HEADQUARTERS PRESS BRIEFING BY LEGAL COUNSEL FOR UNITED NATIONS

Press Briefing

HEADQUARTERS PRESS BRIEFING BY LEGAL COUNSEL FOR UNITED NATIONS

The Legal Counsel for the United Nations, Hans Corell, fielded questions from correspondents at a Headquarters press conference this afternoon on the release today of a letter from Secretary-General Kofi Annan addressed to Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi.

[The letter, which was dated 17 February 1999, contained clarification in relation to the trial of the two Libyan suspects for the bombing of the civilian airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. The defence team for the two Libyan suspects requested authorities in the United Kingdom to release the Secretary- General's letter to the Libyan leader. On Tuesday of this week, the Secretary- General sent a copy of the requested letter to the United Kingdom Ambassador, Sir Jeremy Greenstock. Today, both the United Kingdom and the United States Governments made the letter public, along with the Secretary-General's cover letter to Sir Jeremy.]

On the issue of the understanding with Libya, in the third paragraph of the letter, how essential was the sentence "the two persons would not be used to undermine the Libyan regime" to the eventual deal that brought about the delivery of the men? Could the deal have been made without that sentence? a correspondent asked. To answer that question, Mr. Corell said that it was important to provide a background to the exercise.

The Secretary-General's role was to assist in transferring the two Libyans from Tripoli directly to the Netherlands, he said. When the Secretary-General had started the process, it appeared that there had been many questions for which the Libyans wanted clarification. The exercise developed, therefore, into an exchange of information between the Libyans and the delegations of the other countries involved, namely the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands and France.

The role of the Secretary-General, Mr. Corell continued, was not to get involved in the arrangements for the trial. His role was to create confidence in a situation in which there had been concerns on both sides. The Libyan delegation had been concerned about a number of things. Some of the issues had been addressed in the annex to the Secretary-General's letter to Colonel Qadhafi. But, as it appeared from the letter, that information had been elaborated by the governments involved. The Secretary-General's only role was to convey the message to the Libyan authorities. The Secretary-General was not involved, in any way, in the formulation of the messages that came from the capitals.

How essential had it been to be able to assure the Libyan Government of the understanding that they would not be affected by the trial? a correspondent asked. Mr. Corell said that he did not know. That was not the United Nations role. The annex dealt with the protection of the two suspects, and how they would be treated. "These were genuine concerns. I sensed when I started my contacts with the Libyan delegation that they had many questions, and they were pertinent questions, and they were taken very seriously in the other capitals. The exchange of information was very precise and formal. To get into the contents of that information, that was not the role of the Secretary-General or me", he explained.

Corell Briefing - 2 - 25 August 2000

Responding to the question addressed to Mr. Corell, the Secretary-General's Spokesman, Fred Eckhard, said that he had stated on the record more than once that the intent was not to interfere at all with the legal process. The same paragraph also said that "there will be no deviation from Scottish law", he said. "The idea is that this trial would go wherever the evidence led it." The sentence about "undermining" must be seen in the context of the paragraph as a whole.

Had there been concern at the time that the letter and annex were drafted that it would be a troublesome sentence? a correspondent asked. Mr. Corell said that he did not know. It was information that had been conveyed to the Secretary- General and his role was to forward it to the Libyan authorities. It was also important to recognize the Secretary-General's concern that his correspondence with the leaders of Member States not be disclosed.

The governments involved -- if they had had the letter -- had not released it, out of respect for the Secretary-General's prerogative to communicate it. The turning point was, however, that the defence team had approached the British authorities and had asked for the release of the letter. That was a completely different matter. It was a unique case in many respects. "At the end of the line, it's not a political process, there is a legal process -- proceedings before the criminal court", he said.

Mr. Corell went on to say that when the Secretary-General received the request, he examined it, and in light of the Security Council's request for cooperation with the tribunal, which applied to the Secretary-General himself, he decided to release the letter.

Had the letter been subpoenaed or was it simply a request by the defence team? a correspondent asked. Mr. Corell said that, as he had been informed, it was a request from the defence team to the British authorities. In the Secretary- General's letter to Sir Jeremy, there was a reference to a letter dated April 2000. He did not know what course the request had taken with the British authorities. On 24 July, Sir Jeremy and Richard Holbrooke had come to see the Secretary-General. Mr. Corell was not in New York at the time. The first opportunity Mr. Corell had to meet the Secretary-General was on 21 August. It was correct to say that it was for the Secretary-General to release the letter, which he did, both to Sir Jeremy and Mr. Holbrooke, after he had received the request.

"There are two steps", Mr. Eckhard added. "Releasing it to the governments was one, going public with it, which is what happened today at noon, was the other".

