a treaty would have an important normative and practical impact on disarmament and non-proliferation, Australia strongly opposed further tests by any States. The moratoriums declared and observed by nuclear-weapon States was vital to the negotiations.

Now, States were moving in a determined way to take that fundamental step towards the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, he said. If squandered, that opportunity would slip from their grasp and they would be left with only recrimination at their failure. Resolution 50/65, adopted at last year's Assembly without a vote, recognized the importance of seizing that opportunity

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as soon as possible in 1996. The guidance from the international community provided the firm expectation that a test-ban treaty would be concluded in time for signature by the outset of the next session of the General Assembly in September. The 1996 target dates for conclusion and signature accepted by the overwhelming majority were both necessary and attainable.

While many significant matters required finalization, he believed that only two areas stood between States and achievement of the treaty -- scope and on-site inspection. On scope, they were banning nuclear explosions, and there had to be a true zero-yield standard with no exceptions. All five nuclear- weapon States had to coalesce around that objective and ensure that that was reflected in the text. On on-site inspections, it was fair to say States were still some way from convergence, but they could and must make rapid progress. The complex of interrelated issues would need to be resolved in a balanced package. Within that package, it would be essential to guarantee the principle of access; timely deployment of the inspection; effective use of all relevant information; and assurance against abuse, including the elaboration of managed access provisions.

Many other issues were still to be decided, but generally those problems were localized, he said. And often the outcomes were evident enough. Did any delegation seriously doubt, for example, that the test-ban treaty organization would be in Vienna, co-located in the international centre with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)? They must not lose sight of the goal -- a treaty which banned nuclear-test explosions and which provided adequate deterrence against violations while constraining abuse of any provisions. That treaty was needed both for the disarmament and non-proliferation benefits of the step itself and also because, at this point, a comprehensive test-ban treaty was the best available route towards broader objectives in nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

LUDWIK DEMBINSKY (Poland), outgoing Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban, presented a report on the Committee's work during the period 8 to 19 January. In its substance, the negotiating effort represented a direct continuation of the work programme of 1995 and preparation for the session of 1996. The brief two-week period available to the Committee was put to an intensive and very productive use resulting in important revisions to the rolling text, he noted.

Specifically, Working Group I had considered different aspects of the rolling text pertaining to verification. Meeting between 4 and 15 December 1995, the session had brought together 82 experts from 29 States. The Working Group also reviewed draft language on the international monitoring system, on-site inspections, and on associated measures and recommended some changes to the rolling text of the treaty. In turn, Working Group II dealt with various aspects of the rolling text pertaining to the future test-ban treaty organization. It had considered, in particular, the practical yet sensitive

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issues of the funding, the seat and the possible relation of the organization to the IAEA.

JACOBS S. SELEBI (South Africa) stated that the completion of the negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty was clearly the most important task facing the Conference during that session. The decision to establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban immediately and the Chairman's decision to begin that Committee's work right away signalled to the international community their determination to meet the deadline. If States did not finalize work on the treaty by the middle of this year, then it was highly unlikely that they would be able to meet the deadline. States should then miss the opportunity which the current favourable international political situation had provided.

While the rolling text of the draft treaty remained heavily bracketed, only a few, but fundamental, issues remained to be resolved, he noted. Once those issues had been addressed, many of the other difficulties would either disappear or easily fall into place. South Africa had consistently held the view that the treaty should be an instrument for disarmament and non-proliferation and that both those elements must be reflected in the article on scope. South Africa did not support the concepts of peaceful nuclear explosions or low-yield tests and had welcomed the announcements by France, United States, United Kingdom and the Russian Federation supporting a true zero-yield test-ban treaty. The Australian text highlighted the important issues which had to be addressed and provided for a fully comprehensive, zero-yield test-ban treaty.

South Africa's support of the 1996 deadline for the conclusion of the negotiations and its position on the treaty as an instrument of disarmament and non-proliferation was reinforced by its view that the treaty was an integral part of a programme of action which would lead to the full implementation of the article VI nuclear disarmament obligations of the NPT. On the issue of verification of a treaty, the IMS had to be structured in such a way as to provide confidence in its ability effectively to verify the Treaty. On-site inspection would be rare, and they must, therefore, ensure that the investigation of suspicious events should be swift and effective. He was convinced that the outstanding issues in the rolling text of the treaty would not prove insurmountable, given the necessary political will and flexibility of the part of delegations.

