DIFFERING VIEWS ON STRENGTHENING LAND-MINE RESTRICTIONS EXPRESSED AT VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE

19951002 VIENNA, 27 September (UN Information Service) -- As the Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Inhumane Weapons entered its second day of high-level debate, speakers continued to be unanimous in supporting the addition of a protocol that would ban blinding laser weapons, and the extension of the land-mines Protocol to apply to non-international conflicts. There was still no clear consensus, however, on the extent to which the production, sale and use of anti-personnel land-mines should be restricted.

The representative of China stressed that all States had a legitimate right to use mines to resist foreign aggression. While supporting the standardization of the marking and recording of mine-fields, China stipulated that States parties should be allowed to determine the use of international marks in the light of their specific self-defence environments, and that they should not be obliged to make their mine records public.

A number of speakers -- notably the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom -- endorsed the imposition of a requirement that all anti-personnel mines be detectable, be equipped with self-destruct devices and have specified lifetimes. While the United Kingdom was convinced that a failure rate of one in a thousand was possible for self-destructing anti-personnel mines, and proposed that a standard be written into the definition of such mines in the revised text of Protocol II, a representative of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies said he doubted that the failure rate of such mines would ever reach an acceptable level.

The representative of Colombia said that there were neither smart nor dumb mines, neither humane, easy-to-detect mines, nor safe, self-destruct mines. Echoing the sentiments of the Secretary-General, he favoured a complete ban on all mines.

Statements were also made by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation and representatives of Poland, Croatia, Brazil, Romania, Cuba, Switzerland, Ukraine, Czech Republic, United States and Colombia.

(For background on the Review Conference, see Press Release DC/2522 of 13 September.)

General Exchange of Views

KRZYSZTOF J. JAKUBOWSKI, Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, said he favoured a comprehensive prohibition on the use and transfer of remotely delivered mines which were non-detectable and were not self-destructing. The use of anti-personnel land-mines without such mechanisms should be strictly limited and precisely defined. He said that two weeks ago Poland had adopted a resolution imposing a moratorium on the export of undetectable and non-self-destructing anti-personnel land-mines.

The applicability of Protocol II should be expanded to include non-international armed conflicts, he said. He also supported a five-year review procedure and the creation of an international verification and compliance mechanism and the addition of a protocol on blinding lasers, the specific content of which "should be carefully elaborated".

DAVID DAVIS, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, said that his country now imposed a total ban on the export of non-detectable or non-self-destructing anti-personnel mines, as well as a ban on the export of all anti-personnel land-mines to countries that had not ratified the Convention.

"It is easy to say 'ban all land-mines'," he said. "But the vast majority of countries, including the United Kingdom, regard land-mines as a legitimate means of defence -- provided they are used responsibly and in accordance with the laws of war." A ban by some of the most responsible countries would have little effect where it really mattered. Mines would continue to be used. The aim of the Conference should be to ensure that the international rules for their use were tightened, and that countries which did not follow those rules were denied access to land-mines. The international community should also strive to phase non-self-destructing, anti-personnel mines out of existence.

He said the United Kingdom was keen to see self-destructing mines become the norm. It was convinced that a failure rate of one in a thousand was possible for such mines, and insisted that such a standard be written into the definition of self-destructing anti-personnel mines in the revised text of Protocol II.

As a member of the European Union, his country shared its aim of achieving a Convention whose scope would be broadened to cover internal conflicts and to which more States would adhere. It should set down clear definitions and standards for self-destructing mines, and stipulate how minefields were to be marked and mapped. It should provide for assistance to humanitarian agencies working in mined areas. Protocol II should ensure that mines were detectable. It should also introduce controls on transfers and contain an effective verification mechanism.

He said his Government would continue to support complementary measures. The land-mine control programme it had proposed with the United States sought to stop the production of so-called "dumb" mines and provided for a declared, steady programme of stockpile reductions. The United Kingdom had contributed some £15.9 million to de-mining operations since 1991, and would continue to give high priority to such assistance for many years to come.

