Security Council

5848^th Meeting (PM)

SECURITY COUNCIL TIGHTENS RESTRICTIONS ON IRAN’S PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR

ACTIVITIES, INCREASES VIGILANCE OVER IRANIAN BANKS, HAS STATES INSPECT CARGO

Adopting Resolution 1803 by 14-0-1, Council Welcomes Agreement between Iran,

Atomic Energy Agency to Resolve Outstanding Issues on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

The Security Council today approved a new round of sanctions against Iran for refusing to suspend uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related projects, as had been required in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), and for taking issue with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) right to verify design information provided to it.

Adopting resolution 1803 (2008) by a vote of 14 in favour to none against, with 1 abstention (Indonesia), the Council, acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter [regarding binding measures not involving armed force], the Council affirmed its earlier decision that Iran should, without delay, suspend the aforementioned activities, as required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (Press Release SC/8928 of 23 December 2006).

The Council called upon all States to exercise “vigilance and restraint” regarding entry into or transit through their territories of individuals engaged in or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.

In that connection, it decided that all States should notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2007) of such entry or transit, specifically of those people mentioned in the annex to resolution 1737, annex I to resolution 1747 (Press Release SC/8980 of 24 March 2007), or annex I and annex II (regarding procurement of prohibited items) of the current resolution, as well of additional persons so designated by the Council or the Committee.

The Council further extended the freezing of the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems, including those mentioned in annexes I and II of the current resolution or designated by the Committee.

It called upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat.

The Council also continued the blocking of the import and export of sensitive nuclear material and equipment, except when meant exclusively for use in light-water reactors with advance notice to the Committee.

States were also called upon to inspect cargo to and from Iran of aircraft and vessels owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided “reasonable grounds” existed to believe that the aircraft or vessel was transporting prohibited goods.

The Council welcomed the agreement between Iran and IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme, and progress made in that regard, as set out in the Director General’s report of 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4).  In that context, it stressed the willingness of China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States to enhance diplomatic efforts to promote resumption of dialogue with Iran, with a view to seeking long-term solution of the issue that would allow for wider cooperation and, inter alia, the start of direct talks.

The Council would suspend the sanctions if and for so long as Iran would suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by IAEA, but warned that, in the event Iran did not comply with relevant Council resolutions, it would decide on the adoption of further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII.

At the outset of the meeting, Iran’s representative said: “Today’s action of some members of the Security Council against Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, along with the measures taken in this regard in the past, do not meet the minimum standards of legitimacy and legality.”  Iran’s nuclear programme had been and would remain absolutely peaceful and in no way posed any threat to international peace and security.  It, therefore, did not fall within the Council’s purview.  The peaceful nature of his country’s nuclear programme had been confirmed by each and every IAEA report in the past several years.

By resolving the outstanding issues with regard to Iran’s past activities on the one hand, and conducting all its present activities, including the enrichment, under the full and continuous monitoring of the Agency, the country had removed any so-called “concerns” or “ambiguities” with regard to its peaceful nuclear activities in the past and at present, he said.

He said the Council’s behaviour in undermining the credibility and integrity of the Agency would only serve the interests of those who preferred to ignore IAEA, such as the Israeli regime, which, with hundreds of nuclear warheads in its possession, posed the most serious threat to international and regional peace and security.  The future security of the world depended on how the United Nations, and especially the Security Council, functioned in a just and impartial manner.  In reality, peoples across the globe had now lost their trust in the Council and considered its actions the result of political pressure exerted by a few Powers to advance their own agendas.

Although most Council members said they had voted in favour of the resolution because of Iran’s non-compliance with Council demands, as well as the IAEA stance that it could not guarantee that Iran’s nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes only, Indonesia’s representative, explaining his abstention, said: “Essentially, we are not convinced whether more sanctions, however incremental, well targeted and reversible, would move us forward in resolving the question of Iran’s nuclear programme.”  Conditions today were different than at the adoption of resolution 1747 (2007).   Iran was cooperating with IAEA and, at the present juncture, more sanctions were not the best course.

The representative of the United Kingdom read a statement agreed by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States, with support of the High Representative of the European Union, saying that today’s Council action reflected the international community’s ongoing serious concerns about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear programme.  “We deplore Iran’s continued failure to comply with its United Nations Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency Board requirements, in particular by expanding its enrichment-related activities.”

Calling upon Iran to heed the requirements of the Council and the Agency, including the suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, he said that the group of countries remained committed to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and reaffirmed their commitment to a dual-track approach.  Proposals presented to Iran in June 2006 offered “substantial opportunities” for political, security and economic benefits to Iran and the region.  He urged Iran to take the opportunity to find a negotiated way forward.

The representative of the United States added that the international community had good reason to be concerned about Iran’s activities, as the present regime, armed with nuclear weapons, would pose a greater potential danger to the region and to the world.  Iran had been funding and supporting terrorists and militants in Lebanon, the Palestinian Territory, Iraq and Afghanistan.  The President of Iran had embraced the objective of destroying a Member State of the United Nations.  The ministerial statement showed a commitment to a diplomatic solution.  “It gives us not pleasure, but regret, to have to pass another sanctions resolution.  But our vote today demonstrates that the Council will act when countries violate their international obligations,” he said.