In response to a question about the timing of the release of the letter, Mr. Corell said that it was a question that must be put to the governments involved. The Secretary-General sent his letter to Sir Jeremy on 22 August. There had been many concerns. Maybe they had wanted to inform family members first. He would not wish to speculate. It was very clear, however, that the Secretary-General released the letter to Sir Jeremy, with his covering letter. Mr. Corell had been asked to give the letter simultaneously to Mr. Holbrooke. "Then the matter was in their capitals", he said.

Asked to clarify the sentence in the annex that the two persons would not be used to "undermine the Libyan regime", Mr. Corell said that it was not up to him to explain the sentence. It was information given by the countries involved to the Libyan authorities. The role of the Secretary-General was to convey information. "That is very clear from the letter", he said. The Secretary- General's only task was to transfer the two Libyans from Libya to the Netherlands. It developed into "conveying of information" because of the concerns that were raised, in particular from the Libyan side.

Was it an understanding between the United Nations and Libya or the governments and Libya? a correspondent asked. "If you read the letter carefully you will see that it is information that is conveyed by the Secretary-General. It's not an understanding by the United Nations", he said. The role of the Secretary-General was to convey information.

Who were the parties involved in the understanding? a correspondent asked. Mr. Corell then cited a paragraph of the Secretary-General's letter dated 17 February 1999 to Colonel Qadhafi: "In pursuance of the understanding reached with the envoys, I attach a document setting forth the relevant details thereof. After reviewing this document, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States have confirmed to me that they share the understanding reflected therein. It is now my intention to report this understanding to the Security Council." Mr. Corell said that that had not been done because other things had come up.

Mr. Corell went on to read from the letter: "I have received the outcome of your recent meetings with the envoys dispatched by the leaders of Saudi Arabia and South Africa. In particular, I was very pleased to learn from President Mandela himself about Your Excellency's letter to him dated 9 February 1999 confirming the understanding reached on outstanding issues. In pursuance of the understanding reached with the envoys, I attach a document setting forth the relevant details thereof."

The implication of the 17 February letter was that the understanding was originally reached between the United Nations and the envoys of Saudi Arabia and South Africa, a corespondent said. "Where does it say that?" Mr. Corell responded.

Who reached the understanding with the envoys? a correspondent asked. "These were envoys, as it appears from the letter, by Saudi Arabia and South Africa", Mr. Corell said.

Were they envoys to the United Nations? a correspondent asked. "No, not at all. There were many involved in this matter. One of my tasks was to keep the whole matter on a straight course", Mr. Corell said.

Was it correct, a correspondent asked, to assume that the Secretary-General was involved in negotiating the text and that he assisted in helping everyone reach agreement? If that was the case, how essential was the sentence stating that the "two persons would not be used to undermine the Libyan regime"?. Mr. Corell said that the Secretary-General was not involved in negotiating the text at all. "One thing was important, it was to create confidence", he said. When Mr. Corell started discussions with the Libyan delegation in late September and early October 1998, that had been the main issue.

"It was the understanding among all delegations that the information would have to be channeled through the United Nations", Mr. Corell continued. He had been the person in charge of the team that dealt with all the delegations. There had been the question of creating the necessary trust that the Libyans would take the step to agree to let the two suspects appear in the Netherlands. In the course of this activity, many messages had been conveyed. There had been many

pertinent details, which the Libyans wanted to clarify. The concerns of the delegations had also been taken very seriously.

Mr. Corell's team, which eventually performed the transfer, was on standby by mid-November in 1988, he said. He had been prepared to receive a phone call to act at any time. There were remaining concerns, however, and many persons had been involved, including representatives of Saudi Arabia and South Africa. The Secretary-General had no control over that. Mr. Corell was the only person to represent the Secretary-General. When clarification was sought on the issues mentioned in the annex to the letter, it was then formulated. The annex was drafted in Mr. Corell's office on the basis of information received from the delegations involved. This was why the sentence that "the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States have confirmed to me that they share the understanding reflected therein" was included in the Secretary-General's 17 February letter. "The Secretary-General wouldn't dream of sending off this information on his own; it was received from the envoys who had been involved", he said. The Secretary-General had not been involved in any way in negotiating any deal.

Would the deal have been made without the phrase? a correspondent asked. Mr. Corell said that it was a hypothetical question that he could not answer. He would have to put the question to the Scottish prosecutor.

What did the phrase "to undermine the Libyan regime" actually mean? a correspondent asked. "This language has been provided to us", Mr. Corell said. The paragraph basically dealt with the protection of the two suspects. The whole annex dealt with the protection of the two persons. They were concerned that they should be transferred to the court and not somewhere else. There had been many concerns. It was important for the Secretary-General to act as a channel to convey the information from the other governments to the Libyans that the regime for the trial was a very serious regime.

Who had originated the language of that phrase? a correspondent asked. Mr. Corell said that he would refer to the Secretary-General's letter, where it was said that the two delegations concerned -- the United Kingdom and the United States -- had reviewed it, and that it was based on information given.

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