ANA MARIJA BESKER (Croatia) said her country did not produce land-mines or booby-traps, but had become a victim of them, due to hostilities which began in 1991. Because of that, her country has been actively involved in the issue. She said that currently almost 2.5 million mines had been planted across some 300,000 hectares of land. Despite all efforts, only some 200,000 mines had been cleared since 1991. Cost estimates for mine clearance had been estimated at some $300 million over several years. She appealed to the international community to respond more strongly to the recently created United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance. The amounts in the Fund thus far would not even suffice to cover the costs of clearance of one fifth of the land-mines in Croatia alone.

Against that background, Croatia strongly supported strengthening and broadening the scope of Protocol II. Specifically, she expressed strong support for applying the Protocol to conflicts of a non-international nature, banning anti-personnel land-mines which were not self-destructing or self- neutralizing and establishing a verification and enforcement regime. Echoing the sentiments of some other delegates, she said her country favoured a total prohibition on the use, manufacture stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines, but was prepared to accept some compromises in order to achieve consensus.

LI CHANGHE (China) said the first priority must be to create conditions to attract more countries to become parties to the Convention and its Protocols. It was also important to strengthen the provisions of the Convention and of the land-mines Protocol. Meanwhile, it must not be forgotten that mines were effective defensive weapons for many countries, especially developing countries. All States had a legitimate right to use mines to resist foreign aggression. When revising Protocol II, the Conference should take into account both humanitarian ideals and legitimate military needs.

China favoured extending Protocol II to domestic armed conflicts. However, he said, the Protocol must stipulate that this broadening of its scope did not change the legal status of parties to such a conflict or of any disputed territories. It should provide for the Convention to be legally binding on all parties to domestic conflicts on the territory of a State party. China also supported standardization of the marking and recording of mine-fields. However, marks and records should not undermine any State party's right to self-defence. A State party should be allowed to determine the use of international marks in the light of its specific self-defence environment.

Furthermore, a State party must have the right not to make public the records of the mines placed on its territory.

He reiterated that the revision of Protocol II to reduce civilian casualties should not undermine the defence capabilities of States parties. Also, when considering the types of mines to prohibit, and criteria for detectability and reliability, account should be taken of differing levels of scientific and technological capability among States parties. Because all the countries plagued by land-mines were war-torn developing countries, the international community was duty-bound to provide them with assistance, particularly in mine-clearing; that should be stipulated in the Protocol. That instrument should also provide for technical cooperation and assistance to enable less technologically advanced States parties to comply with its revised technical requirements.

S.B. KRYLOV (Russian Federation) said that in peacetime, thousands of Russian citizens had fallen victims to Second World War land-mines, and against that background he strongly supported the efforts of the international community to impose strict limitations on the use of mines. Last December, Russia established a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines, but that, he said, was only part of the land-mine issue. An integrated approach, along the lines of the current draft version of Protocol II, would be required.

Along those lines, he supported extending the Protocol to cover non-international conflicts, restrictions on non-detectable mines, ban transfer of mines to non-governmental entities and States which were not parties to the Protocol and establishing further guarantees to protect international staff working in mined areas. He also favoured adding a protocol to the Convention to prohibit the use of blinding laser weapons. He stressed, however, that agreed-upon control mechanisms should not frighten off interested parties, and a balance of interests was required to guarantee the universality and effectiveness of international controls.

JOSE VIEGAS FILHO (Brazil) said that his Government had recently ratified the Convention. It had not produced or exported a single land-mine since 1989. He urged the Conference to produce a text based strictly on the principles of international law, particularly those of the Charter, and to bear in mind that it was dealing with matters that must also be considered from a military point of view. While the ideal would be a world totally free of excessively injurious weapons, the international community should set a series of partial, specific commitments on the road to that ideal. He anticipated concrete results with respect to such issues as: the adoption of a ban on non-detectable anti-personnel mines; extension of Protocol II to non- international conflicts; prohibition of export of anti-personnel mines to non-States parties; adoption of verification mechanisms.

He welcomed the proposed ban on blinding laser weapons. He said that if self-destructing, self-neutralizing mines were to become the norm throughout the world, the appropriate technology for their production would have to be transferred.