The representatives of South Africa, Libya, Viet Nam, France, China, Costa Rica, Burkina Faso, Belgium, Panama, Croatia and the Russian Federation also made statements.

The meeting was called to order at 12:45 p.m. and adjourned at 2:55 p.m.

Background

The Security Council met this afternoon to take action on a draft resolution regarding non-proliferation contained in document S/2008/141, sponsored by France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

It also had before it a letter dated 22 February from the Permanent Representative of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General and the Council President (document S/2008/116).  In it, the Ambassador writes that the latest report of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General of 22 February (GOV/2008/4) declares the full implementation of the work plan concluded between Iran and IAEA in August 2007 (INFCIRC/711) and, thus, resolution and closure of all outstanding issues.  The Director General had stressed that “the Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided by Iran, in accordance with the work plan, are consistent with its findings” and “considers those questions no longer outstanding”.  The report also clearly attests to the “exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme”, both in the past and at present.

He writes that the consideration of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme was imposed on the Council by certain countries out of “mere political motivations and narrow national interests and on the basis of certain pretexts and allegations, which have been totally baseless”.  The full implementation of the work plan has eliminated those pretexts and allegations.  The current and other reports show that Iran is committed to its international obligations and, at the same time, persistent in pursuing and exercising its legal and inalienable rights.

He further states in his letter that, according to the IAEA report, the Agency had recently received from Iran additional information similar to that which Iran had previously provided, pursuant to the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as updated design information.  Iran had provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and had provided relevant reports.  It had also provided access to individuals in response to the Agency’s requests.

It had now become clear, says Iran’s Permanent Representative, that the country’s peaceful nuclear issue should be dealt with by the Agency as the sole pertinent international organization and that safeguards implementation in Iran had to be “in a routine manner from now on”.  Further, “the Security Council should avoid inflicting more damage to the credibility and authority of IAEA, as well as its own credibility, by persisting in further illegal and illogical engagement and actions pursued by few countries,” he writes.

Draft Resolution

The full text of the draft resolution (document S/2008/141) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling the statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006 and its resolution 1747 (2007) of 24 March 2007, and reaffirming their provisions,

“Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

“Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

“Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/22), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/48) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and heavy-water-related projects as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,

“Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, emphasizing that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the Agency’s right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility,

“Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commending the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme in the work plan between the Secretariat of the IAEA and Iran (GOV/2007/48, Attachment), welcoming the progress in implementation of this work plan as reflected in the IAEA Director General’s report of 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), underlining the importance of Iran producing tangible results rapidly and effectively by completing implementation of this work plan including by providing answers to all the questions the IAEA asks so that the Agency, through the implementation of the required transparency measures, can assess the completeness and correctness of Iran’s declaration,

“Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution, that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,

“Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), and noting the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

“Having regard to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,

“Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Actions Task Force (FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolution 1737 (2006),

“Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

“Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

“Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

“1.   Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006), and underlines that the IAEA has sought confirmation that Iran will apply Code 3.1 modified;

“2.   Welcomes the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and progress made in this regard as set out in the Director General’s report of 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), encourages the IAEA to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues, stresses that this would help to re-establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and supports the IAEA in strengthening its safeguards on Iran’s nuclear activities in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA;

“3.   Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I to resolution 1747 (2007) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3(b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006);

“4.   Underlines that nothing in paragraph 3 above requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) and resolution 1747 (2007), including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

“5.   Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex II to this resolution as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

“6.   Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 above shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;

“7.   Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annexes I and III to this resolution, and any persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them and to persons and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

“8.   Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:

(a)   all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006), of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in sections 1 and 2 of the Annex to that document, and sections 3 to 6 as notified in advance to the Committee, only when for exclusive use in light water reactors, and where such supply, sale or transfer is necessary for technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices as provided for in paragraph 16 of resolution 1737 (2006);

(b)   all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in 19.A.3 of Category II of document S/2006/815;

“9.   Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade, in order to avoid such financial support contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

“10.  Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

“11.  Calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspectthe cargoes to and from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

“12.  Requires all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph above is undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days a written report on the inspection containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place, circumstances, results and other relevant details;

“13.  Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above;

“14.  Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the measures imposed in resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution;

“15.  Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote resumption of dialogue, and consultations on the basis of their offer to Iran, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this issue which would allow for the development of all-round relations and wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and inter alia, starting direct talks and negotiation with Iran as long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA;

“16.  Encourages the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks;

“17.  Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by the present resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

“18.  Requests within 90 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

“19.  Reaffirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to in the paragraph above, and:

(a)   that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;

(b)   that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), and in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c)   that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

“20.  Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

Resolution Annex I

1.    Amir Moayyed Alai (involved in managing the assembly and engineering of centrifuges)

2.    Mohammad Fedai Ashiani (involved in the production of ammonium uranyl carbonate and management of the Natanz enrichment complex)

