PRESS CONFERENCE BY Russian Federation

 

The Government of Georgia had made up the 6 August incident in which it had accused the Russian Federation of violating its airspace, Vitaly Churkin, the latter country’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, said today.

Responding to a correspondent’s questions at a Headquarters press conference this afternoon, Mr. Churkin said a March incident in which five helicopter gunships had reportedly fired rockets at two villages in Georgia’s Kadori valley was also made up.

“The version advanced by the Georgian side of the air incident on August 6, 2007, in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict looks at least controversial, while conclusions about a ‘Russian involvement’ appear unfounded,” he said in a brief statement before taking questions.  “The Georgian version of the August 6 incident began literally to fall apart when a group of experts from the Ministry of Defence of Russia, comprising leading Russian Air Force experts, were working in Georgia on 16-17 August.”

He said there were serious doubts as to the reliability of the printouts and the digital copy of the radar data provided by the Georgian side.  While those materials showed clear traces of “Russian intruder aircraft” crossing the border between the two countries, they lacked a number of other objects that had been in the same airspace, according to Russian information that had been provided to Georgian experts.  Additionally, Georgian radar had failed to reflect the manoeuvres of unidentified aircraft in the vicinity of Tsitelubani village, as reported by eyewitnesses.

The Georgian version of an emergency launch of a KH-58 missile from a Russian SU-24 aircraft near Tsitelubani contained a number of inconsistencies, he said.  Using a GPS navigator, Russian experts took the geographical coordinates of the hole and determined that, given the position of the missile shown in images provided by the Georgian side, it was to follow the course of 330 NW.  If so, it could not be physically launched or dropped from an aircraft following the course suggested by the Georgian side for the intruder aircraft.  It was known that the charge did not detonate.  The missile’s design and the technical procedure of its launch from an SU-24 were such that, if its engine had been started, as per the information provided by the Georgian side, it could not have failed to detonate.  A failure to explode could only occur in the event of an emergency drop and non-ignition of the engine.  There was no third option, as the Georgian experts had admitted after a thorough explanation by their Russian counterparts.

Furthermore, he continued, if the missile had been operating normally, it could not penetrate the soil at nearly full length without damage, as the Georgian side claimed.  The plastic cover of the warhead was to have been destroyed on impact against the ground.  Only the heavier fragments of the body could remain in the hole, such as engine parts or those of the warhead.

He said the situation was different if the missile had been used in an undue fashion, for example, launched or just dropped from a SU-25 aircraft, which was in service at the Georgian Air Force.  Technically, it was quite possible after some alteration of the aircraft’s weapon hanger system or the missile itself.  Notably, during consultations Russian experts heard from one of the Georgian military men that the unidentified aircraft appeared to have ejected heat flares while manoeuvring.  Unlike SU-25 aircraft, SU-24s are not equipped with devices that create decoy targets.

However, he added it was impossible to check the version related to these facts as Russian experts were not allowed to inspect Georgian SU-25s.

What the Georgian side showed to the Russian experts as the remaining parts of the unexploded Russia KH-58 missile, was, in fact, a group of separate fragments, of which only three could belong to aerial munitions of that class, and namely section 4 and two rudders out of four.  There was nothing else to prove that it was a KH-58 missile.  The other fragments belonged to different kinds of air weapons; the marking on some of them shows that directly.

Over two thirds of the parts and skin of the alleged missile were missing, he said.  The Georgian side gave no explanation why there were no fragments of two rudders out of four.  As to the central section with the wings, the engine and the warhead, which carried the missile’s serial number and year of manufacture, the Georgian side claimed that it was entirely destroyed immediately upon excavation from the ground.

The question arises, what was the reason for such a hasty destruction of that fundamental evidence? he asked.

The material of the fragments that were presented by the Georgian side as the remains of the missile’s wings have nothing in common with titanium, of which alloys the wings of the high-speed KH-58 were made.

Noting that the remains of the missile included a small unit bearing markings in English, he said such a part could not possibly have been installed in a Soviet or Russian missile, as the use of foreign-manufactured components was banned.  “The Georgian side very quickly destroyed the only part of the missile that carried its number and date of manufacture, and now offers only photographs.”

He recalled that several air force regiments had been based in Georgia during the Soviet era and the KH-58 had been available to two of them.  Some 100 such missiles had been stored in warehouses near their airfields and 1,000, among other weapons, in a central warehouse.  They had remained in Georgian territory until December 1992.  “On the whole, information and facts gathered by the Russian experts during their work in Georgia on 16-17 August and the behaviour of our Georgian colleagues make it possible to state with full confidence that the incident of August 6 was a deliberate provocation organized and carried out by those in Georgia who are interested in aggravating the situation.”

Asked what had triggered Russia’s unprecedented participation in the investigation and whether the country still opposed international probe, Mr. Churkin replied that it was difficult to understand what kind of investigation could be conducted when so many elements had been destroyed and the hole covered for incomprehensible reasons.  The Georgian side had said they saw no prospects for a bilateral investigation.

In response to another query as to his most optimistic and pessimistic view of Russian-Georgian relations, he said it was frequently heard that Georgia wished to continue dialogue on the breakaway Abkhazia and Ossetia regions; yet, its other line was to discredit Russia, while trying to work towards a resolution without its participation.

Asked about proposals to seek a resolution through the General Assembly or the Security Council, he pointed out that the Secretariat had said there was no independent evidence, so there was no prospect for going the Security Council route.

Responding to another question, Mr. Churkin acknowledged that some Security Council members had been quick to side with Georgia, but others had said the way to deal with the matter was through bilateral consultations.

As for a theory that the incident had been a mistake, resulting from a military exercise at Astrakhan, the Permanent Representative said Astrakhan was some way off and the evidence did not support that theory.  Moreover, if Russian aircraft had wanted to attack Georgian radar they would not have to cross the border.  Politically, the Russian Federation had nothing to gain, whereas the Georgian claim was in line with the recent pattern of behaviour by political elements trying to aggravate tensions over the Russian mediation and peacekeeping role in Abkhazia and Ossetia.

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For information media • not an official record