FLORIN ROSU, Director of the Disarmament Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, said the use of land-mines had grown exponentially over the past few years and, in the absence of new controls, was likely to continue to do so. Romania ratified the Convention and its three Protocols in May, and declared an initial one-year moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines, to begin 1 July.

The first essential objective of the Conference should be the promotion of universal or near-universal adherence to the Convention, he said. Further, he also highlighted the importance of extending the scope of Protocol II to include conflicts of a non-international nature, imposing far-reaching restrictions on anti-personnel mines which were not self-destructing or self-neutralizing and banning all anti-personnel land-mines which were not easily detectable. He also supported creating a verification and fact-finding commission and expanding the scope of technological cooperation.

JORGE MORALES PEDRAZA (Cuba) said his country had been forced, with the sole objective of guaranteeing its own security, to mine the entire area bordering on the Guantanamo naval base, the only base in the world which was maintained by force, against the will of the Government and people of the host country. The mines were intended to protect the civilian population in nearby areas; Cuba would immediately de-mine the area if the United States would withdraw its forces.

Most developing countries did not produce mines, he noted, although some were exporters. According to information published by the United Nations, a total of 24 developed countries produced some 220 different models of anti-personnel land-mines. The United States was the major producer. Cuba produced mines strictly for its own use, and would only use them for defence against an external threat. It would be willing to subscribe to a total ban on exports to all countries, regardless of whether they were States parties; and a ban on production of non-detectable, non-self-destructing anti-personnel mines. It should be specified that self-neutralizing mines had a maximum lifetime of 30 days.

Cuba was willing to agree that mines should only be used with specified marking. It would accept the establishment of a verification commission that would analyse reports made by States parties of violations by other States parties. It was also prepared to support a protocol to ban blinding laser weapons.

MICHAEL J. MATHESON (United States) said his country had ratified the Convention in March of this year. The ultimate goal of the international community should be the elimination of anti-personnel land-mines, including a ban on their use, production, stockpiling and transfer, and that goal would best be accomplished by developing viable alternatives to reduce the risks faced by civilian populations. That process must begin at the Review Conference with a substantial revision of the land-mine Protocol.

Noting that most land-mines had been laid in internal armed conflicts, and by States not party to the Convention, he said his delegation would press for certain specific improvements to the Protocol: He favoured expanding the scope of the Protocol to apply to internal armed conflicts. All remotely delivered mines should be equipped with self-destruct devices and a back-up "self-deactivating feature" in the event the self-destruct mechanism failed. He proposed a maximum mine life of 30 days from emplacement and a self-deactivation feature with a 120-day limit. All other anti-personnel land-mines should be required to be used within controlled, marked and monitored minefields, protected by fencing or some other civilian safeguard.

Echoing sentiments expressed by other representatives, he favoured a requirement that all mines be detectable by commonly available technology, proposed creating a requirement that it would be the duty of the party laying mines either to clear them or maintain them in controlled fields and supported an effective verification mechanism and more frequent consideration of the land-mines Protocol.

On the issue of blinding laser weapons, he said his country had reviewed its position and now supported adding a new protocol to prohibit the use of laser weapons "specifically designed to cause permanent blindness of unenhanced vision". He stressed however, that he would not be open to restrictions on the use of lasers for "targeting, range-finding and countering optical or electro-optical devices".

LUCIUS CAFLISCH, of Switzerland, said his country was particularly interested in seeing a new protocol adopted to ban blinding laser weapons. It was also submitting to the Conference a proposal on small calibre weapons. But the priority must be to revise Protocol II. Improved regulation of land-mines should entail: extension of the Protocol to cover internal armed conflicts and times of peace; prohibition of the production, export, transfer or use of non-detectable or non-self-destructing mines; stricter requirements for marking and recording of mine fields; and establishment of a binding international verification mechanism.

None of those provisions would be enough, however, unless they were framed in a way that would permit the majority of members of the international community to subscribe to them, he said.