3.    Abbas Rezaee Ashtiani (a senior official at the AEOI Office of Exploration and Mining Affairs)

4.    Haleh Bakhtiar (involved in the production of magnesium at a concentration of 99.9%)

5.    Morteza Behzad (involved in making centrifuge components)

6.    Dr. Mohammad Eslami (Head of Defence Industries Training and Research Institute)

7.    Seyyed Hussein Hosseini (AEOI official involved in the heavy water research reactor project at Arak)

8.    M. Javad Karimi Sabet (Head of Novin Energy Company, which is designated under resolution 1747 (2007))

9.    Hamid-Reza Mohajerani (involved in production management at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan)

10.   Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi (former Deputy Chief of Armed Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of State Anti-Smuggling Headquarters, engaged in efforts to get round the sanctions imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007))

11.   Houshang Nobari (involved in the management of the Natanz enrichment complex)

12.   Abbas Rashidi (involved in enrichment work at Natanz)

13.   Ghasem Soleymani (Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand Uranium Mine)

Resolution Annex II

A.    Individuals listed in resolution 1737 (2006)

1.    Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development

2.    Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)

3.    Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager ( Arak)

B.    Individuals listed in resolution 1747 (2007)

1.    Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)

2.    Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre, which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)

Resolution Annex III

1.    Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (BK Co.) (involved in the production of centrifuge components)

2.    Barzagani Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies (subsidiary of Saccal System companies) (this company tried to purchase sensitive goods for an entity listed in resolution 1737 (2006))

3.    Electro Sanam Company (E. S. Co./E. X. Co.) (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)

4.    Ettehad Technical Group (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)

5.    Industrial Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery (aka Instrumentation Factories Plant) (used by AIO for some acquisition attempts)

6.    Jabber Ibn Hayan (AEOI laboratory involved in fuel-cycle activities)

7.    Joza Industrial Co. (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)

8.    Khorasan Metallurgy Industries (subsidiary of the Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG) which depends on DIO. Involved in the production of centrifuges components)

9.    Niru Battery Manufacturing Company (subsidiary of the DIO. Its role is to manufacture power units for the Iranian military including missile systems)

10.   Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries (has participated in construction of the Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan) 

11.   Safety Equipment Procurement (SEP) (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)

12.   TAMAS Company (involved in enrichment-related activities. TAMAS is the overarching body, under which four subsidiaries have been established, including one for uranium extraction to concentration and another in charge of uranium processing, enrichment and waste)

Statements

MOHAMMAD KHAZAEE ( Iran) said: “Today’s action of some members of the Security Council against Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, along with the measures taken in this regard in the past, do not meet the minimum standards of legitimacy and legality.”   Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme had been brought to the Council in violation of the [International Atomic Energy Agency’s] statute; Iran had not violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.  It had signed the Additional Protocol in 2003 and had begun its voluntary implementation, which it was not supposed to have begun implementing prior to 2003.  In addition, Iran was only obliged to inform IAEA 180 days prior to feeding nuclear material into facilities, but it had informed the Agency about the uranium conversion facility four years prior to its operation in 2004, and also four years before Iran had been obliged to do so.

He said Iran’s nuclear programme had been, and would remain, absolutely peaceful, and in no way posed any threat to international peace and security.  It, therefore, did not fall within the Council’s purview.  The peaceful nature of his country’s nuclear programme had been confirmed by each and every IAEA report in the past several years.  On the basis of ideological and strategic grounds, Iran categorically rejected the development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, as well as of all other weapons of mass destruction, and it was a leader in international efforts to oppose such weapons.  The IAEA Director General had stressed in various statements that “the Agency does not have any data or evidence indicating that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons” and that there was “no evidence Iran’s enrichment of uranium is intended for a military nuclear programme”.

The outstanding issues were now resolved and closed, he stressed.  The co-sponsors of today’s resolution had argued in the past that the Council should be involved due to unresolved outstanding questions.  However, Iran had concluded a work plan with IAEA in August 2007 to address and resolve the outstanding issues.  The conclusion of the work plan had been described as “a significant step forward” by the Director General.  The co-sponsors of today’s resolution had spared no efforts to hamper its successful implementation.  The Agency’s 22 February report, however, had “clearly declared the resolution and closure of all outstanding issues”.  The Director General had said after the report’s release, “we managed to clarify all the remaining outstanding issues, including the most important issue, which is the scope and nature of Iran’s enrichment programme”.

By resolving the outstanding issues with regard to Iran’s past activities on the one hand, and conducting all its present activities, including the enrichment, under the full and continuous monitoring of IAEA, the country had removed any so-called “concerns” or “ambiguities” with regard to its peaceful nuclear activities in the past and at present, Mr. Khazaee said.   Those who had resorted to a systematic and relentless campaign of false claims, propaganda, intimidation and pressure aimed at IAEA had prompted one of its senior officials to stress that “since 2002, pretty much all the intelligence that’s come to us [from the United States] has proved to be wrong”.  A well-organized and pre-planned propaganda campaign had begun even before the release of the latest IAEA report, in order to eclipse Iran’s resolving outstanding issues.