With regard to the programme of work for 1996, he said it appeared that there was a large measure of support in the Conference for work on the following issues: nuclear disarmament, fissile material cut-off, transparency in armaments, and security assurances. As yet, however, there was no agreement on how they could realistically approach those issues this year. It was possible to make some meaningful advancement on those issues without

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misdirecting resources necessary for the completion of the comprehensive test- ban treaty negotiations.

HISAMI KUROKOCHI (Japan) said that the task the Conference faced this year -- the mission of concluding the comprehensive test-ban treaty -- was of vital importance to the whole world. It was encouraging that States had succeeded in the prompt resumption of the work on the treaty at the very first day of deliberation of the 1996 session. It was a clear manifestation that all were committed to the earliest possible conclusion of the negotiations on it. Japan would make its utmost effort towards concluding the treaty this coming spring. A world free of nuclear testing was now within reach. States should not miss this precious window of opportunity. For that purpose, they had first of all to have a clear vision of a feasible time-frame. The goal of signing the treaty by the fall of 1996 made it necessary for them to have a clean text available during the second session of the Conference this year. Secondly, States had to sort out the questions to be solved in the negotiations in the Conference from those issues that they might entrust to the Preparatory Commission.

The scope was the central issue of the treaty. Japan supported a true zero-yield treaty, which prohibited all nuclear explosions. It was Japan's desire to see the treaty become a concrete step towards nuclear disarmament. Japan urged all nuclear-weapon States to agree on a true zero-yield as soon as possible. She hoped that increasing support for the treaty language proposed by Australia would soon lead to a consensus, as it accurately embodied the true zero-yield nuclear-test ban. With respect to verification, it was regrettable that the intersessional work on the IMS this month could not produce sufficient results. Further progress was required in the near future. As regards on-site inspection, she shared the view that it would be necessary to them to formulate a sort of package that encompassed all related major elements. As to the organization it should be small, efficient, cost-effective and devoid of too much bureaucratization. Japan considered Vienna favourably as a possible seat for the organization to make the best use of existing expertise, particularly that of the IAEA.

Saying that she would be remiss if she did not take up the subject of nuclear disarmament, she recalled that Japan had consistently appealed to the nuclear-weapon States to steadily move towards nuclear disarmament. It was particularly imperative now in view of the indefinite extension of the NPT and the "Principles and Objectives". As repeatedly stated, Japan's position on nuclear disarmament was clear -- the goal must be the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons. That should be achieved through a variety of measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation, to reduce existing nuclear stockpiles and prevent qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Those measures must be put into action through realistic measures that would lead to actual nuclear disarmament. Beyond the comprehensive test-ban treaty, the prohibition of the

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production of fissile material for nuclear weapons had to be the next such concrete step.

MOHAMED NACER BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI (Morocco) announced that his country had ratified on 13 December 1995 the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. In becoming a party to the Convention, Morocco, which had never possessed nor ever intended to possess chemical weapons, hoped to be able to contribute to the total and definitive elimination of that type of weapon.

Taking into account the basic characteristics of the Convention banning chemical weapons, notably of its scope and universal character, Morocco wished that the treaty would rapidly receive the greatest number of ratifications so that it could thus enter into force with the least delay. In ratifying the Convention, he stated, Morocco recalled that it had always supported the total elimination of all arms of mass destruction. The adoption of the Convention constituted a step towards that fundamental objective for the security of the entire international community.

YONG SHIK HWANG (Republic of Korea) recalled that on 21 September 1995 the Conference had adopted a decision by consensus whereby the 23 countries listed in the 1993 report by the then Special Coordinator on Membership would all assume membership of the Conference at the earliest possible date to be decided by the Conference. That decision was not only a reflection of the long-cherished aspirations of the 23 States for full membership, but also a landmark in the history of the Conference which made it possible to broaden the basis of support for the results of future disarmament negotiations.

In spite of the significance and the urgency of the decision, it had yet to be implemented, he said. That was mainly due to differing opinions on whether or not one State among the 23, which was subject to the Security Council's comprehensive enforcement measures, would have the right to deny consensus on any decision to be adopted by the Conference. Once a consensus was reached, however, all the participants in the negotiations should honour the results. If that understanding of the practice of consensus was applied to the question of Conference expansion, the decision made by consensus should, as such, be faithfully implemented. He hoped that all the members would not stand in the way of the consensus method which the Conference had chosen to advance and cooperate in creating a general atmosphere conducive to solving the question of expansion at the earliest possible date.

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