VOLODYMYR BELASHOV (Ukraine) said that even with a significant increase

in de-mining efforts worldwide, even with far-reaching technological advances, the problem of land-mines would not be solved unless their proliferation was halted. He reminded delegates that the countries suffering the most from land-mine contamination were not themselves producers -- over 85 per cent of all uncleared land-mines were purchased or transferred from one of the 40 mine-producing countries. Against that background, on 1 September, Ukraine introduced a four-year moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines of all types.

On expanding the Protocol to include internal conflicts, he said that his country supported provisions which clearly stated that the use of land-mines against civilian populations in all circumstances was prohibited. He supported imposing restrictions on land-mines without self-destruct mechanisms and on remotely delivered mines. He favoured the complete prohibition of all booby-traps and other devices attached to objects such as children's toys or medical equipment and supported establishing an efficient verification and compliance mechanism.

JAROMIR PRIVRATSKY (Czech Republic) associated his country with yesterday's statement by the representative of the European Union. He said that Protocol II must be extended to apply to internal armed conflicts. All mines that were not easily detectable must be prohibited; there must be specific technical specifications in that regard. There must be a world-wide ban on the transfer of any non-self-destructing anti-personnel mines. Elimination of "dumb" mines was a common aim, but it would be difficult and costly to achieve.

He supported the proposal to prohibit the transfer of any mines to entities that were not States, or non-parties to Protocol II. No anti-personnel mines of any kind had been produced in his country since 1990, and no export licences for such mines issued since 1989, he stated.

He said it should be stipulated in Protocol II that the parties that placed mines were responsible for their removal. Effective implementation and verification mechanisms should be incorporated into the Convention; those would include the establishment of a verification commission to investigate alleged breaches and violations. He also supported the addition of provisions aimed at protecting United Nations missions and humanitarian operations. He urged participants to do their best to encourage other countries, particularly mine-stricken developing countries, to become parties to the Convention and to Protocol II. He also appealed to them to adopt an additional protocol on blinding lasers, on the understanding that legitimate military uses of lasers would not be affected.

CARLOS LEMOS SIMMONDS (Colombia) said that despite the fact that his country had not yet adhered to the Convention, he was deeply involved in the process of this Conference as an observer. While his country neither manufactured nor used land-mines, it was victimized by their use by guerrilla groups. Home-made mines, almost impossible to detect, caused devasting damage and numbered in the thousands in Colombia.

Supporting statements by the Secretary-General and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), he said there were neither smart mines nor dumb mines, neither humane, easy-to-detect mines, nor safe self-destructing mines, which still retained their potential to maim and kill. All mines were injurious, all posed a grave danger to civilian populations and all mines, without exception, needed to be banned. Ceasing to manufacture mines would be the best and simplest way to save people from harm. He cited a statement which appeared in the Herald Tribune newspaper made by former United States Marine Commander Alfred Gray Jr., who was quoted as saying that not in any conflict area including Korea, south-east Asia and Panama did he know of an instance in which the use of mines would have made the difference between victory or defeat. That alone, the speaker said, should give delegates reason to rethink the value of land-mines.

He said he hoped humanitarian concerns, rather than legal technicalities, would prevail, both in land-mines and in elimination of blinding laser weapons. He hoped the Conference would prohibit the use of anti-personnel land-mines and blinding laser weapons and would broaden its Protocol to cover internal armed conflicts. Calling for decisive action, he said it was not the boldness of the Convention which had caused so few countries to adhere to it, but its timidity.

FRIEDRICH WENDL, of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, said that many of the world's poorest people did not have the option of abandoning mined fields to farm elsewhere. For people maimed by land-mines, the introduction of self-neutralizing and detectable mines was no solution.

"We doubt that the failure rate of such mines will ever reach an acceptable level. Anything less than certainty is no consolation for the children who have to walk to school across the supposedly safe ground", he said. There was no halfway solution. Only an all-out ban on the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of land-mines was acceptable. The Federation fully supported the proposed extension of the Convention to cover non-international armed conflicts, as a first step towards a total ban.

While land-mines were the urgent focus of today's discussion, the Federation was also deeply concerned about the rapid escalation in the trade in, and use of, all forms of small weapons, he said. He also urged the Conference to ensure that laser weapons were never used.

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