He said the full implementation of the work plan, and thus resolution and closure of the outstanding issues, had eliminated the most basic pretexts and allegations, on the basis of which Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme had been referred to the Council.  “ Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme should be dealt with solely by the Agency.”

Addressing the suspension issue, he said that Iran could not and would not accept a requirement that was legally defective and politically coercive.  Neither in the IAEA’s statute, nor in the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s safeguards, not even in the Additional Protocol, were “enrichment” and “reprocessing” prohibited.  There was not even a limit for the level of enrichment.  Voluntary suspension had been in place for more than two years in Iran and that had been verified.  It had become clear, however, that those insisting on suspension had indeed aimed to prolong and ultimately perpetuate it, and thus deprive Iran from exercising its inalienable rights.  The attempt to make the suspension mandatory through the Council, from the outset, had violated the fundamental principles of international law, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA Board of Governors’ resolutions.

He said the Council’s decision to coerce Iran into suspension had also been a gross violation of the United Nations Charter’s Article 25.  The Council could not coerce countries into submitting either to its decisions taken in bad faith or to its demands negating the fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter.   Iran needed to enrich uranium to provide fuel for the nuclear reactors it was planning to build to meet the growing energy needs.  There had never been guarantees that those fuel needs would be provided fully by foreign sources.  No country could solely rely on others to provide it with the technology and materials that were vital for its development and for the welfare of its people.

As a representative of a founding Member of the United Nations, he expressed “grave concern and dismay regarding the path that the Security Council has chosen and pursued”.  The Council should be a secure and safe place where the rights of nations, not only were not violated, but were fully respected.  A question arose as to why, after all the crimes of the Zionist regime in the Occupied Palestinian Territory had had been described as ethnic cleansing, genocide and war crimes by the international community, the Council had failed to put an end to those crimes.  Recalling the Council’s inaction after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980, he said “no amount of explanation would be able to describe the disastrous consequences of these unacceptable behaviours of the Security Council”.

The Council’s behaviour in undermining the credibility and integrity of IAEA would only serve the interests of those who preferred to ignore the Agency, such as the Israeli regime, which, with hundreds of nuclear warheads in its possession, posed the most serious threat to international and regional peace and security.  “Is it not time for the Council to respect the judgement of an institution that is part of the UN system?  Or to respect the legitimate rights of a great nation with a long history of civilization and peaceful coexistence with other nations?” he asked.  The future security of the world depended on how the United Nations, and especially the Security Council, functioned in a just and impartial manner.  In reality, peoples across the globe had now lost their trust in the Council and considered its actions the result of political pressure exerted by a few Powers to advance their own agendas.

DUMISANI S. KUMALO ( South Africa) regretted that the sponsors of the resolution persisted with the same text they had tabled before the IAEA Director General’s report.  The resolution appeared not to adequately take into account the progress that had been made between Iran and the Agency.  Adoption of the new resolution could not even be postponed until the IAEA Board had had a full opportunity to consider the matter.  That left the impression that the verification work and progress made by the Agency was virtually irrelevant to the co-sponsors.

He said the rationale to bring the issue to the Council was to reinforce the decisions of the Agency and enhance its authority, yet the resolution did not accurately reflect what was happening at the Agency.  He was seriously concerned about the implications of that for the Security Council’s credibility, and the only reason South Africa supported the resolution was to preserve the unanimity behind previous Council decisions.

IAEA was the only international authority that could provide necessary assurances as to the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, he said.  It was unfortunate that the Council gave the impression that it was in such haste to decide on further punitive sanctions that it did not wish to consider the progress being made through IAEA to provide factual information on implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s safeguards in Iran.  The Director General’s report clearly showed that all outstanding safeguard issues had been clarified and the Agency had not found evidence of diversion.

Since the adoption of resolution 1747 (2007) and following the release of the United States national intelligence estimate, the situation had changed, he said.  Since all outstanding issues had been clarified, there should be increased confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.  At the same time, the need for continued factual information about Iran’s current nuclear activities could be said to be more important in the context of the recent allegations of weaponization activities.

Also important, he noted, was not to jeopardize any of the gains made, and the Council should seek to build on progress made through the continued verification of the Agency’s work.  Given the “confidence deficit” that existed, he urged moving forward in a responsible manner.

South Africa did not wish to see a nuclear-weaponsized Iran or the denial of the right of any signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to exploit the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, he said.  Nor did South Africa want to see a war break out over the nuclear programme in Iran.  Additionally, the suspension of enrichment activities should not become a goal in itself.  The Council should assure Iran that the call for suspension was not a smokescreen for any indefinite suspension or termination.

He said it was also important to terminate the sanctions once IAEA had addressed the remaining issues.  In addition, the restrictions on dual-use goods and on loans and credits must not be allowed to have a negative impact on the civilian population of Iran.  Security Council members that voted in favour of the resolution, including South Africa, had a special obligation to the Iranian people and must exercise the highest degree of oversight in the implementation of the sanctions to ensure no unintended consequences.

IBRAHIM O. A. DABBASHI ( Libya) said his country attached great importance to nuclear non-proliferation and it was not continuing in its programme.  The only guarantee of the non-use of weapons of mass destruction was their elimination.  In that context, he favoured nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world, including the Middle East, and had supported resolutions in that regard, including in the context of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, including in 2007.  Non-proliferation and disarmament were comprehensive issues and should be applied without discrimination.

He said the Council had not attached appropriate importance to Israeli nuclear weapons, despite the fact that Israel had refused to take part in the Non-Proliferation Treaty or comply with the IAEA safeguards regime.   Israel had not taken into consideration the repeated appeals against nuclear weapons, which could have “terrible effects” in the region.   Israel’s attitude, and the massacres it was committing in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, showed that the regime was “terrorist and irresponsible”.  It did not take into consideration international law or international codes of conduct.  It was vital for the Council to deal with that subject comprehensively, and for all countries to become party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

While stressing the importance of nuclear non-proliferation, he also reaffirmed the right of States parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  The report of the IAEA Director General of 22 February showed that essential progress had been made on the Iranian nuclear file and most outstanding issues had been resolved.  The draft resolution should have taken those positive developments into consideration.

However, he said, given the fact that countries that had developed the text had taken into account the concerns of other members and that most believed it was appropriate to adopt the resolution, despite the fact that his delegation did not agree with the assessment process, Libya associated itself with the Council’s consensus and would support the resolution, so as to promote one Council viewpoint.

LE LUONG MINH ( Viet Nam) said his country attached great importance to all three major pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- non-proliferation, respect for the rights of all the parties to develop, research and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and nuclear disarmament.  Viet Nam had proposed changes to the draft resolution to the effect that Iran’s cooperation with IAEA and other progress, as well as the authority and role of the Agency as the body mandated to resolve the non-proliferation issues within the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s framework would be more adequately reflected.  With the proposed changes having been incorporated, the fact that IAEA had indicated that Iran still needed to respond to requests by it and by the Council, as well as the fact that the scope of implementation envisaged in the draft was basically the same as in the previous resolutions adopted by consensus, Viet Nam would vote in favour of it.

He said favourable conditions must be created, however, for the peaceful solution of the Iran nuclear issue, including cessation of hostile policies against Iran, assurance of Iran’s legitimate security interests and respect for the right of Iran to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the adherence by all States in the region to the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be positive steps in that direction.  While hailing new progress in cooperation between Iran and IAEA, he hoped that Iran’s efforts would be positively matched in the coming period.

MARTY M. NATALEGAWA ( Indonesia) underscored the imperative to find a peaceful solution to any question related to nuclear non-proliferation, one that was guided by the need to protect the integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.   Indonesia had full confidence in IAEA’s credibility and had been guided by its latest report in determining the right course of action.  He appreciated Iran’s efforts for greater cooperation, which had allowed the Agency to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material.   Iran had provided IAEA with access to declared nuclear material, as well as required nuclear material accountancy reports in that connection.

He noted that the Agency had considered that all remaining outstanding issues contained in the work plan, with the exception of one, had been resolved.  The report stated that Iran had not suspended its enrichment-related activities, had begun developing new generation centrifuges and had continued its construction of the IR-40 reactor of heavy water production.  For the remaining one issue, namely alleged weaponization studies, the report noted that the Agency had not detected the use of nuclear material.  However, it also stated that it was “not yet in a position to determine the full nature of Iran’s nuclear programme”.  It was important to note that progress had been made in resolving the outstanding issues.

Noting the “well-calibrated nature” of the report, which depicted well the complexity of the issue, he said that Indonesia had expected that the draft resolution would reflect those complex dynamics and mixed findings.  In that context, he noted that the additional sanctions had been described as “incremental” and that the Council would suspend implementation if Iran curtailed all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

“Essentially, we are not convinced whether more sanctions, however incremental, well targeted and reversible, would move us forward in resolving the question of Iran’s nuclear programme,” he said, wondering whether more sanctions at this juncture constituted “the most sensible approach”.  Instead, he believed the lack of confidence and trust was at the heart of the matter.

He said he expected Iran to continue to engage actively with the Agency to build confidence about its programme.  The Iran dossier was referred to the Council to encourage the country to resolve outstanding verification issues, and while work was ongoing, progress had been made.  Suspension of enrichment-related activities was not an end in itself, isolated from developments in Iran’s cooperation with IAEA.

There was often a vicious cycle, with no guarantee given to non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the security of supply of nuclear technology and materials for peaceful purposes; they were prone to suspicion, he said.  To end that cycle, it was imperative to move forward in a constructive manner and renew the initiative to establish a multilateral arrangement to guarantee the security of supply of nuclear technology and material.  That would provide assurance to Iran and end existing suspicions.  The Non-Proliferation Treaty should be pursued in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner.

It was important to recognize that conditions today were different than on the eve of adoption of resolution 1747 (2007), he said.   Iran was cooperating with IAEA and, at the present juncture, more sanctions were not the best course.  For that reason, Indonesia would abstain in today’s vote.

Action

The Council then voted on the draft resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 14 in favour to none against, with 1 abstention ( Indonesia) as resolution 1803 (2008).

Statements

JOHN SAWERS (United Kingdom), reading a statement agreed by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States, with support of the High Representative of the European Union, said that the Security Council today adopted resolution 1803 (2008) reflecting the international community’s ongoing serious concerns about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear programme.  It was the third time the Council had sent a strong message of international resolve to Iran by adopting a sanctions resolution under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter.  “We deplore Iran’s continued failure to comply with its United Nations Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board requirements, in particular by expanding its enrichment-related activities,” he said.

He noted progress made in implementing the IAEA-Iran work plan, but also the Agency’s serious concerns about the “alleged studies”, which were critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to the country’s nuclear programme.  He called upon Iran to heed the requirements of the Council and the Agency, including the suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

He said he remained committed to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and reaffirmed the countries’ commitment to a dual-track approach.  Proposals presented to Iran in June 2006 offered “substantial opportunities” for political, security and economic benefits to Iran and the region, and he urged Iran to take the opportunity to find a negotiated way forward.

Reiterating the countries’ recognition of Iran’s right to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, he reconfirmed that, once the international community’s confidence in the “exclusively peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear programme was restored, Iran would be treated in the same manner as any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

He said the countries remained ready to negotiate future arrangements, modalities and timing in that respect, once the conditions had been established.  As that would require further diplomatic efforts, the European Union’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, had been asked to meet with Saeed Jalili, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, to address concerns of both sides.

Speaking in his national capacity, he said his Government welcomed the “very broad support” for the Council’s resolution.  Its adoption underlined the global community’s profound concern that Iran might be intending to use its nuclear programme for military purposes.  “The United Kingdom does not have confidence that Iran’s programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,” he said.

The resolution was a necessary response to Iran’s failure to comply with IAEA Board requirements, including suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activity and work on all heavy-water-related projects, resolution of all outstanding questions and implementation and ratification of the Additional Protocol. Iran’s progress with IAEA addressed only one of those issues.   Iran had refused to answer the most difficult questions about its past programmes.  Overall, Iran had clearly failed to abide by its legal obligations under successive Security Council resolutions.

The political statement agreed by the Foreign Ministers of the “E3+3”, with support of the European Union High Representative, had made clear the commitment to a negotiated solution on the basis of far-reaching proposals to which the six countries had agreed in June 2006, he said.  “Our offer would give Iran everything it needs to develop a modern civil nuclear power programme, including legally guaranteed supplies of nuclear fuel.”  He regretted that Iran had ignored the offer. Iran’s failure to do what was required, as stated by IAEA, had left no other option but to seek further measures in the Council.

He said those measures strengthened restrictions on individuals and entities associated with Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and ballistic missile programme, increased vigilance over the activities of Iranian banks, introduced a provision for careful scrutiny of new commitments for export credits to Iran and encouraged States to inspect cargo to and from Iran.  By adopting the text, the Council had continued its “incremental and proportionate approach”.  His Government urged Iran’s leaders to suspend its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and cooperate fully with IAEA.  With the new resolution, the Council was reaffirming the clear choice confronting Iran’s leaders: to cooperate with the global community or pursue their nuclear programme in disregard of international concerns.  He hoped they would take the positive path.

JEAN-PIERRE LACROIX ( France) saluted the almost unanimous adoption of the resolution as a clear and firm message.  The Non-Proliferation Treaty had established a regime based on trust and confidence.   Iran had concealed an underground nuclear programme.  While enrichment was going on, Iran was working on techniques that could be used to develop nuclear weapons.  Iran was also actively developing long-range missiles.  Given that situation, the international community’s request to restore confidence was understandable.  Iran must suspend proliferation-sensitive activities and cooperate with IAEA.  That was not a matter of refusing Iran the right to develop nuclear energy.  The Director General had concluded that IAEA could not take a stand on the nature and scope of Iran’s nuclear programme.

He said there was no choice but to adopt sanctions against the country.  Describing the measures in the current resolution, he said the approach was not punitive.  The priority was to find a diplomatic solution.  The Council would suspend the measures as soon as Iran fully respected its obligations.   Iran had been offered a proposal for cooperation dealing with political, economic and nuclear cooperation, as a way of extending a hand to the Iranian people.  He hoped that proposal would be accepted.

ZALMAY KHALILZAD ( United States) said that, instead of suspending its enrichment and reprocessing activities, as required by the Council, Iran had chosen to dramatically expand its number of operating centrifuges and to develop and test a new generation of centrifuges.  It continued the construction of its heavy-water research reactor at Arak and it still had not implemented the Additional Protocol.  Once again, the Council had had no choice but to act.  “At stake is the security of a vital region of the world and the credibility of the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency as they seek to hold Iran to its nuclear non-proliferation commitments.”  The latest IAEA report had stated that Iran had not met its obligation to fully disclose its past nuclear weapons programme.

He said that, on the core issue of whether Iran’s nuclear programme was strictly peaceful, the report had not shown serious progress.  IAEA had presented Iran with documents detailing Iran’s efforts to develop a nuclear warhead and other possible undeclared activities with nuclear material.   Iran had dismissed those documents as “baseless and fabricated”.  IAEA, however, did not share that conclusion.  “Instead of slogans and obfuscations, the international community needs answers from Iran.”  The international community must be able to believe Iran’s declaration that its nuclear programme was for exclusively peaceful purposes.

Iranian leaders, as a first step, must cease enrichment and reprocessing activities and make a full disclosure of all of its weapons-related work, he said.  Iran had not fully implemented the Additional Protocol, which IAEA required in order to determine what other undeclared nuclear activities were taking place.  He asked, in that regard, why Iranian leaders were not fully implementing the additional safeguards and what it was hiding.  If Iran wanted the world to believe that its nuclear programme was peaceful, that programme must be transparent with IAEA inspectors and Iran must implement the Additional Protocol, as repeatedly called for by the Council and IAEA.

He said the United States recognized Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  The five permanent members of the Council and Germany had offered to help Iran develop civil nuclear power, and the Russian Federation had supplied fuel for Iran’s nuclear power plan in Bushehr.  That had exposed Iran’s false claim that it needed to enrich uranium for civil nuclear power.  Seventeen countries generating nuclear power purchased their fuel on the international market, rather than enrich uranium themselves.  Iran should follow the example of other States that had abandoned nuclear weapons programmes, two of them now sitting on the Council, namely South Africa and Libya.

The international community had good reason to be concerned about Iran’s activities, as the present regime armed with nuclear weapons would pose a greater potential danger to the region and to the world, he warned.  Iran had been funding and supporting terrorists and militants in Lebanon, the Palestinian Territory, Iraq and Afghanistan.  The President of Iran had embraced the objective of destroying a Member State of the United Nations.  The ministerial statement agreed to by the “P5+1” showed a commitment to a diplomatic solution.  “It gives us not pleasure, but regret, to have to pass another sanctions resolution.  But our vote today demonstrates that the Council will act when countries violate their international obligations.”  He hoped Iran would engage in constructive negotiations over the future of its nuclear programme.  Such negotiations, if successful, would have profound benefits for Iran and the Iranian people.

WANG GUANGYA ( China) said today’s resolution was the Security Council’s fourth on the Iranian nuclear issue since July 2006.  It reflected international concern at, and expectations of all parties regarding an early settlement through diplomatic negotiations of, the Iranian nuclear issue.  Developments vis-à-vis the Iranian issue had been mixed.  On one hand, the Director General’s latest report suggested that the Agency could verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran and had no concrete information about possible undeclared nuclear material and activities.   Iran had clarified such outstanding issues as uranium contamination and polonium experiments, and had provided information similar to that which it had provided previously, pursuant to the Additional Protocol.

He said his country welcomed the cooperation between Iran and IAEA, but the report had also stated that Iran had not suspended its enrichment activities, as required by Security Council resolutions, and it had started development of centrifuges.  As the impasse had not been broken, the international community was calling for more diplomatic efforts, and hoped that parties could bring the issue back on the track of settlement.

Against that backdrop, the Council’s resolution was not aimed at punishing Iran; rather urging its return to the negotiating table, he said. The sanctions were not targeted at the Iranian people, and would not affect Iran’s normal economic and financial activities with other countries. Indeed, the measures were reversible: if Iran complied with the Security Council and IAEA resolutions, the sanctions would be suspended or terminated.

He reiterated that sanctions could not resolve issues; they could only promote negotiations.  Indeed, the best approach was through diplomatic negotiating.  All parties should adopt a highly responsible attitude, and he further urged flexibility and sincerity in resuming talks.  Efforts to seek a solution should assure Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to address international nuclear non-proliferation concerns.   Iran should fully comply with IAEA and Security Council resolutions, as soon as possible.

Noting that the six Foreign Ministers had expressed their readiness to increase diplomatic efforts to vigorously facilitate the resumption of negotiations, he said China hoped that all would engage in closer contact on the basis of mutual respect, including for each others’ concerns, and increased mutual trust, and seek an approach that was acceptable to all.  His Government was ready to work with all parties to settle the Iranian nuclear issue.

JORGE URBINA ORTEGA ( Costa Rica) said he could not accept that the representative of Iran had stated that the Council had acted on the instigation of some countries.  There were still areas of non-compliance by Iran with Council resolutions.

The strategic approach to preventing proliferation was based on the willingness of States that lacked nuclear weapons not to acquire them, and the decision of the nuclear-weapon States to gradually reduce their arsenals, he said.  However, some countries that were not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had developed nuclear weapons programmes with total impunity.  Real progress in disarmament required that, not only horizontal proliferation had to be stopped, but also vertical proliferation, meaning that the continuous development of new technologies should also be halted.

He could not endorse the behaviour of some States that demanded that others comply with their obligations stemming from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, while disregarding some of their own responsibilities.  There was very little incentive for non-proliferation in an international environment in which there was feeble progress in disarmament and weak guarantees that the existing nuclear weapons would not be utilized.

There was a need for a transparent, sustainable and credible plan for multilateral nuclear disarmament and to create a virtuous circle where progress in disarmament and non-proliferation could mutually reinforce one another, he said.  His country respected the right of every State to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but considered that right to be contingent on the fulfilment of all international obligations on the matter.  The right to enrich uranium was a legitimate activity if its scope and objectives were subjected to complete international supervision through absolutely transparent processes.  “We believe this is still not the case of the Iranian nuclear programme, and for this reason, we are obligated to support the resolution that we are voting on today,” he said.

The situation in Gaza was a different matter, he said.  He expressed concern at the humanitarian situation in the region and had condemned attacks on Israel.  His country had also criticized non-action by the Council.

MICHEL KAFANDO ( Burkina Faso) said his country, since the start of consideration of the Iranian question, had registered its reservations about considering a resolution prior to the issuance of the IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear programme, as it recognized any country’s right to achieve nuclear energy for civilian purposes.  Burkina Faso had examined the IAEA report and noted the absence of full cooperation on the part of Iran, as well as the fact that IAEA could not determine the exact nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

He stressed that all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must fully disclose their information, and that view was further supported by the report’s description of uranium enrichment activities and the development of new centrifuges.  He had also noted the report’s statement on the refusal of Iran to implement the Additional Protocol.  For those reasons -- and to encourage Iran’s full cooperation with IAEA, notably by providing specific information on its nuclear programme -– Burkina Faso had voted in favour of the resolution.

The objective of the additional measures was not to choke Iran or to create prejudice; it was simply to encourage Iran’s cooperation with the Agency and the transparency of its programme, he explained.  He urged that dialogue continue to persuade Iran that it was in its interest to subscribe to the safeguards system.  In that spirit, he approved the statement made by the Foreign Ministers of the six countries, which expressed a desire for increased dialogue with Iran.  He was convinced that, only through negotiations would the Iranian issue be resolved.

JOHAN VERBEKE ( Belgium) said he had voted in favour of the resolution and welcomed its adoption by a large majority.  He regretted that Iran was still not in compliance with Council resolutions aimed at suspension of uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related projects.  The 22 February IAEA report had concluded that the Director General was not in a position to provide guarantees regarding non-declared material and the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.  The new resolution was part of a gradual approach aimed at urging Iranian authorities to adopt a more cooperative and transparent position.  The resolution also made clear that the path of good faith negotiations remained open to Iran.

ALFREDO SUESCUM ( Panama) said he regretted that, once again, sanctions had to be imposed on Iran.  The necessity of applying coercive measures reflected a failure of diplomacy on the part of all parties.  As a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran must adhere to restrictions related to development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, but had the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including enrichment.  That right, however, involved important obligations, including the open and transparent inspection by IAEA.

He said that, according to its last report, IAEA could not provide guarantees on the absence of non-declared materials and was still not in a position to determine the nature of the uranium-enrichment programme.  Until there was clarity on the current scope of the nuclear programme, Iran had not fully complied with its obligations.  Although the Council had required that Iran suspend enrichment activities, it had not done so, according to the IAEA report, and, therefore, was not complying with Council resolutions.  For those reasons, Panama had voted in favour of the resolution, but hoped that the situation could be solved promptly.

NEVEN JURICA ( Croatia) said his country, as an active member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA Board, attached importance to the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and fully shared the concerns of the wider international community.  Every State had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but it was also important to abide by international obligations.  While the report’s findings were satisfactory, they did not paint an overall positive picture, as they pointed to Iran’s avoidance of key questions.   Iran’s failure to provide a clear response left questions about the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

He noted that IAEA had also pointed to possible military dimensions to the programme and to provisions of resolution 1747 (2007) that had not been implemented.  Further, Iran had not suspended its enrichment-related activities.  In light of that, Croatia had voted in favour of the resolution.  Following that, his Government welcomed the commitment of the six Foreign Ministers to continue with all diplomatic efforts to resolve the issues.

Council President VITALY I. CHURKIN (Russian Federation), speaking in his national capacity, said his Government had supported the resolution and was pleased that the work of the six Foreign Ministers had brought the Council to a text that was balanced and met the tasks at hand.  Indeed, the resolution was a political signal to Iran on the need for cooperation, on the basis of implementing recommendations.  It was important for the six countries now to develop proposals for further talks, from which Iran and the region could benefit.  The Council recognized Iran’s rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Once confidence was restored, Iran would be treated in the same manner as any other Treaty party.

He said today’s decision, similar to those in resolutions 1747 (2007) and 1737 (2006), was taken under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter and called for no use of force whatsoever.  Effective solution of the problem could be found only in the political and diplomatic sphere.  His Government favoured a “fresh approach” and was prepared to facilitate talks to settle pending issues.  Hopefully, Iran would analyse today’s statements and choose to meet the requirements of both the Council and IAEA, and help to launch negotiations.  The six countries must also be willing to engage in constructive cooperation with Iran.

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For information media • not an official record